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Abstract 
 
Guy Debord (1931-1994) was the director of the International situationniste journal and de facto 
leader of the group of artists, writers, filmmakers and political agitators who went by the same 
name.  This thesis will consider his many articles, signed and unsigned, that he contributed to the 
journal alongside his films and the theoretical work for which he is best known, La Société du 
spectacle (1967) in order to analyse and critique his written, filmic and organisational contribution 
to the group.  The notion of ‘Situationism’, one Debord and the Situationists disdained, will be 
examined in the course of an assessment of the Situationists’ enduring relevance to contemporary 
debates in thought and politics as well as to the theory and practice of protest.  In resistance to 
attempts to cast the Situationists as Romantic idealists who founded their critique of society upon a 
notion of unalienated human nature in need of freeing from the fetters of a capitalistic spectacle, it 
will be argued that the Situationists presented a radical rejection of such notions in elaborating 
their own conception of the capacities for egalitarian political subjectivation.      
The first chapter deals with the formative influence of Marx and Marxism on Debord’s La Société 
du spectacle and Situationist theory more generally.  The second chapter examines the Situationist 
concept of détournement, the diversion or hijacking of pre-existing cultural elements in new 
works, with particular reference to Debord’s films.  A third chapter presents a particular 
conception of ethics which emerges from both the writings and the organisational practice of the 
Situationist International before a final chapter assessing the Situationists’ pertinence to twenty-
first century emancipatory politics.   
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Introduction 
 
 
The term ‘Situationism’ is one Guy Debord and the Situationist International disdained in resistance 
to their work being read as a static theoretical dogma.  In a series of dictionary-style definitions in the 
first issue of the Internationale situationniste journal, published in 1957, the entry for 
‘Situationnisme’ ran as follows: 
Vocable privé de sens, abusivement forgé par dérivation du terme précédent [‘situationniste’]. 
Il n’y a pas de situationnisme, ce qui signifierait une doctrine d’interprétation des faits 
existants.  La notion de situationnisme est évidemment conçue par les anti-situationnistes.1 
A professed hatred of all such ideological ‘-isms’, those which sought to provide a theoretical basis 
for and justification of practical action, lasted throughout the lifetime of the group but the scope of 
what was considered ‘anti-Situationist’ remained less consistent.  After the group’s fifth conference, 
in Gothenburg, in 1962, it was declared that all works of art produced by the Situationists would 
themselves be ‘anti-Situationist’; that is, such works produced in the context of the art market, given 
their location within a capitalist mode of production, could not be considered as ‘Situationist’.  The 
eponymous term itself derives from the notion of the ‘situation construite’, the first of the entries in 
their series of parodic dictionary definitions, given as ‘Moment de la vie, concrètement et 
délibérément construit par l’organisation collective d’une ambiance unitaire et d’un jeu 
d’événements.’2  The very concept that would give the group its name, however, would in fact largely 
disappear from their writings after ’62, as such a quasi-utopian idea of complete freedom from the 
fetters of capitalist conditioning became inconsistent with the totalising theory of spectacle, elaborated 
during the course of the ‘60s and eventually given its fullest articulation in Debord’s La Société du 
spectacle (1967).  It is this book, and the theory it put forth, which are most associated with the 
Situationist International today.  In what follows, I will attempt to show how and why an impulse to 
                                                          
1 Authorship unattributed, ‘Définitions’, Internationale situationniste, 1 (1957), 13-14 (p.13).  
2  Ibid. 
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redefinition and revaluation of foundational theoretical concepts animated the work of Debord and the 
Situationists.   
The motivation behind this impulse, as well as the rejection of the term ‘Situationism’, lies in 
the resistance to what they called ‘récupération’, rendering dangerous ideas amenable to the 
cataloguing and commodifying imperatives of capitalism, neutralising their negative, disruptive 
potential.  The sardonic connotations of healing and recovery allude to the dominance of the 
spectacle: that anything purporting to resist must eventually be subject to reconciliation with the 
forces of power.  In the very first article of the Situationists’ journal, ‘L’amère victoire du 
surréalisme’, reference is made to how the surrealist legacy has come to be ‘recouvert et utilisé par le 
monde répressif que les surréalistes avaient combattu.’3  In the context of the French state’s recent 
canonisation of Debord — in 2009, the Bibliothèque nationale de France purchased his archive for 
over €1m, as Nicolas Sarkozy’s then Minister for Culture, Christine Albanel, declared his work a 
‘trésor national’4— in addition to the concerted academic interest Debord has been subject to, 
particularly since his death in 1994 (the Situationists frequently paraded their contempt for the 
university), the recuperation of the Situationists seems near complete.  Nevertheless, by revisiting the 
writings and films of Debord alongside the journal he directed, it is my intention to critically reassess 
the enduring pertinence of Situationist theory and practice to twenty-first century modes of resistance 
and emancipation.   
In undertaking this task, it is helpful to reconsider the notion of Situationism in its 
contemporary context.  While much of the existing literature loyally eschews the term in deference to 
the Situationists’ cogent repudiation of it, given the repeated insistence that theirs was a project bound 
                                                          
3 Authorship unattributed, ‘Amère victoire du surréalisme’, Internationale situationniste, 1 (1958), 3-4 (p.3). 
This title has been ‘détourned’ more than once in the critical writing on the Situationists.  See Gianfranco 
Marelli, L’Amère victoire du situationnisme: pour une histoire critique de l’Internationale situationniste (1957-
1972) (Cabris: Éditions Sulliver, 1998) and Peter Wollen, ‘Bitter Victory: The Art and Politics of the 
Situationist International’, in On the Passage of a few people through a rather brief moment in time: The 
Situationist International 1957-1972, ed. by Elisabeth Sussman (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991), pp.20-
61.  
4 Alain Beuve-Méry, ‘Deux cents personnes dînent ensemble pour garder en France l’œuvre de Debord’, Le 
Monde, 13 June 2009 <http://www.lemonde.fr/culture/article/2009/06/13/deux-cents-personnes-dinent-
ensemble-pour-garder-en-france-l-oeuvre-de-debord_1206504_3246.html> [Accessed 11 May 2016]. 
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to a particular historical era,5 it is worth employing not only for the heuristic purposes of referring to a 
particular group’s activity during such a particular historical conjuncture, but in the critical endeavour 
of discerning what we might do well to leave behind of the Situationists’ theory, practice and 
organisation.    
The characterisation of Guy Debord as something of a poète maudit is a familiar trope in his 
popular reception and consistent with his entry into the pantheon of French literary greats.  Philippe 
Sollers, one of the founders of the literary avant-garde journal Tel Quel in 1960, has championed this 
conception of Debord in his writings: ‘C’est parce qu’il était un grand poète métaphysique d’un enfer 
social sans poètes que Debord reste, aujourd’hui même, révolutionnaire.’6  This conception of Debord 
views Debord primarily as a great ‘stylist’ of the French language, and privileges his more 
melancholic post-Situationist work, as well as his eventual suicide, in establishing a mythology of a 
tragic hero.  Vincent Kaufmann’s biography of Debord, Guy Debord ou la révolution au service de la 
poésie,7 follows this portrayal in emphasising Debord’s ‘singularité’, and the cult of personality that 
Debord cultivated around himself.  For Kaufmann, whose work’s title succinctly establishes the 
relationship between politics and writing he understands from Debord’s work, Debord’s early film, 
Hurlement en faveur de Sade (1952) — made during his time in the company of Romanian poet 
Isodore Isou’s Lettrists, which consisted only of a blank screen alternating black and white with an 
accompanying soundtrack — is emblematic of the Debord oeuvre.  This provocation is taken by 
Kaufmann as a guiding thread, though in Chapter Two we will see that there is evidence to suggest 
that Debord viewed his first film as a mere prank, and barely conceived of it as a ‘work’ at all.  A 
tactic of self-mythologisation and the rhetorical use of heroic figurations are certainly an important 
component of Debord’s films and Situationist writings generally but this tendency to assert Debord’s 
pre-eminence as a writer and stylist fails to acknowledge how such rhetorical bombast, during the 
                                                          
5 Numerous instances of such assertions will be cited in what follows, particularly in association with Debord’s 
Hegelianism and the concept of time and history at play in the Situationists’ work.  To give one example: ‘Cela 
vaut-il la peine de le redire? Il n’y a pas de “situationnisme”.  Je ne suis moi-même situationniste que du fait de 
ma participation, en ce moment et dans certaines conditions, à une communauté pratiquement groupée en vue 
d’une tâche, qu’elle saura ou ne saura pas faire.’ Guy Debord, ‘A Propos de quelques erreurs d’interprétation’, 
Internationale situationniste, 4 (1960), 30-33 (p.33).  
6 Philippe Sollers, Eloge de l’infini (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), p.571.  
7 Vincent Kaufmann, Guy Debord ou la révolution au service de la poésie (Paris: Fayard, 2001). 
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course of what they were not shy of referring to as ‘propaganda’, served their self-consciously 
political project of the transformation of everyday life.8     
Conversely, rather than fetishising Debord as a heroic figure at the centre of the S.I., there is a 
prizing of the extra-institutional location from which Situationist theory emerged, independent of 
academia and of conventional relations with publishing houses.  The ‘totale’ in Eric Brun’s Les 
Situationnistes: une avant-garde totale (2014), references this resistance to parcellisation; in 
employing Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of field and demonstrating the extent to which the Situationists 
sought to refuse standard modes of ideological formation, Brun subsumes their activity under a quasi-
scientific sociological rubric.  A similar manoeuvre occurs in much of the art historical criticism of 
the S.I., of which Fabien Danesi’s Le Myth brisé de l’International situationniste: l’aventure d’une 
avant-garde au cœur de la culture de masse (2008) is a prime example.  The emphasis placed here on 
the S.I. as an artistic avant-garde who sought to translate their aesthetic activity into the realm of 
society and politics, despite the frequent assertion throughout the S.I.’s writings that such discrete 
compartmentalisation of aesthetics and politics mirrors only the commodity form of capital.  This art-
historical reading of the S.I. unsurprisingly privileges the early Situationist activity before the ‘artists’ 
split’ in 1962, and the concepts developed in this period, particularly to do with the urban 
environment, psychogéographie, urbanisme unitaire and the dérive, as a means of demonstrating the 
practical application of aesthetic theory.9 
In an altogether different reading of the what he calls ‘Le Mouvement situationniste’,10 
Patrick Marcolini’s ‘histoire intellectuelle’ is a considerable work of scholarship not only on the 
                                                          
8 To give one example here, Ivan Chetcheglov writes in the first issue of I.S., ‘Un revirement complet de l’esprit 
est devenu indispensable, par la mise en lumière de désirs oubliés et la création de désirs entièrement nouveaux.  
Et par une propagande intensive en faveur de ces désirs.’  Ivan Chetcheglov (Printed under the pseudonym 
Gilles Ivain), ‘Formulaire pour un urbanisme nouveau’, Internationale situationniste, 1 (1957) 15-20 (p.18).  
Italics in original.  This conception of their work as serving a propagandist function will be examined in Chapter 
Two.  
9 The above cited On the Passage…, ed. by Elisabeth Sussman accompanied the exhibition of the same name 
which took place in the Pompidou Centre in Paris and the Institute for Contemporary Art in London and Boston 
between February 1989 and January 1990.  Other examples of this include: ed. Tom McDonough, Guy Debord 
and the Situationist International: Texts and Documents (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).  Simon Ford, The 
Situationist International: A User’s Guide (London: Black Dog, 2005).  Simon Sadler, The Situationist City 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).  Mikkel Bolt Rasmussen, ‘The Situationist International, Surrealism and 
the Difficult Fusion of Art and Politics’, Oxford Art Journal, 27.3 (2004), 367-87. 
10 Patrick Marcolini, Le Mouvement Situationniste: une histoire intellectuelle (Paris: L’Echappée, 2013).    
5 
 
diversity and breadth of the S.I. but on the ‘trajectories’ of their theory after the dissolution in 1972, 
tracing their influence on a diverse range of political movements.  Marcolini’s ultimate criticsm of the 
‘movement’ rests on what he sees as their unquestioning reproduction of the progressivist spirit of the 
trente glorieuses underlying their technological optimism.  This alleged progressivism is for 
Marcolini what accounts for Situationist theory’s compatibility with capitalist recuperation.  
Marcolini subsequently goes as far as to advance a ‘conservatisme révolutionnaire’, which he 
describes as an ‘activité de discrimination’ involving a ‘revolutionary choice’ between which 
elements of the ‘être social’ merit conservation.11  He markedly distinguishes his approach from what 
has been called ‘accelerationist’ theories in Anglophone theory, and its Francophone analogue, 
‘communisation’.12  This attempt at a politically generative rhetorical manoeuvre in a time where neo-
liberal capital has itself become ‘revolutionary’13 seems, however, to curtail, rather than energise, the 
experimentation or elaboration of emancipatory activity in the here and now.    
Whilst Marcolini’s conservatisme révolutionnaire is not quite espousing the return to a pre-
spectacular, unalienated state of human social organisation, his final argument is reminiscent of what 
Jean-Luc Nancy has described as the Romanticism borne of the ‘metaphysical assumptions’ of 
Situationist theory.  For Nancy, Situationist critique remains tributary to a Romantic conception of 
genius and therefore opposes the false reality of the spectacle by positing an underlying authentic 
reality.14  This is a similar view to the one Jacques Rancière outlines in Le Spectateur émancipé, 
where he describes Debord’s theory of spectacle as holding ‘la vision romantique de vérité comme 
non-séparation.’15  Both understand this as remaining within the Platonist tradition, betraying their 
subordination of Situationist theory to Debord’s theory of spectacle (explicitly in Nancy’s case, who 
describes ‘la critique situationniste’ as ‘la dernière ressource critique dans un monde sans critique’).16  
In this estimation, the theory of spectacle is a technologically updated version of Plato’s allegory of 
                                                          
11 Ibid., p.330. 
12 See Communisation and its Discontents: Contestation, Critique and Contemporary Struggles, ed. by 
Benjamin Noys (New York: Minor Compositions, 2011) and Benjamin Noys, Malign Velocities: 
Accelerationism and Capitalism (Alresford: Zero Books, 2014).   
13 Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neo-liberalism’s Stealth Revolution (New York: Zone Books, 2015). 
14 Jean-Luc Nancy, Être Singulier pluriel (Paris: Galilée, 1996), p.70. 
15 Jacques Rancière, Le Spectateur émancipé (Paris: La Fabrique, 2008), p.12.  
16 Nancy, p.70. 
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the cave.  This understanding of the theory of spectacle limits Debord to an analysis of the image 
form, a reading which is complicated by reading the I.S. journal in concert with La Société du 
spectacle, which, as I will endeavour to demonstrate, distances Situationist theory from such 
humanistic readings.17   
It is this kind of interpretation which has led to the Situationists being understood as capital’s 
avant-garde, a critical manoeuvre reminiscent of the historicisation of May ’68: both oppositional 
currents forged a breach in the status quo which permitted the course of subsequent capitalist 
development incorporating the discontents of protesters.18  Henri Lefebvre, a one-time collaborator 
with Debord before an acrimonious parting, described Situationism as ‘a dogmatism without a 
dogma’,19 whether knowingly or not, precisely echoing the terms in which Debord describes the 
spectacle: ‘Le spectacle est absolument dogmatique et en même temps ne peut aboutir réellement à 
aucun dogme solide.’20  This thesis will also seek to show how what I argue is a rhetorical recourse to 
notions which invite this humanistic reading is constitutive of the seductive, mythologising and 
propagandistic side of their work.   
Anselm Jappe’s intellectual biography of Debord is widely considered to be one of the better 
books on his thought.  Jappe discards the humanistic reading of Debord in favour of placing the 
emphasis upon his Hegelian Marxism.  Jappe’s analysis of how Debord departs from the labour 
theory of value, against ‘workerist’ currents of Marxism and posits a notion of history and community 
as essence of man.21  This latter notion Jappe associates with the enduring notion of ‘subject-object 
                                                          
17 This is perhaps the most common misapprehension of Situationist theory.  For a concerted reading of Debord 
in this vein, which casts the theory of spectacle as derivative of ‘liberal individualism’, see Richard Kaplan, 
‘Between Mass Society and Revolutionary Praxis: The Contradictions of Guy Debord’s Society of the 
Spectacle’, European Journal of Cultural Studies, 15.4 (2012), 457-78.  
18 This notion will be explored in Chapter Four.  For an excellent account and critique of this tendency, see 
Kristin Ross, May ’68 and its Afterlives (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).  
19 Kristin Ross, Interview: ‘Henri Lefebvre on the Situationist International’, October, 79 (1997), 69-83 (p.76). 
20 Guy Debord, La Société du spectacle (Paris: Buchet/Chastel, 1967), Thesis 71.  As this book is referred to 
frequently throughout the thesis, subsequent quotations will be followed by the numbered thesis in parentheses 
in the main body of the text. 
21 Debord’s Hegelianism, and particularly the importance of Debord’s conceptualisation of time and history are 
the focus of Tom Bunyard’s unpublished PhD thesis and subsequent article based on this research: see Tom 
Bunyard, ‘A Genealogy and Critique of Guy Debord’s Theory of Spectacle’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, 
Centre for Cultural Studies, Goldsmiths, University of London, 2011) and Tom Bunyard, ‘“History is the 
Spectre Haunting Modern Society”: Temporality and Praxis in Guy Debord’s Hegelian Marxism’, Parrhesia, 20 
(2014), 62-86.  
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identity’ which he identifies in Debord’s theory.  This Hegelian recasting of the humanistic reading is 
indicative of Jappe’s allegiance to Debord’s theory, whereas I contend that Situationist theory as a 
whole resists this epistemological foundationalism and subordinates purely theoretical exposition to a 
rhetorical ‘prise de position’.  Despite the avowedly propagandistic nature of this rhetorical bombast, I 
argue that the Situationists do not reproduce the hierarchical distinction between activity and passivity 
in their theoretical writings, but that the organisational practice of excommunication and denunciation 
betrays a conception of politics and ‘the political’ which goes against their stated desire to reproduce 
none of the workings of what they call ‘le pouvoir hierarchisé’22 in their everyday activity.   
Where Jappe is scornful of linking the Situationists’ work to postmodernism,23 Sadie Plant 
has sought to recover the ‘dangerous’ aspects of Situationist thought from the politically agnostic 
work of Jean-Baudrillard and Jean-Francois Lyotard.24  Plant’s stated intent is to demonstrate the 
relevance of Situationist thought to the contemporary moment, by arguing that: ‘Against doubtful 
poststructuralist and uncompromisingly negative postmodern responses to this question, the 
Situationists have left a legacy of assertive confidence in the possibility of the collective construction 
not only of a playful discourse but impassioned forms of living too.’25  There is perhaps a flavour of 
the humanistic reading of the S.I. in what amounts to Plant’s ethical distinction between 
postmodernism and the Situationists.26  Rather, I will attempt to show that it is the uncompromising 
negativity of the Situationists’ theory and rhetoric which offers readers the possibility of resisting the 
modes of normalisation and subjection which constitute Debord’s spectacle.  Plant also states that, ‘It 
                                                          
22 Raoul Vaneigem, ‘Banalités de base’, Internationale situationniste, 7 (1962), 32-41 (p.41).  
23 Anselm Jappe, Guy Debord, trans. by Donald Nicholson-Smith (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1999), p.72 and pp.163-66.  
24 Sadie Plant, The Most Radical Gesture: The Situationist International in the Postmodern Age (London: 
Routledge, 1992).  Plotting a similar course (though through a prolonged engagement with Baudrillard only), 
Richard Gilman-Opalsky has attempted a similar task almost twenty years later.  See Richard Gilman-Opalsky, 
Spectacular Capitalism: Guy Debord and the Practice of Radical Philosophy (New York: Minor Compositions, 
2011).  
25 Plant, p.187 
26 As Gilman-Opalsky puts it: ‘Baudrillard repudiates Debord for one of the main reasons I centralize the 
importance of his work — because Debord advances a critical theory of high-tech postindustrial capitalism 
without abandoning normative theory and praxis’ (p.27).  I would question whether Debord’s theory can be said 
to directly deal with ‘high-tech postindustrial capitalism’.  In Chapters One (in association with the theory of 
spectacle) and Four (in association with contemporary theories of work, debt and the university), I will attempt 
to analyse how Debord’s theory might well be updated and extended to this present conjuncture.   
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was the Situationists’ identification of an antagonism at the heart of society ― a central principle of 
dualism, separation, mediation or alienation ― which enabled them to posit an unproblematised 
unified social experience as the goal of revolutionary practice.’27  I will argue that this antagonism is 
not necessarily identified theoretically, but consists of a rhetorical tactic which alludes on the one 
hand to the inducement to revolt and resist and on the other, to a problematic understanding of 
politics.  This will be explored in Chapters Three and Four.  
Most recently, McKenzie Wark has written widely on the legacy of the S.I.  Having written 
two books he describes as ‘détournements’ (this is the most important of the Situationists’ theoretical 
notions and will be encountered throughout the thesis, though most concertedly in Chapter Two) of 
Debord’s La Société du spectacle and Raoul Vaneigem’s Traité de savoir-vivre à l’usage des jeunes 
générations,28 he has published two studies of the S.I.  In both, he has sought to de-centre the history 
of the S.I. from Debord, Paris, and the period between 1962 and 1972, what Debord called the second 
and third phases of Situationist activity.29  Whilst Wark’s endeavour to shed light on the contribution 
of women, the S.I.’s North African contingent and the activity of figures who have garnered only 
peripheral attention in the history of the S.I. is a valuable one, I have chosen precisely the opposite 
method.  In this study, I have chosen to concentrate on the period of activity of the Situationist 
International, 1957-1972, with some leeway either side to account for the theoretical concepts 
elaborated in the pre-Situationist Lettrist and Lettrist International groupings which would come to 
play an important role in Situationist theory during the 60s and to consider Debord’s later filmic work, 
which I consider to be the most interesting examples of Situationist détournement.  This thesis will 
centre on Debord and the S.I.’s French section, with the hope of not further embroidering the myth of 
Guy Debord as master and tragic Situationist hero but to examine that myth, as well as how and why 
                                                          
27 Plant, p.131.   
28 See Sam Cooper, ‘The Unreturnable Situationist International: Berfrois Interviews McKenzie Wark’, Berfrois 
(2011) <http://www.berfrois.com/2011/09/berfrois-interviews-mckenzie-wark/> [Accessed 11 May 2016].  The 
two books in question are: McKenzie Wark, A Hacker Manifesto (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2004) and McKenzie Wark, Gamer Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).  His two books 
seeking to move away from the Parisian S.I. and the central figures of Debord and Vaneigem are:  McKenzie 
Wark, The Beach Beneath the Street (New York: Verso, 2011) and McKenzie Wark, The Spectacle of 
Disintegration: Situationist Passages out of the Twentieth Century (New York: Verso, 2013). 
29 Guy Debord, ‘La question de l’organisation pour l’I.S.’, Internationale situationniste, 12 (1969), 112-13 
(p.112). 
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they forged this mythology around themselves and their work.  Though I will predominantly refer to 
Debord’s writings and films, and where ‘the Situationists’ are invoked, I will often be referring to 
Debord’s unattributed articles in the journal he directed and the organisational practices he (rather 
despotically) authored, this will be in the course of disturbing the orthodoxies of Situationist theory’s 
reception and developing a critical account of the emancipatory potential and politically galvanising 
effects of reading the Situationists today.   
This study then proceeds with the following questions in mind: 
 How does Debord’s theory of spectacle depart from Marx’s work?   
 If the theory of spectacle can be said not only to refer to images and the mass media, what 
else does it encompass? 
 Can Debord’s theory be updated given the extent of technological change since his time of 
writing? 
 How can Debord and the Situationists be read in resistance to a humanistic interpretation?  
 Is there a Situationist theory of the subject? 
 What relationship can be discerned between the elaboration of a theoretical discourse and the 
rhetorical imposture which characterises so much of their work?  What part do ‘works’, 
writing or film, play in Situationist politics? 
 In what ways can Debord’s filmic work be shown to enact in sound and image the ‘dialectical 
theory’ of détournement?   
 What role do utopian figurations play in Situationist theory?  
 Can the Situationists’ writings on work and the university be of use to understanding the 
contemporary conjuncture?   
In this reading of the pamphlets, journal articles, books, films, graffiti and other works the 
Situationists produced, I have chosen not to proceed chronologically but, in the first half of the thesis, 
by addressing the two key theoretical concepts the S.I. leave behind them:  in Chapter One, the theory 
of spectacle, and in Chapter Two, détournement.  In the second half of the thesis, Chapter Three 
10 
 
proposes a particular conception of ethics which emerges from the S.I.’s work and organisational 
practice, while Chapter Four examines the Situationists’ responses to the ‘events’ of May ’68 and 
what Debord saw at the time as the ‘beginning of an era’ of revolutionary contestation.
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Marxism and the Theory of Spectacle 
 
Alienation and the Commodity                                    
Debord’s first sentence of La Société du spectacle is a détournement of Marx’s first line of Capital 
(1867).  Where the French translation of the latter reads: ‘La richesse des sociétés dans lesquelles 
règne le mode de production capitaliste s’annonce comme une “immense accumulation de 
marchandises”’,1 the final portion of the sentence quoting his own 1859 work, A Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy,  Debord amends: ‘Toute la vie des sociétés dans lesquelles règnent les 
conditions modernes de production s’annonce comme une immense accumulation de spectacles’ 
(Thesis 1. Emphasis is Debord’s).  Debord signals both his enduring allegiance to — and first 
departure from — Marx’s theory.  Debord sets out his theoretical project to demonstrate how Marx’s 
theory of the commodity reaches its apogee after a century’s worth of technological development.  
That is to say, in the era of film, television, print and advertising, to take the spectacle at what Debord 
describes as its most immediately obvious and rudimentary form: the mass media.  Debord 
unambiguously cautions against taking the spectacle to exclusively refer to the media.  Instead, he 
describes the spectacle as a social relation between people mediated by these images (Thesis 4).  In 
order to understand precisely what Debord means by this, we must first offer a brief explication of 
Marx’s theory of the commodity as outlined in both his early and later work.   
Marx defines a commodity as an object which fulfils a human need of some sort.  As a result 
of this function, it can be traded in a market place, hence its French translation ‘marchandise’.2  In 
                                                          
1 Karl Marx, Le Capital: Critique de l’économie politique, Livre première, trans. by Étienne Balibar and others 
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993), p.17.  
2 Marx, Le Capital, p.40. 
12 
 
Capital, Marx describes the commodity in connection with two other important concepts: use-value 
and exchange value.  The use-value of an object is manifest in its utility or consumption and is 
directly related to the commodity’s physical properties.  Exchange value, on the other hand, whilst 
appearing to be an objective function of an object’s use-value, is a purely quantitative function and 
therefore renders all commodities potentially equivalent: ‘En tant que valeurs d’usage, les 
marchandises sont principalement de qualité différente, en tant que valeurs d’échange elles ne peuvent 
être que de quantité différente, et ne contiennent pas donc un atome de valeur d’usage.’3  It is this 
equivalence which deprives the commodity of its use-value as it also divorces it from its relationship 
to the particular human labour entailed in forging it or bringing a commodity to the market place, 
Marx states.  Consequently, ‘Si l’on fait maintenant abstraction de la valeur d’usage du corps des 
marchandises, il ne leur reste plus qu’une seule propriété: celle d’être des produits de travail.’4  
Marx’s extensive theoretical elaborations on the concepts of value and labour do not appear to be of 
great concern to Debord, though we know from the reading notes present in his archive at the 
Bibliothèque nationale de France that he read Capital.5  Rather, in La Société du spectacle, it is the 
Marx of the 1844 Philosophic and Economic Manuscripts that Debord conflates with the 
appropriation of the language of Capital, by bringing the theory of alienation into relation with the 
commodity; both notions are of crucial importance to the theory of spectacle.  Alienation, as we shall 
see in further detail below, is a concept redolent of what Louis Althusser referred to as the ‘young’ 
Marx’s work:  
This fact expresses merely that the object which labour produces — labour’s product — 
confronts it as something alien, as a power independent of the producer.  The product of 
labour is labour which has been embodied in an object, which has become material: it is the 
objectification of labour.  Labour’s realization is its objectification.  Under these economic 
conditions this realization of labour appears as loss of realization for the workers; 
                                                          
3 Ibid., p.42. 
4 Ibid. 
5 BnF, Guy Debord, Notes et Projets, Fonds Guy Debord, XXème siècle, NAF28603 (Paris). 
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objectification as loss of the object and bondage to it; appropriation as estrangement, as 
alienation.6 
This idea of alienated labour, a labour which no longer belongs to the worker and is inextricably 
linked to his survival but is bought from and sold to the producer, is one the Situationists make central 
to their theory.  Debord described as his ‘first work’ a graffito on a wall on the Rue de Seine 
instructing the passer-by to ‘ne travaillez jamais’, such was his perception of labour under the 
conditions of spectacle as irrevocably alienated: ‘L’institutionnalisation de la division sociale du 
travail, la formation des classes avaient construit une première contemplation sacrée, l’ordre mythique 
dont tout pouvoir s’enveloppe dès l’origine’ (Thesis 25).  In Capital, Marx distinguishes between the 
economic and the social division of labour.  What he calls the economic division of labour is the result 
of technical expediency and not inherently exploitative, whilst the social division of labour are the 
result of a ‘social control function’ bound to class hierarchy.7  It is this notion of exploitation and 
servitude Debord takes from the latter Marx, married with the analysis of alienation in the 1844 
Manuscripts.8  It is Debord’s contention that capitalist development has reached a level of 
accumulation at his time of writing that any labour recognised as productive to society and not 
deliberately hostile to it, served the perpetuation of what he calls the spectacle-commodity economy: 
                                                          
6 Karl Marx, Economic & Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, trans. by Martin Milligan 
<https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Economic-Philosophic-Manuscripts-1844.pdf> 
[Accessed 30.10.2014] (p.29). 
7 Marx, Le Capital, pp.47-48. 
8 Marx, 1844 Manuscripts, p.30: ‘What, then, constitutes the alienation of labour?  
First, the fact that labour is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his intrinsic nature; that in his work, 
therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop 
freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind.  The worker therefore only feels 
himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself.  He feels at home when he is not working, and 
when he is working he does not feel at home.  His labour is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced 
labour.  It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it.  Its alien 
character emerges clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labour is shunned 
like the plague.  External labour, labour in which man alienates himself, is a labour of self-sacrifice, of 
mortification.  Lastly, the external character of labour for the worker appears in the fact that it is not his own, 
but someone else’s, that it does not belong to him, that in it he belongs, not to himself, but to another.  Just as in 
religion the spontaneous activity of the human imagination, of the human brain and the human heart, operates on 
the individual independently of him — that is, operates as an alien, divine or diabolical activity — so is the 
worker’s activity not his spontaneous activity.  It belongs to another; it is the loss of his self.’ 
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Le caractère fondamentalement tautologique du spectacle découle du simple fait que ses 
moyens sont en même temps son but […] Le spectacle se soumet les hommes vivants dans la 
mesure où l’économie les a totalement soumis.  Il n’est rien que l’économie se développant 
pour elle-même.  Il est le reflet fidèle de la production des choses, et l’objectivation infidèle 
des producteurs. (Theses 13 and 16) 
There is, however, no Situationist theory of labour.  Debord does not attempt a structural analysis of 
human labour as Marx attempts in Capital, rather, alienation is what Debord takes from Marx and 
then describes its extension in the era of spectacle.  Debord calls this ‘separation’: alienation from the 
individual’s activity creates the passive role of spectator (we will see later that this extends to the 
realm of consumption, not just production in the form of alienated labour).  ‘Tout ce qui était 
directement vécu s’est éloigné dans une représentation’ (Thesis 1), as the first thesis ends after the 
above cited détournement of Marx.  Chapter One of La Société du spectacle, ‘La séparation achevée’, 
delineates the processes by which the alienation perpetrated by a capitalism recognisable to Marx 
achieved a total separation between ‘an actually lived life’ and an existence structured according to 
the perpetuation of the economic and social status quo:  
Avec la séparation généralisée du travailleur et de son produit, se perdent tout point de vue 
unitaire sur l’activité accomplie, toute communication personnelle directe entre les 
producteurs.  Suivant le progrès de l’accumulation des produits séparés, et de la concentration 
du processus productif, l’unité et la communication deviennent l’attribut exclusif de la 
direction du système.  La réussite du système économique de la séparation est la 
prolétarisation du monde.  (Thesis 26) 
This idea of separation appears as the apogee of Marx’s concept of alienation in the era of spectacle: 
‘La séparation est l’alpha et l’oméga du spectacle’ (Thesis 25).  The technological development set 
into motion under the social conditions of capitalism leads to an extension of alienation; separation is 
the culmination of this alienation facilitated by technological development.  It is ‘generalised’ to the 
extent that the spectacle is capable of colonising not only labour relations but all communication 
between ‘producers’.  The result of this colonisation is what Debord describes as the proletarianisation 
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of the world: the category of the proletariat, alienated and exploited workers whose activity is 
divorced from their own ends encompasses all those who live under the conditions of this ‘stage’ of 
capitalism.    
Debord does attempt to clarify that this separation is not a Manichean opposition between 
real, social life on one hand and a never-ending stream of images on the other:  
On ne peut opposer abstraitement le spectacle et l’activité sociale effective; ce dédoublement 
est lui-même dédoublé.  Le spectacle qui inverse le réel est effectivement produit.  En même 
temps la réalité vécue est matériellement envahie par la contemplation du spectacle, et 
reprend en elle-même l’ordre spectaculaire en lui donnant une adhésion positive.  La réalité 
objective est présente des deux côtés.  Chaque notion ainsi fixée n’a pour fond que son 
passage dans l’opposé: la réalité surgit dans le spectacle, et le spectacle est réel.  Cette 
aliénation réciproque est l’essence et le soutien de la société existante.  (Thesis 8) 
Just as ‘lived reality’ is occupied by static contemplation, spectatorship, so the object of this 
spectatorship is forged by human labour and productive forces.  The spectacle is, then, a social 
relation: ‘Le spectacle n’est pas un ensemble d’images, mais un rapport social entre des personnes, 
médiatisé par des images’ (Thesis 4), again echoing the language of Capital, where Marx writes that: 
‘le capital n’était pas une chose, mais un rapport social entre les personnes médiatisé par des choses.’9  
The spectacle refers both to the forms of mediation and to the social relation between people 
engendered by this mediation.  Debord’s theory diagnoses the expansion of alienation under the aegis 
of economic development:   
Le spectacle dans la société correspond à une fabrication concrète de l’aliénation.  
L’expansion économique est principalement l’expansion de cette production industrielle 
précise.  Ce qui croît avec l’économie se mouvant pour elle-même ne peut être que 
l’aliénation qui était justement dans son noyau originel.  (Thesis 32) 
                                                          
9 Marx, Le Capital, p.859.  
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Alienated labour, for Debord, referred to working for a wage, being used as a means to the ends of a 
self-perpetuating spectacular economy.  The labour of writing books and journal articles, as well as 
compiling and distributing these journals, was viewed as not being in the service of the spectacular 
economy but in direct hostility to it.  The Situationists clearly felt that the only acceptable form of 
labour was undertaken in defiance of the roles of the social whole determined by spectacular power 
relations.  
Debord’s spectacle describes a world of ‘la marchandise dominant tout ce qui est vécu’ 
(Thesis 37).  The nature of this domination is expounded by Debord in connection with another 
concept taken from Capital, commodity fetishism.  Debord states that: ‘C’est le principe du 
fétichisme de la marchandise, la domination de la société par “des choses suprasensibles bien que 
sensibles”, qui s’accomplit absolument dans le spectacle’ (Thesis 36), here quoting Marx directly.  
The importance of this notion for Debord’s spectacle demonstrates the significance of Hungarian 
Marxist György Lukács’s influential 1923 History and Class Consciousness.  Translated into French 
for the first time in 1960, the book forms an important lens through which to appreciate Debord’s 
reading of Marx.  In History and Class Consciousness, Lukács underscores Hegel’s influence on 
Marx’s work and concentrates on alienation, reification (the name given to the result of the process of 
alienation that leads to social relations becoming relations between ‘things’) and commodity fetishism 
as the primary impediments to the realisation of a proletarian class consciousness.  As Louis Althusser 
writes in Pour Marx, there is here present a notion of: 
‘L’humanisme de classe’ au sens, repris des œuvres de jeunesse de Marx, où le prolétariat 
représenterait, dans son ‘aliénation’, l’essence humaine elle-même, dont la révolution devrait 
assurer la ‘réalisation’: cette conception ‘religieuse’ du prolétariat (‘classe universelle’ parce 
que ‘perte de l’homme’ en ‘révolte contre sa propre perte’), a été reprise par le jeune Lukacs 
[sic] dans Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein.10  
                                                          
10 Louis Althusser, Pour Marx (Paris: François Maspero, 1966), p.228. 
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Lukács was unquestionably an important mediating influence on Debord’s reading of Marx.  Anselm 
Jappe, in his ‘intellectual biography’ of Debord, alleges that for both Lukács and Debord the 
preoccupation with alienation indicates that ‘there must after all be such a thing as a substantially 
“healthy” subject, otherwise it would make no sense to speak of the “falsification” of a subject’s 
activity.’11  Richard Kaplan launches a similar critique of Debord in which he argues that the theory of 
spectacle is ‘implicitly dependent upon liberal individualism, which abstracts individuals from the 
cultural traditions and social relations in which they are embedded.’12  Indeed, at first glance, 
Debord’s critique of the society of the spectacle appears to inherit a certain metaphysical bent — that 
is to say, a reliance on an essentialist, transhistorical notion of ‘the human’ — from the young Marx.  
Subsequently, for Debord, ‘Le spectacle est la reconstruction matérielle de l’illusion religieuse’ 
(Thesis 20).  Althusser famously suggested that Marx’s deep identification with Feuerbach as 
indicative of his ‘young’ period: The German Ideology and the departure from German idealism that 
heralds the beginnings of the ‘epistemological break’ is Marx’s first work indicating a conscious and 
definitive rupture with Feuerbach’s philosophy and his influence.  He goes on to state that all of the 
expressions of Marx’s idealist ‘humanism’ are Feuerbachian.13  The adjectives the Marx of the 1844 
Manuscripts employs to describe Feuerbach’s ‘positive, humanistic and naturalistic criticism’,14 
demonstrate what Althusser criticises in favour of ‘scientific’ inquiry.  Althusser brings a selection of 
Feuerbach’s writings between 1839 and 1945 under this title of ‘philosophical manifestoes’.  He casts 
these texts in the following terms: 
Ce sont de vraies proclamations, l’annonce passionnée de cette révélation théorique qui va 
délivrer l’homme de ses chaînes.  Feuerbach s’adresse à l’Humanité.  Il déchire les voiles de 
l’Histoire universelle, détruit les mythes et les mensonges, découvre et rend à l’homme sa 
vérité.  Les temps sont venus.  L’Humanité est grosse d’une révolution imminente qui lui 
                                                          
11 Jappe, Guy Debord, p.27. 
12 Kaplan, p.457.  
13 Althusser, Pour Marx, p.39.  
14 Marx, 1844 Manuscripts, p.2. 
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donnera la possession de son être.  Que les hommes en prennent enfin conscience, et ils seront 
dans la réalité ce qu’ils sont en vérité: des êtres libres, égaux et fraternels.15 
It would be easy to conclude that the Situationists can be characterised in this same manner: lyrical 
and passionate Romantics with a deep conviction in a concept of a creative and adventurous ‘human 
nature’ which social, cultural and political reality exists to obscure and stifle.  By detractors and 
partisans alike, an understanding of the Situationist movement as espousing a belief in the 
revolutionary capabilities of this ‘human nature’ prevails.  As Sadie Plant writes: ‘It was the 
Situationists’ identification of an antagonism at the heart of society ― a central principle of dualism, 
separation, mediation or alienation ― which enabled them to posit an unproblematised unified social 
experience as the goal of revolutionary practice.’16  
Suggesting that an inheritance of Marx’s concept of alienation necessarily entails the 
perpetuation of the concept of an inalienable human nature (by opposing directly the spectacle to what 
is ‘true’ and ‘unalienated’) fails to acknowledge the rhetorical function of such effusions.  The 
reductive hyperbole of a sentence such as: ‘Dans le monde réellement renversé, le vrai est un moment 
du faux’ (Thesis 9. Emphasis is Debord’s), which asserts that the world of spectacle is an upside down 
one in need of being righted, is of little substantive analytical importance.  In its invocation of the 
words of Hegel, however, it serves the purpose of referencing Hegel to an erudite reader, conjuring 
the past two hundred years of European philosophy.  To the uninitiated into this particular club, it 
provides an incisive critique of a perhaps recognisable environment.  As we will see in the following 
chapter, this double function could be seen to rely on an appeal to authority in the form of 
unacknowledged quotation as well as a pedagogical manoeuvre of seduction, seeking to mystify in the 
same way as the spectacle, in Debord’s analysis.  What emerges here, however, is that by attempting 
to inspire action, Romantic notions of creativity and humanity serve a rhetorical purpose, not 
necessarily indicative of a belief which underpins their theory.  Kaplan does not envisage such a 
                                                          
15 Althusser, Pour Marx, p.37. 
16 Plant, p.131. 
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possibility, and assumes the Situationists must be hypostatising the concepts they take from the young 
Marx: 
In this tradition, the key model of action commencing from Marx’s materialist turn was to 
conceive of humans as conscious, creative actors.  People work on the natural world, and as 
they fabricate the object world around them, they culturally mould themselves.  For Marx, 
this process of objectification helped unfold the essential attributes of the human species: its 
‘species being’.  Labour created a multifaceted, rich cultural world in which we could unfold 
potential aspects of our personalities.17  
The use of the words ‘man’s being’ is enough for Kaplan to be satisfied that the Situationists retain a 
notion of human nature.  However, Kaplan’s assertion that Debord’s critique of modern society rests 
on a ‘liberal individualist’ worldview belies an understanding of the Situationists’ use of such a 
heritage, and the rather more refined critique present throughout La Société du spectacle: 
La technique spectaculaire n’a pas dissipé les nuages religieux où les hommes avaient placé 
leurs propres pouvoirs détachés d’eux: elle les a seulement reliés à une base terrestre.  Ainsi 
c’est la vie la plus terrestre qui devient opaque et irrespirable.  Elle ne rejette plus dans le ciel, 
mais elle héberge chez elle sa récusation absolue, son fallacieux paradis.  Le spectacle est la 
réalisation technique de l’exil des pouvoirs humains dans un au-delà; la scission achevée à 
l’intérieur de l’homme.  (Thesis 20) 
Though appearing quasi-metaphysical in nature, it demonstrates that Situationist invocations of ideas 
of ‘human nature’ are a reflection of a notion realised by social processes and material objects: la 
technique.  Just as previously man was conceived in relation to God and the heavens, now it is the 
reign of spectacle which proffers a particular conception of man which is necessarily dominant by 
means of its ubiquity.  Any concept of human nature in Debord must be understood as bound to time 
and history, as the construction of what is recognised as ‘human’ is bound to social and cultural 
                                                          
17 Kaplan, p.461.  
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organisation.  In La Société du spectacle, Debord refers to Hungarian sociologist Karl Mannheim’s 
concept of ‘total ideology’ with reference to the spectacle’s suspension of history. 
L’idéologie, que toute sa logique interne menait vers ‘l’idéologie totale’, au sens de 
Mannheim, despotisme du fragment qui s’impose comme pseudo-savoir d’un tout figé, vision 
totalitaire, est maintenant accomplie dans le spectacle immobilisé de la non-histoire.  (Thesis 
214) 
An approving citation is a rarity in the writings of Debord and the Situationists, so frequent was their 
recourse to excoriation of their peers and rivals.  Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia (1936) sought to 
extend the concept of ideology from the work of Marx into a totalising concept which inevitably 
bound knowledge to social class, location and generation.18  He elaborated the concept of relationism, 
that the inevitable contingency of knowledge could only be cast as arbitrary in contrast to a 
disembodied, metaphysical conception of knowledge, one which relied on some form of essentialism, 
for example, that of a human nature.  Debord’s citing of Mannheim indicates a rejection of a 
Feuerbachian-Marxist theory of ‘species-being’, or ‘natural’ human consciousness.   
The second chapter of La Société du Spectacle, entitled ‘La marchandise comme spectacle’, 
charts Debord’s understanding of Marx’s commodity’s relationship with spectacle.  In particular, 
Debord diagnoses the conservative nature of this phenomenon in its ‘coagulation’ of human activity, 
just as Marx repeatedly describes the commodity’s coagulation of labour.19  Debord extends this 
coagulation to the entirety of ‘activity’ owing to what he sees as capital’s colonisation of desire and 
therefore so-called ‘free time’ in the form of spectacle.  Though the commodity is a category essential 
to Marx’s later ‘scientific’ theory, Debord continues to consider the commodity in terms of alienation.  
À ce mouvement essentiel du spectacle, qui consiste à reprendre en lui tout ce qui existait 
dans l’activité humaine à l’état fluide, pour le posséder à l’état coagulé, en tant que choses qui 
                                                          
18 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (Mansfield Centre, CT: 
Martino Publishing, 2015).  First published 1936.  
19 See Marx, Le Capital, p.45: ‘En tant que valeurs, toutes les marchandise ne sont que les mesure déterminées 
de temps de travail coagulé.’  Then also pp.58, 104, 213, 242.   
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sont devenues la valeur exclusive par leur formulation en négatif de la valeur vécue, nous 
reconnaissons notre vieille ennemie qui sait si bien paraître au premier coup d’œil quelque 
chose de trivial et se comprenant de soi-même, alors qu’elle est au contraire si complexe et si 
pleine de subtilités métaphysiques, la marchandise.20  (Thesis 35) 
The opposition of the fluid state of human activity and the spectacle’s coagulation could be read as 
describing the passage of history in the manner of a Marxist teleology of progress and development in 
the direction of communism.21  It is this ‘possession’ of human activity, its enclosure within the 
instrumental laws of capital, which arrests any supposed advance of history.  This concept of history 
need not, however, imply teleology.  It is Debord’s contention that the standardisation of human 
activity engineered by the exhaustive equivalence of the commodity controls the horizon of possible 
actions for the individual.  Rather than indicating a historical process which ineluctably leads to a 
communist utopia that the spectacle impedes, this implies an infinitely open-ended process of making 
and remaking of human activity, labour and social organisation which the spectacle is designed to 
freeze; to maintain in stasis one particular incarnation of this activity.  The Situationists hold no 
teleological concept of an inevitably or inherently progressive march of history: ‘Cette histoire n’a pas 
d’objet distinct de ce qu’elle réalise sur elle-même, quoique la dernière vision métaphysique 
inconsciente de l’époque historique puisse regarder la progression productive à travers laquelle 
l’histoire s’est déployée comme l’objet même de l’histoire.’ (Thesis 24) This rejection of teleology in 
the Situationists’ work bespeaks (as we shall see in the final section of this Chapter) an 
acknowledgement of the inevitable necessity of communication, in all its imperfection, in human 
social organisation, rather than a utopian or essentialist notion of an attainable ‘whole’ or 
‘unalienated’ human state.   
 
                                                          
20 Again, here Debord has remained close to the words of Marx’s Capital, where he describes the commodity as 
‘pleine de subtiltés métaphysiques’, p.81.  
21 See Vladimir Illyich Lenin, ‘Three Sources and Components of Marxism’. Available online here: 
<http://www.cpa.org.au/resources/classics/3-sources-n-3-component-parts-of-marxism.pdf> [Accessed 
30.10.2014] (p.31).  
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Professional Marxism  
Althusser’s famous thesis of the ‘epistemological break’ holds, as mentioned above, that there exists 
an important divide between the ‘young’ and the ‘mature’ Marx.  Marx’s early writings are, for 
Althusser, bound to German idealism: their humanistic and Romantic emphasis on alienation is 
largely outgrown after The German Ideology, written in 1845-6, in favour of the economic-scientific 
study which would become known as historical materialism.  Althusser argues that the latter is Marx’s 
enduring theoretical contribution.  For Althusser, Marx breaks radically with any theory that founds 
history and politics on notions of the essence of man.  The works of the pre-1845 ‘young’ Marx are 
here characterised by Althusser, with reference to the 1844 Philosophic and Economic Manuscripts, 
as the basis of an inferior, immature brand of Marxism with which his scientific approach sought to 
dispense:   
Le manuscrit économico-philosophique a nourri toute une interprétation soit éthique, soit (ce 
qui revient au même) anthropologique, voire même religieuse, de Marx — Le Capital n’étant 
alors, en son recul et apparente ‘objectivité’ que le développement d’une intuition de jeunesse 
qui aurait trouvé son expression philosophique majeur dans ce texte, et ses concepts: avant 
tout les concepts d’aliénation, d’humanisme, d’essence sociale de l’homme, etc.22 
Althusser rejects the proposition of Landshut and Mayer’s preface to their 1931 translation of Capital 
that it constitutes an ethical theory, the beginnings of which are present in the young Marx, in such a 
way as he describes the narrative of maturation of his work in breaking with the concepts of 
alienation, humanism and the ‘social essence of man’.  He decries the tendency to seek to defend 
Marx en bloc, by tracing the theory of Capital to his earlier work: 
Philosophes, idéologues, religieux, se sont lancés dans une gigantesque entreprise de critique 
et de conversion: que Marx revienne aux sources de Marx, et qu’il avoue enfin que l’homme 
mûr n’est en lui que le jeune Marx déguisé.  Ou, s’il persiste et s’entête dans son âge, qu’il 
                                                          
22 Althusser, Pour Marx, p.156.  
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avoue alors son péché de maturité, qu’il reconnaisse qu’il a sacrifié la philosophie à 
l’économie, l’éthique à la science, l’homme à l’histoire.23 
Humanism and related concepts are ideological constructs, where socialism is ‘scientific’.24  The 
antipathy towards ‘anthropological Marxists’ who sought to trace the theories of Capital to his earlier 
works and thus retained the above listed concepts is repeatedly asserted in the lectures which make up 
Pour Marx, as well as in earlier essays such as ‘A propos du marxisme’.25  Gregory Elliot emphasises 
Althusser’s insistence that his writings were to be understood in response to the theoretical and 
political context of their time, which he calls ‘Althusser’s moment’.26  Althusser’s opposition to 
humanistic interpretations of Marx took place in the political context of the crisis in the international 
Communist movement and the response to this crisis of the Parti Communiste Français (PCF).  The 
Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956 and the subsequent policy of 
de-Stalinisation saw the beginnings of conflict between the USSR and the Communist Party of China.  
The Soviets’ policy of ‘communism in one country’ saw them adopt a more gradualist, constitutional 
approach of ‘peaceful coexistence’ with the West whilst the Chinese embarked on their ‘great leap 
forward’ and, in 1965, released a pamphlet entitled On the Question of Stalin.  This pamphlet 
defended Stalin’s memory and service to the revolutionary cause, hailing him as a great Marxist-
Leninist.  Khrushchev had meanwhile dubbed the party program of the twenty-second party congress 
of 1961 as a ‘document of true communist humanism’.27  The Russians stood accused of revisionism 
— of pursuing goals for the good of the state rather than for the good of the revolution — by the 
Chinese.  In France, the PCF was forced to respond to this schism.  Having emerged from the Second 
World War with enhanced prestige following their role in the Resistance and its mythologisation after 
the Liberation, the PCF boasted half a million members in 1945, polled 28% in the 1946 elections and 
dominated political and intellectual discourse on the left.  Althusser chose to remain within the PCF as 
a member, rather than opting for the ‘fellow-traveller’ approach, as did Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice 
                                                          
23 Ibid., p.48.  
24 Ibid., p.229. 
25 Louis Althusser, ‘A propos du Marxisme’, Revue de l'enseignement philosophique, 3.4 (1953), 15–19. 
26 Gregory Elliot, Althusser: The Detour of Theory (Boston: Brill, 2006), p.2. 
27 Quoted in Gregory Elliot, Althusser, p.5. 
24 
 
Merleau-Ponty, criticising the party line from without.  Though he was, therefore, duty-bound to 
follow the PCF in accepting the Khrushchevite line, he sought to oppose theoretically what he saw as 
a shift to the right.28  His condemnation of humanistic interpretations of Marx constituted a theoretical 
attack on what he perceived as a political regression.   
Another key figure in French Marxism of the period, Henri Lefebvre, had left the PCF in 
1959, having joined in 1928 and been active in the Resistance.  Though both Lefebvre and Althusser 
espoused their fidelity to the concept of dialectical materialism, Lefebvre took precisely the opposite 
position to Althusser on the subject of the ‘wholeness’ of Marx’s work, particularly in relation to 
alienation.  Alienation is a central concept in Lefebvre’s reading of Marx.  As Stuart Elden states in 
his study of Lefebvre: ‘Lefebvre read Marx as a total thinker, with equal stress on the early writings 
and the late ones.  He was interested in how concepts such as alienation were central throughout 
Marx’s career.’29  Lefebvre had Althusser’s early writings on the young Marx in his sights in the 
foreword to the second edition of his Critique de la vie quotidienne Vol.1, written in 1958:  
Why was the concept of alienation treated with such mistrust?  Why was the Hegelianism in 
Marx’s early writings rejected?  Where does the tendency to separate Marx from his roots, 
and his mature scientific works from his early writings, come from?  Or the tendency to date 
and determine the formation of Marxism from his political writings?  Analysis shows that 
behind all this lies that murky mixture of simplistic empiricism, pliant subjectivism and 
doctrinaire, authoritarian dogmatism which is the philosophical basis of the Stalinist 
interpretation of Marxism.30 
He would later describe Althusser as ‘a neo-Stalinist ideologue’,31 his attitude to alienation as 
‘ridiculous’,32 whilst he saw Structuralism as ‘an ideology of the dominant class, a scientific travesty 
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of progressive thought’.33  Lefebvre sought to rescue Marx from ‘economism’ and an economistic 
reading which suggested political economy had subsumed or superseded philosophy entirely.  In an 
interview with Kristin Ross, Lefebvre acknowledged that Constant Nieuwenhuys’s thought on the city 
expressed an affinity with his early volumes of La Critique de la vie quotidienne in their 
preoccupation with the environments encountered during the course of everyday existence.  It was a 
transformation of this urban space in which both saw the possibility of a transformation of the social 
environment.  Constant’s writing on the situation would inform Lefebvre’s theory of ‘moments’ as set 
out in La somme et le reste (1959).34  In the third issue of the S.I.’s journal, an article entitled ‘Le sens 
du dépérissement de l’art’ cited a text Lefebvre had written for the journal Arguments praising his 
critique of the art world whilst reproving the journal itself for ‘neo-reformism’ and being incapable of 
producing material of any novelty.35  Though the article in Internationale situationniste also criticised 
what they saw as Lefebvre’s naïve call for the supersession of philosophy — something they stated 
was an axiom of revolutionary thought since Marx wrote that philosophers had only interpreted the 
world, the point was to change it, in his Theses on Feuerbach36 — such critical engagement was far 
more constructive than the unsubstantiated insult accorded the like of Althusser.  In 1960, a short 
journal article sought to establish a relationship between the concept of the situation and Lefebvre’s 
theory of ‘moments’.  ‘Théorie des moments et construction des situations’ begins by stating its 
intention to examine ‘quel usage peut-on faire entre ces concepts pour réaliser les revendications 
communes?’37 and proceeds into a largely sympathetic description of the ‘moment’ which 
nevertheless illustrates the distinction they sought to make between Lefebvre’s concept and their 
notion of the constructed situation.  For the Situationists, ‘le “moment” est principalement temporel, il 
fait partie d’une zone de temporalité, non pure mais dominante.  La situation, étroitement articulée 
dans le lieu, est complètement spatio-temporelle.’  A situation was not only deemed to be specific to a 
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period of time but to the place in which it occurred.  The situation is, by its very nature, unrepeatable 
whereas Lefebvre’s concept was defined by the intervention of moments of ‘jouissance’ into the 
everyday.  The Situationists illustrate this difference with reference to an example of one such 
moment of Lefebvre’s, love: 
Lefebvre parle du ‘moment de l’amour’.  Du point de vue de la création des moments, du 
point de vue situationniste, il faut envisager le moment de tel amour, de l’amour de telle 
personne.  Ce qui veut dire: de telle personne en de telles circonstances.38  
Lefebvre conceives of the moment as instances of revelation of a recovered unity of life which the 
alienating forces of capital obscure.  The situation, however, is constructed and defined by its 
resistance to the particular circumstances of the environment in which it takes place: ‘Ce qui 
caractérisera la situation, c’est sa praxis meme, sa formation délibérée.’39  Despite the apparent 
convergence on the two concepts, a convergence which permitted a critical exchange and Debord and 
Michelle Bernstein’s friendship and collaboration with Lefebvre, a crucial difference is signalled in 
this early piece.  Lefebvre’s ‘moment’ is animated by the recovery of a lost unity of the everyday, as 
much of his work was instructed by the study of traditional, rural, ways of life.40  This recovery, or 
return of an absolute value, a ‘jouissance de la vie naturelle et sociale’,41 contrasts with the situation 
as something ‘inséparable de sa consommation immédiate, comme valeur d’usage essentiellement 
étrangère à une conservation sous forme de marchandise’.42  
Lefebvre and Debord collaborated and were friends between 1957 and 1962 before an 
acrimonious falling out amid accusations of plagiarism from the Situationists relating to a piece they 
had written together on the Paris Commune and other tumult of a more personal nature.  Lefebvre 
himself described their association as a ‘love story that ended badly, very badly’.43  This description 
draws attention to the more personal nature of their friendship: theirs was not the typical relations of 
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‘knowledge transfer’ in lectures and seminars under the prism of the university but a more passionate, 
rather than professional, relationship.  The piece on the Paris Commune that was to at least partly 
provoke their divorce was written with Debord and Bernstein during a countryside walk at Navarrenx, 
where Lefebvre owned a property, during a stay in which Lefebvre recalled considerable alcohol 
consumption.  Despite Lefebvre’s desire in the above cited interview to blame their falling out on 
Debord’s penchant for purging as well as complicated private relations, there is scope for 
understanding the antipathy later displayed in writing as an expression of the Situationists’ critique of 
institutional Marxism and academia.  Simon Sadler argues that their fundamental disagreement was a 
question of revolutionary praxis.44   
We have seen above how the Situationists distinguished between the situation and the 
moment is the former’s construction as a coincidence of theory and practice, rather than a passively 
experienced ‘moment’.  Similarly, in an article in the first issue of Internationale situationniste, 
‘Thèses sur la révolution culturelle’, Debord denounces Lefebvre’s theorisation of a tendency he 
termed the ‘revolutionary romantic’ in a book co-written with Lucien Goldmann, Claude Roy and 
Tristan Tzara.45  Lefebvre referred to an artistic response to the conflict between the ‘progressive 
individual’ and the world.  This Romanticism was revolutionary, as opposed to its traditional 
association with bourgeois thought, owing to its reference to the ‘possible’ of the future.  Debord 
criticised this notion for asserting that the identification of this conflict was sufficient to constitute 
revolutionary action in the cultural domain: ‘Lefebvre renonce par avance à toute expérience de 
modification culturelle profonde en se satisfaisant d’un contenu: la conscience du possible-impossible 
(encore trop lointain), qui peut être exprimée sous n’importe quelle forme prise dans le cadre de la 
décomposition.’46  Once again it is the relationship between theory and practice that Debord takes 
issue with in Lefebvre’s work.  That this tension can be simply expressed within the existing forms of 
cultural production means that it cannot constitute revolutionary action on its own.  The university 
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was another body which constituted this ‘cadre de la décomposition’.  Lefebvre invited Debord to 
speak at Le Centre d’études sociologiques on the topic of Surrealism, an incident recounted in the 
second issue of the journal under the title ‘Suprême levée des défenseurs du surrealisme à Paris et 
révélation de leur valeur effective’.47  Though present, Debord chose to address the crowd via a pre-
recorded message which insulted the assembled surrealist sympathisers whilst the sound of a guitar 
played in the background.  Sadler is correct to suggest that this tactic carries the implication that the 
academic arena and the form of address in this context was not the place in which Debord and the 
Situationists saw meaningful work in the direction of the revolution of everyday life.  Lefebvre was ill 
and therefore absent that day, the I.S. article recounts.  By 1964, however, after their rancorous split 
with Lefebvre, the ninth issue of I.S. began with an editorial entitled ‘Maintenant l’I.S.’ in which the 
group targeted heralded figures on the left:  
La critique révolutionnaire de toutes les conditions existantes n’a certes pas le monopole de 
l’intelligence, mais bien celui de son emploi.  Dans la crise présente de la culture, de la 
société, ceux qui n’ont pas cet emploi de l’intelligence, n’ont, en fait, aucune sorte 
d’intelligence discernable.  Cessez de nous parler de l’intelligence sans emploi, vous nous 
ferez plaisir.  Pauvre Heidegger! Pauvre Lukàcs [sic]! Pauvre Sartre! Pauvre Barthes! Pauvre 
Lefebvre! […] Les spécialistes de la pensée ne peuvent plus être que des penseurs de la 
spécialisation.48 
Lefebvre finds himself among the list of those castigated as specialists of thought.  Specialisation is 
here inevitably linked with the above discussion of the social division of labour; when oppositional 
thought permits itself to become yet another realm of this division of labour, it functions comfortably 
within the spectacle, to be bought and sold as a commodity.  This recuperation or co-option occurs in 
the realm of publishing when revolutionary ideas are expressed without the intention or endeavour to 
pursue these ideas in actions.  Equally, the role of the academic, the teacher and researcher is 
implicated in this specialisation and division of labour for the Situationists.  Lefebvre taught 
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throughout the sixties at the Universities of Strasbourg and Nanterre.  It was at Lefebvre’s former 
institution, Strasbourg University, a year after he had left for Paris, that a group of students who had 
read Internationale situationniste were elected to the students’ union and commanded the yearly 
budget.  After contacting the Paris-based Situationists, a tract entitled De la misère en milieu étudiant 
considérée sous ses aspects économique, politique, psychologique, sexuel et notamment intellectuel et 
de quelques moyens pour y remédier (1966) was printed and disseminated around the university.  The 
entire annual budget of the Strasbourg U.N.E.F was spent on the publication.  The resulting scandal 
and court case has gone down in Situationist lore, a tale told frequently in accounts of the group’s 
activities.49  The text was a vitriolic attack on the institution of the university which rehearsed key 
elements of Debord’s critique as it would appear a year later.   
The above problematizing of the concept of ‘intelligence’ in connection with specialisation 
and the social division of labour calls to mind Jacques Rancière’s Le Maître Ignorant (1987), in which 
he presents nineteenth century schoolmaster Joseph Jacotot’s teaching style as presuming intellectual 
equality between the students and the teacher.  Jacotot saw the traditional method of explanation by a 
‘knowledgeable’ master to the uninitiated student as an unnecessarily hierarchical approach: ‘Avant 
d’être l’acte du pédagogue, l’explication est le mythe de la pédagogie, la parabole d’un monde divisé 
en esprits savants et esprits ignorants, esprits mûrs et immatures, capables et incapables, intelligents et 
bêtes.’50  Rancière instead proposes presupposing all human intelligence as equal, where 
proclamations of incapacity on behalf of the student, ‘demonstrate a commitment on behalf of the 
student to the same logic as that of the arbitrary Platonic injunction that forbids the shoe-maker from 
thinking, the principle of specialisation.’51  Intelligence therefore seems to be understood as a 
phenomenon bound to other social categories: one can demonstrate intelligence, the capacity to excel, 
within the realm of any specialisation but the ‘use’ of this capacity can only be demonstrated by 
opposing this specialisation of knowledge and activity that constitutes ‘existing conditions’.  The 
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Situationists and Rancière share this opposition to the principle of a socially distributed specialisation 
of activity, as well as the antipathy towards the instructive pedagogical mode: teaching under the 
hierarchical form of the university merely served to induct the student into the ways of the university 
itself and consequently in the ways of the ‘existing conditions’, in that the sole purpose of such an 
education is to prepare the student for ‘work’.  In De la misère en milieu étudiant, the disciplinary 
segregation of the university was first attacked as implicated in this specialisation: ‘Toutes les 
analyses et études entreprises sur le milieu étudiant ont, jusqu'ici, négligé l'essentiel.  Jamais elles ne 
dépassent le point de vue des spécialisations universitaires (psychologie, sociologie, économie), et 
demeurent donc: fondamentalement erronées.’52  The Situationists here decry the narrow scope and 
methodologies which are dictated by the very social, economic and institutional forms that research 
should be critically examining.  In an article on interdisciplinarity, cultural studies and queer theory, 
Lisa Downing refers to Michel Foucault’s work on the disciplinary:  
The dissemination of a scholarly discipline, then, parallels the means of disciplining the 
population, since both operate by means of segregation, categorization, division — and 
divisiveness.  In this sense, knowledge is implicated in, and works through, the operations of 
power.53 
Whilst the Situationists took this relationship between power, knowledge and disciplinarity to be a 
function of specialisation, the social division of labour and capital, Downing seeks to defend the 
notion of interdisciplinarity against the relatively recent trend of its becoming an omnipresent 
platitude in the academia of today.  Her call for a meaningful interdisciplinarity to be undertaken in its 
‘mobile, transformative and politicized forms’54 echoes the Situationists’ resistance to the tyranny of 
the commodity form’s convention and orthodoxy.  During the 1960s, whilst those such as Althusser 
attempted to acknowledge this state approved transmission of knowledge and critique these 
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institutions from within, the Situationists saw institutionality itself as the cause of alienation.  The 
process of a university education is held to be a mere induction into the obedient submission to the 
commodity form, rather than the opportunity for ‘independent thought’ it pretends to be.  The function 
of the university is to train future functionaries for their future posts as managers in factories or 
offices.  The Situationists cast the university as a training ground for future functionaries, where 
professors herd them into their eventual jobs.  This instrumentalist notion of the university entails a 
similar concept of the alienation of knowledge as Debord describes in terms of labour.  Rather than a 
study which can affect and improve the life of the student, the university provides a system of 
knowledge dissemination based on strict hierarchies and conventions.  It is concerned with the 
reproduction of the same, according to the Situationist analysis.  As labour serves the category of the 
economy, so the student’s accumulation of knowledge serves to succeed in their exams.  The sole 
purpose of these exams is to secure a role in the specialised division of labour above described and 
therefore perpetuate the logic of spectacle.  The Strasbourg tract further denounces the students who 
continue to prize their education in these circumstances: 
Que l’Université soit devenue une organisation — institutionnelle — de l’ignorance, que la 
‘haute culture’ elle-même se dissolve au rythme de la production en série des professeurs, que 
tous ces professeurs soient des crétins dont la plupart provoqueraient le chahut de n’importe 
quel public de lycée — L’étudiant l’ignore; et il continue d’écouter respectueusement ses 
maîtres, avec la volonté consciente de perdre tout esprit critique afin de mieux communier 
dans l’illusion mystique d’être devenu un ‘étudiant’, quelqu’un qui s’occupe sérieusement à 
apprendre un savoir sérieux, dans l’espoir qu’on lui confiera les vérités dernières.55 
The Situationists abhor the student’s capacity to romanticise, or to merely accept, his or her role as 
‘student’.  Henri Lefebvre, for all his early affinities with the Situationists, remained in academia 
throughout the sixties and the Situationists’ uncompromising condemnation of the ‘professor’, made 
him easier to break with.  The above mocking description of ‘serious’ knowledge is reminiscent of 
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another of the figures of the intellectual left, Jean-Paul Sartre.  In L’Être et le néant (1943), Sartre 
described what he termed, ‘l’esprit de sérieux qui saisit les valeurs à partir du monde et qui réside 
dans la substantification rassurante et chosiste des valeurs.’56  The Situationists appear to inherit 
Sartre’s conception of bad faith in their condemnation of the unquestioning identification with one’s 
role in the social whole.  This ‘spirit of seriousness’ is a pernicious form of bad faith, a flight from 
man’s inevitable freedom, as Sartre has it.  The Situationists identify this seriousness as an 
internalisation of the values of the spectacle; in the case of the student, this means enthusiastically 
subscribing to their duty to inherit the knowledge passed down to them by their professors.57   
 The implied necessity of the relationship between teacher and student for the pursuit of this 
‘knowledge’ creates what Oliver Davis calls a ‘pedagogical temporality of delay: the time to act 
would never come, the inequalities which were to be eliminated would always remain in place.’58  For 
Rancière, the primary aim of Althussser’s criticism of humanistic readings of Marx was to ensure the 
institutional privilege of intellectuals by asserting the political necessity of his own ‘scientific’ work 
to workers’ struggle.59  His notion of ‘theoretical practice’ appealed to a great many Marxist scholars 
as it offered them a place within the revolution precisely as intellectuals.60  Althusser held that Capital 
sought to understand social relations of production under capitalism within the context of the 
economic system and was therefore not a matter of interpretation but a scientific process of discovery.  
Such a process thus requires not only ‘serious’ study but the figure of the pedagogue able to instruct 
and pass on such scientific knowledge.  Debord here outlines his critique of structuralism: 
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L’affirmation de la stabilité définitive d’une courte période de gel du temps historique est la 
base indéniable, inconsciemment et consciemment proclamée, de l’actuelle tendance à une 
systématisation structuraliste.  Le point de vue où se place la pensée anti-historique du 
structuralisme est celui de l’éternelle présence d’un système qui n’a jamais été créé et qui ne 
finira jamais.  
The time for action would not come, for Debord, because structuralism is a symptom of the social 
conditions it endeavours to understand.  It is the institutionality of structuralism, its reliance on the 
academy for a fertile ground to be read, taught, and reproduced that makes it a complacent form of 
middle class thought, one he further describes as: ‘[une] pensée intégralement enfoncée dans l’éloge 
émerveillé du système existant, ramène platement toute réalité à l’existence du système’ (Thesis 201).  
Debord’s presentation of dialectical theory emphasises fluidity in contrast to this perceived rigidity: 
Dans son style même, l’exposé de la théorie dialectique est un scandale et une abomination 
selon les règles du langage dominant, et pour le goût qu’elles ont éduqué, parce que dans 
l’emploi positif des concepts existants, il inclut du même coup l’intelligence de leur fluidité 
retrouvée, de leur destruction nécessaire.  (Thesis 205) 
Debord again alludes to Marx, but here ‘fluidité’ replaces ‘négation’ in the postface to the second 
German edition of Capital.  This fluidity is in contrast to the ‘temps gelé’ that the spectacle engenders 
and structuralism, in Debord’s analysis, mimics.  Rather than relying on a notion of history as a 
progressive process that the spectacle impedes, this notion of fluidity implies recognition of the 
contingency and particularity of the spectacle’s construction at the same time as urging action in the 
present.  This is not necessarily done in the name of any ‘Human’ or unalienated ‘being’ but in 
acknowledgment of the potential of infinite other possibilities.  It is in the work of Raoul Vaneigem 
that we see the rather more Romantic image of the Situationists borne out.  He is less reticent than 
Debord to make mention of human nature and his lyrical prose provides a stark contrast to the icily 
clinical tone of La Société du Spectacle.  Vaneigem frequently discusses the project of a ‘homme 
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total’,61 issues rallying cries around notions of ‘humanité’ and ‘créativité’, and demonstrates a 
passionate and poetic style: 
La barque de l’amour se brise contre la vie courante.  Es-tu prêt, afin que jamais ton désir ne 
se brise, es-tu prêt à briser les récifs du vieux monde?  Il manque aux amants d’aimer leur 
plaisir avec plus de conséquence et de poésie…  Nous voici quelques-uns épris du plaisir 
d’aimer sans réserve, assez passionnément pour offrir à l’amour le lit somptueux d’une 
révolution.62 
Such passages exemplify the Situationists’ predilection for putting forth galvanising ideas in an 
attractive fashion and asserts their status not as a philosophical ‘movement’ or tendency within 
academic Marxism but as a revolutionary avant-garde who sought to change the world in which they 
lived.  This can be contrasted directly with Althusser, as we have seen in connection with Rancière.  
Perhaps the best examples of the Situationists’ effective sloganeering and incitement to revolt 
surround the events of May 1968, whilst les événements proved equally significant for 
Althusseriansim in a very different way.  Many of Vaneigem’s phrases adorned walls in Paris 
throughout the month of May: ‘Nous ne voulons pas d’un monde où la certitude de ne pas mourir de 
faim s’échange contre le risque de mourir d'ennui’, ran one such graffito. 63  Another such popular 
refrain at the time, it would not be unreasonable to surmise, saw Althusser as one of its targets: 
Ceux qui parlent de révolution et de lutte de classes sans se référer explicitement à la vie 
quotidienne, sans comprendre ce qu’il y a de subversive dans l’amour et de positif dans le 
refus des contraintes, ceux-là ont dans la bouche un cadavre.64 
Indeed, it is the events of May which are often associated with the discrediting of Althusserianism.  
Many members of the Situationist International took part in the occupation of the Sorbonne and 
formed the Conseil pour le Maintien des Occupations, holding various debates, attempting to form 
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some kind of organisation among the students before Debord became frustrated with what he 
perceived to be the student movements’ inherent conservatism, as we shall see in Chapter Four.  
Whilst Debord’s La Société du spectacle may be a work of jargon heavy ‘high theory’, it carried none 
of the institutionally-mortgaged baggage of salary and prestige, therefore none of the attendant air of 
hypocrisy in the context of the May events.  Nevertheless, as we will see in the following chapter on 
détournement, Rancière levels a similar charge of pedagogic didacticism at the Situationists.65 
The turn of phrase employed repeatedly by Debord and the Situationists, in describing the 
‘essentially scandalous truth’ of their writings and here the ‘scandal’ of dialectical theory, reveals a 
great deal about the manner in which they saw their thought acting in practice.  The word ‘scandale’ 
derives from the Septuagint Greek skandalon, a rendering of the term for ‘stumbling block’ in the 
Hebrew Bible, mikshowl.66  In an idiomatic usage in the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament, a 
stumbling block is a behavior or attitude that leads another person into sin.  As noted above, the 
Situationists saw the social orthodoxy established under the spectacle as the modern incarnation of the 
religious worldview.  They sought to lead others into ‘sin’ in resisting the hierarchies and orthodoxies 
to which the individual is submitted in everyday life.  Understood as this inducement to sin, 
Situationist theory becomes radically different in conception to the work of Althusser, Lefebvre, or 
Sartre.  The Situationists’ critique of professionalised Marxism emerges from their inducement to 
‘sin’ against all varieties of given social roles.  This raises the question of the Situationists’ 
expectation of those within the established hierarchies.  What of the student?  What, for that matter, 
do they expect of the proletariat?  Debord’s final ‘thesis on cultural revolution’ perhaps demonstrates 
how their uncompromising notion of the necessity of political praxis ultimately condemns the 
Situationists themselves: ‘Nous serons des “romantiques révolutionnaires”, au sens de Lefebvre, 
exactement dans la mesure de notre échec.’67  Their failure to ‘surmonter notre désaccord avec le 
monde’ and to bring about the ‘destruction extrême de toutes les formes de pseudo-communication, 
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pour parvenir un jour à une communication réelle directe (dans notre hypothèse d’emploi de moyens 
culturels supérieurs: la situation construite)’,68 potentially affords their writings an ongoing pertinence 
to cultural critique but it also testifies that the Situationist International itself ‘failed’ as a 
revolutionary group.  What amounts to Debord’s eventual admission of his and the group’s 
Romanticism demonstrates an eschatological approach to their praxis: had they succeeded, had those 
weeks in May fulfilled their promise and brought revolution to fruition, then their project could hardly 
have been conceived as mere academic or aesthetic contemplation of the possible.  This early 
declaration comes across as a utopian commitment, justifying their actions in the name of a liberating 
moment to come.  Moreover, any labour not deemed by their judgment to be immediately intended to 
bring about this utopia is condemned.  In the following section, I will attempt to elucidate this 
seemingly intractable sectarian zealotry in connection with the critique of modernity formulated by 
the Frankfurt School.    
 
Art, Leisure, Consumerism 
One important elaboration of Marx’s theory Debord would attempt in La Société du spectacle and 
which formed a mainstay of Situationist criticism throughout the group’s existence was the extension 
of the rule of the commodity and concomitant alienation of the individual subject into the realm of 
‘leisure’.  That is, time not engaged in production but that which is supposedly ‘free’.  Writing in the 
context of the trente glorieuses — the thirty or so years of post-war economic growth in France and 
much of Western Europe which saw the automobile and television in particular increasingly identified 
as the spoils of a burgeoning consumer society — the Situationists decried the direction of this 
economic and technological development as antithetical to human desires.69  Ivan Chtcheglov’s 
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Formulaire pour un urbanisme nouveau, originally written in 1953 and reprinted in the first issue of 
I.S. lamented that:  
Une maladie mentale a envahi la planète: la banalisation.  Chacun est hypnotisé par la 
production et le confort — tout-à-l’égout, ascenseur, salle de bains, machine à laver. 
Cet état de fait qui a pris naissance dans une protestation contre la misère dépasse son but 
lointain — libération de l’homme des soucis matériels — pour devenir une image obsédante 
dans l’immédiat.  Entre l’amour et le vide-ordure automatique la jeunesse de tous les pays a 
fait son choix et préfère le vide-ordure.70  
Chtcheglov’s words appear to espouse a repudiation of modern technologies which is uncharacteristic 
of the early Situationist enthusiasm for technical advance and its emancipatory potential.  What is 
here important for Situationist theory as it would develop throughout the sixties however, is the idea 
of the course of this advance far exceeding its goal of liberating mankind from material hardship.  
Fourteen years later, Debord theorises this excess in an era which affords greater independence from 
the struggle to survive, but does so only by condemning the individual to a different form of 
enslavement:   
La croissance économique libère les sociétés de la pression naturelle qui exigeait leur lutte 
immédiate pour la survie, mais alors c’est de leur libérateur qu’elles ne sont pas libérées. [...] 
L’économie transforme le monde, mais le transforme seulement en monde de l’économie.  La 
pseudo-nature dans laquelle le travail humain s’est aliéné exige de poursuivre à l’infini son 
service, et ce service, n’étant jugé et absous que par lui-même, en fait obtient la totalité des 
efforts et des projets socialement licites, comme ses serviteurs.  L’abondance des 
marchandises, c’est-à-dire du rapport marchand, ne peut être plus que la survie augmentée.  
(Thesis 40) 
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This notion of an augmented or heightened level of survival suggests the extension of Marx’s theory 
of commodity relations according to the technical capabilities of capitalism a century on from the first 
publication of Capital.  Debord diagnoses a solicitous spectacle which entreats the individual to 
become complicit in his or her exploitation.  The rewards of consumerism afford the worker the 
trappings of luxury in the form of the commodity.  It is a seductive ruse when the technological means 
at the disposal of the society of the spectacle permit a near permanent saturation of everyday life. 
This aspect of the theory of spectacle has distinct affinities with the critique Theodor Adorno 
(1903-1969) and Max Horkheimer (1895-1973) formulated of the ‘culture industry’ in their classic of 
twentieth-century Marxian critical theory, Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944).  Adorno and 
Horkheimer were two of the most prominent members of the Frankfurt School for Social Research, 
with which Herbert Marcuse, Wilhelm Reich and Walter Benjamin were also associated.  In Dialectic 
of Enlightenment, they contended that the rational project of enlightenment thought comprised self-
destructive tendencies from its very inception.  The identification of these inherent contradictions 
constituted Adorno and Horkheimer’s project ‘to explain why humanity, instead of entering a truly 
human state, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism.’71  Like Debord, Adorno and Horkheimer 
criticized the domination of the commodity over mankind, having ‘extended its arthritic influence 
over all aspects of social life’.72  This was nowhere more in evidence than in the realm of what they 
called the culture industry, which as early as the 1940s, Adorno and Horkheimer identified as the 
commodification of cultural forms submitted to the instrumental logic of capitalism.  They argued that 
the industrialisation of culture necessitates the homogenisation of the forms of artistic production.  
Whilst what Adorno and Horkheimer call ‘autonomous art’ has a critical capacity owing to its 
independence from the rationality of society, film, television and magazines come in pre-packaged 
consumable units which function seamlessly within the capitalist status quo.  The predictable and 
formulaic character of the culture industry is its defining attribute: in the same way that Debord would 
                                                          
71 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2002), p.xiv.  
72 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (London: Verso, 1997), p.28.  Translation selected above 
previous version, all further citations are from Stanford version.  
39 
 
contend that the spectacle sought to reproduce the existing society, Adorno and Horkheimer proclaim 
that ‘culture today is infecting everything with sameness’.73    
The culture industry, the production and dissemination of art forms as commodities, comes to 
dominate capitalist production in both the Frankfurt School analysis and Debord’s.  As Anselm Jappe 
points out, however, this concurrence cannot be considered in terms of ‘influence’ as there can be no 
question of Debord having read Adorno and Horkheimer’s work before the publication of La Société 
du spectacle: no book of Adorno’s was translated into French before 1974, two years after the 
dissolution of the Situationist International.74  Debord nevertheless describes the shift towards an 
economy of cultural production in a distinctly similar manner to Horkheimer and Adorno:  
La culture devenue intégralement marchandise doit aussi devenir la marchandise vedette de la 
société spectaculaire […] la culture doit tenir dans la seconde moitié de ce siècle le rôle 
moteur dans le développement de l’économie, qui fut celui de l’automobile dans sa première 
moitié, et des chemins de fer dans la seconde moitié du siècle précédent. (Thesis 193) 
This development necessitates a modification in the role of the proletariat in the commodity economy: 
‘À ce point de la “deuxième révolution industrielle”, la consommation aliénée devient pour les masses 
un devoir supplémentaire à la production aliénée’ (Thesis 42).  The continued growth of the economy, 
an indispensable precondition of capitalist organisation, now requires a further service of workers: 
this is the Situationists’ account of the emergence of the consumer society.  Debord quotes Marx’s A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy directly in expounding his elaboration of the latter’s 
theory of the proletarian as exploited during the process of production:  
Alors que dans la phase primitive de l’accumulation capitaliste ‘l’économie politique ne voit 
dans le prolétaire que l’ouvrier’, qui doit recevoir le minimum indispensable pour la 
conservation de sa force de travail, sans jamais le considérer ‘dans ses loisirs, dans son 
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humanité’, cette position des idées de la classe dominante se renverse aussitôt que le degré 
d’abondance atteint dans la production des marchandises exige un surplus de collaboration de 
l’ouvrier.  Cet ouvrier, soudain lavé du mépris total qui lui est clairement signifié par toutes 
les modalités d’organisation et surveillance de la production, se retrouve chaque jour en 
dehors de celle-ci apparemment traité comme une grande personne, avec une politesse 
empressée, sous le déguisement du consommateur.  Alors l’humanisme de la marchandise 
prend en charge ‘les loisirs et l’humanité’ du travailleur, tout simplement parce que 
l’économie politique peut et doit maintenant dominer ces sphères en tant qu’économie 
politique.  Ainsi ‘le reniement achevé de l’homme’ a pris en charge la totalité de l’existence 
humaine.  (Thesis 43) 
Herein lies the specificity of the era of spectacle over and above Marx’s analysis of a capitalism 
which deprives the workers of the spoils of their labour.  The spectacle requires the cooperation of a 
proletariat whom it continues to deprive of participation in the organisation of their everyday life 
which would constitute, for Debord, their fulfillment.  It is therefore, ‘une guerre de l’opium 
permanente pour faire accepter l’identification des biens aux marchandises’ (Thesis 44).  This notion 
of the spectacle which seeks to engender identification on behalf of the individual suggests an attempt 
to influence and to manipulate their consciousness.  Adorno and Horkheimer offer little or no concept 
of what a human consciousness free of the commodity’s domination might look like, instead prizing 
intellectual independence as their ultimate pursuit, an independence the culture industry impedes: ‘the 
countless agencies of mass production and its culture impress standardised behaviour on the 
individual as the only natural, decent, and rational one.’75  They describe this ‘impression’ of 
behaviour in greater detail at the end of the Culture Industry essay: 
The way in which the young girl accepts and performs the obligatory date, the tone of voice 
used on the telephone in the most intimate situations, the choice of words in conversation, 
indeed, the whole inner life compartmentalised according to the categories of vulgarised 
                                                          
75 Horkheimer and Adorno, p.135. 
41 
 
depth psychology, bears witness to the attempt to turn oneself into an apparatus meeting the 
requirements of success, an apparatus which, even in its unconscious impulses, conforms to 
the model presented by the culture industry.  The most intimate reactions of human beings 
have become so entirely reified, even to themselves, that the idea of everything peculiar to 
them survives only in extreme abstraction: personality means hardly more than dazzling white 
teeth and freedom from body odour and emotions.76 
It is the ubiquity and the uniformity of the culture industry which creates the possibility of this 
colonisation of the ‘inner life’.  The culture industry is responsible for distributing the criteria of 
‘success’, of the exemplary mode of conduct between people (just as we have seen Debord describe 
the spectacle as ‘un rapport social entre des personnes médiatisé par des images’ (Thesis 4)).  This 
concept of the manipulation or conditioning on behalf of the culture industry is a problematic one as 
the question of an individual’s identification with a ‘falsehood’ could imply an entirely subjective and 
immeasurable concept of ‘truth’.  Indeed, Jappe takes this further by contending that the critique of 
alienation in Debord is such that it precludes understanding the spectacle as a form of influence which 
elicits the collaboration of the individual by concocting enticements, instead portraying a total 
perversion of consciousness, reducing the ‘spectator’ to nothing more than an instrument of capital: 
What seems entirely to be absent from either History and Class Consciousness or The Society 
of the Spectacle is any hint that the subject might be under attack, within itself, from forces of 
alienation capable of conditioning its unconscious in such a way as to cause it to identify 
actively with the system in which it finds itself.77 
The implication being therefore that neither Debord, nor the Lukács of History and Class 
Consciousness ‘doubt for a moment that a “healthy”, non-reified subjectivity could exist’ in 
opposition to the alienated and that ‘Debord’s critique of the spectacle seems to resuscitate the need 
for an identical subject-object, as when he evokes “life”, understood as a fluid state in 
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contradistinction to the spectacle’s “congealed form” or its “visible freezing of life”’.78  Debord 
certainly has frequent recourse to describing the spectacle as a ‘falsification’ owing to the totalising 
nature of his rhetoric.  This notion of an ‘identical subject-object’ comes from Lukács’s History and 
Class Consciousness and Jappe accuses Debord of inheriting this idealism.  Despite acknowledging 
Debord’s conception of the human as irrevocably bound to time and history, Jappe stops short of 
acknowledging that this precludes any unification of ‘subject’ and ‘object’, by conceiving of human 
knowledge as constantly to be remade: 
Sans doute, le pseudo-besoin imposé dans la consommation moderne ne peut être opposé à 
aucun besoin ou désir authentique qui ne soit lui-même façonné par la société et son histoire.  
Mais la marchandise abondante est là comme la rupture absolue d’un développement 
organique des besoins sociaux.  Son accumulation mécanique libère un artificiel illimité, 
devant lequel le désir vivant reste désarmé.  La puissance cumulative d’un artificiel 
indépendant entraîne partout la falsification de la vie sociale.  (Thesis 68) 
‘Pseudo-needs’ the spectacle conjures to induce the spectator’s fidelity to the rule of the commodity 
(be they actual physical commodities, a car or the latest fashionable item of clothing, or abstract 
notions of social standing and ‘success’) are explicitly not the reverse of ‘authentic desires’ borne of a 
healthy, unalienated consciousness.  All desires, Debord concedes, are socially and historically 
constructed but, where they coincide with the perpetuation of the hierarchisation of the commodity 
economy, they must be opposed.  In some respects, Debord is here far closer to Adorno than to 
Lukács.  Susan Buck-Morss argues, in her analysis of Adorno, Walter Benjamin and the Frankfurt 
School that this subject-object identification is the point at which Adorno broke with Lukács’s 
conflation of the proletarian consciousness and ‘truth’.79  Reading Debord as preserving this 
identification permits the characterisation of Situationist theory as idealist and therefore open to 
charges of a reductive humanist essentialism or a teleological ‘faith’ in the process of ‘History’ as 
agent.  Buck-Morss also describes how Adorno rejected the traditional Marxist conception of the 
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proletariat as motor of history, which leads us to consider the role of the proletariat in Debord’s 
theory, which is perhaps less clear cut than it would initially appear.   
Debord and the Situationists explicitly invoke the proletariat as the revolutionary class whose 
ascent onto the historical stage would overcome the rule of the commodity.80  Debord, as Jappe rightly 
notes, however, is prone to vacillation in his characterisation of the proletariat: at once casting it the 
traditional Marxist sense of the workers who sell their labour and as the entirety of humanity who are 
deprived of ‘activity’ and ‘life’, enslaved to the commodity by the spectacle.81  The notion of 
proletarianisation as an expansive process suggests that all individuals find themselves in the 
proletarianised state by living their life under the totalising dominion of the spectacle.  The proletariat 
traditionally defined derived their identity from their labour: it was they who produced the material 
transformation of nature under capitalist relations of production only to have the fruits of this labour 
expropriated by the bourgeoisie.  What was expropriated from the proletariat was their access to ‘life’ 
itself owing to the domination of the commodity economy over all human activity.  If this is the case, 
then those previously designated the bourgeois must also have their activity equally expropriated: ‘Ce 
prolétariat est objectivement renforcé par le mouvement de disparition de la paysannerie, comme par 
l’extension de la logique du travail en usine qui s’applique à une grande partie des “services” et des 
professions intellectuelles’ (Thesis 114).  Urbanisation incorporates the peasantry into the proletarait, 
whilst the extension of the logic of the factory to the office (as this formulation of Debord’s might be 
updated) reiterates the process of ‘proletarianisation’ described in the earlier thesis.  The Situationist 
analysis of class, then, seems fluid and it is therefore difficult to understand revolution as 
conceptualised by the Situationists in terms of class warfare, despite their frequent invocation of the 
proletariat.  
The question of consumerism further obscures the identity of the proletariat.  If their (albeit 
‘falsified’) consciousness leads them to participate in the prolongation of the reign of the commodity, 
then their inherent antagonism to capitalism is called into question:  
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Dans ce développement complexe et terrible qui a emporté l’époque des luttes de classes vers 
de nouvelles conditions, le prolétariat des pays industriels a complètement perdu l’affirmation 
de sa perspective autonome et, en dernière analyse, ses illusions, mais non son être.  Il n’est 
pas supprimé.  Il demeure irréductiblement existant dans l’aliénation intensifiée du 
capitalisme moderne: il est l’immense majorité des travailleurs qui ont perdu tout pouvoir sur 
l’emploi de leur vie, et qui, dès qu’ils le savent, se redéfinissent comme le prolétariat, le 
négatif à l’œuvre dans cette société.  (Thesis 114)  
This proletariat, which seems fungible in its constituents of any and all classes as previously defined, 
is opposed to the society of the spectacle as a whole.  What Debord declares necessary is a prise de 
conscience on behalf of this broadly conceived proletariat: they must realise the need to resist the 
alienated consciousness of the spectacle.  The implication that the contemplative step of ‘knowing’ or 
realising their proletarian state sees the worker ascend to the historical stage somewhat bypasses the 
question of practice and organisation.  This conception of the proletariat seems to largely ignore the 
existence of real material poverty and inequality; the discussion of ‘survival’ being surmounted and 
privation existing predominantly in its ‘enriched’ guise equally fails to take this into account.  Theirs 
is something of a complacent disposition towards a phenomenon which unquestionably remains a 
social ailment today, both globally and within the ‘developed’ world itself.  
This contemplative notion of the proletariat also problematizes the Situationist endorsement 
of workers’ councils as a post-revolutionary form of government.  The incongruence of the rhetorical 
invocation of a traditionally conceived proletariat and the abstract theorisation of a proletarianised 
population renders the question of post-capitalist organisation difficult.  The most extensive 
theoretical meditation on the workers’ council in Debord’s La Société du spectacle runs as follows:  
C’est le lieu où les conditions objectives de la conscience historique sont réunies; la 
réalisation de la communication directe active, où finissent la spécialisation, la hiérarchie et la 
séparation, où les conditions existantes ont été transformées ‘en conditions d’unité’.  Ici le 
sujet prolétarien peut émerger de sa lutte contre la contemplation: sa conscience est égale à 
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l’organisation pratique qu’elle s’est donnée, car cette conscience même est inséparable de 
l’intervention cohérente dans l’histoire.  (Thesis 116)  
Specialisation, hierarchy and separation are obliterated by the workers’ council; in ‘direct’, ‘active’ 
communication, the council provides ‘unitary conditions’ for the ‘proletarian subject’ to emerge from 
the fight against ‘contemplation’ and ascend to the plane of ‘historical’ action.  The thesis brings 
together a considerable catalogue of the terms used by Debord to denounce the spectacle and 
proclaims their obliteration in favour of an equally lengthy résumé of the affirmative categories of 
Debord’s theorisation.  Though we may seem once again to be in the presence of a Lukácsian subject-
object, the kingdom of the ‘healthy subjectivity’, passages such as this, and characterisations of 
Debord and the Situationists such as this which ultimately reduce them to this position, disregard the 
extent to which Debord saw his work not as a theoretical framework for revolutionary action, but as a 
prelude to this revolutionary action itself by seeking to provoke such a prise de conscience.   
Debord’s theses on détournement (which will be looked at in detail in Chapter Two) saw him 
attempt to establish a theoretical basis for an ‘insurrectional style’.  Debord’s description of critical 
theory states that, ‘il n’est pas une négation du style, mais le style de la négation.’  This chiasmus, 
particularly in the form of the inversion of the genitive, was a rhetorical device employed frequently 
by the Situationists.  Chiastic structure is a literary technique which dates back to the ancient Greek 
study of rhetoric and was also common in the ancient Hebrew and Greek texts of the Old and New 
Testaments, as well as the Qur’an.82  Debord describes how this device was used by both Hegel and 
Marx, its purpose being to demonstrate the fluidity of words and their meanings as well as ideas and 
the concepts behind them.  The negation described above in terms of style and this demonstration of 
the perpetual pliability of words and concepts seeks to oppose the spectacle by exalting everything the 
spectacle is not, any desire or action which is destructive to the preservation of existing hierarchies.  
Even the concept of situation and most especially the endorsement of councilism are mere vestiges of 
a theory, the former constituting no more than the negative of spectacle, casually theorised in some 
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Lettrist and early Situationist writings then virtually jettisoned altogether by the mid-sixties.  Debord 
states that ‘La vérité de cette société n’est rien d’autre que la négation de cette société’ (Thesis 199), 
by which we should understand that his model of intellectual and political activism begins exclusively 
negatively, that is to say, critically.  In this way, it recalls apophatic, ‘negative’ theology, the via 
negativa that sought to describe the existence of God by virtue of what He is not.  Jacques Derrida 
describes negative theology, a concept with which his thought came to be associated, as ‘a language 
that does not cease testing the very limits of language, and exemplarily those of propositional, 
theoretical, or constative language’,83 in a formulation reminiscent of Debord on the insubordination 
of words and the Situationists’ uncompromising critique of academic theory.  In the same essay, 
Derrida describes negative theology as ‘paradoxical hyperbole’,84 which is perhaps an interesting 
perspective on Situationist theory; a theoretical discourse which denounces the spectacle in its entirety 
whilst acknowledging that nothing can exist independently or outside of social and cultural mediation 
and does so with a frequent and extravagant rhetorical violence. 
Buck-Morss describes how philosophy was criticism and negation for Adorno, whilst ‘both 
philosophy and art had a moral-pedagogic function, in the service of politics not as manipulative 
propaganda, but rather as teaching by example.’85  For Adorno, writing itself was praxis, in a self-
legitimising formulation much like Althusser’s ‘theoretical practice’.  Just as he contended that the 
true work of art derived its critical capacity from its complete independence from material concerns 
— praising its status as a separate sphere — he espoused ‘non-participation’: he insisted on the 
freedom of the intellectual from Party control, indeed from all direct concern as to the effect of his 
work upon the public, while at the same time maintaining that valid intellectual activity was 
revolutionary in itself.’86  Adorno did nothing to stop police evicting students occupying the Frankfurt 
Institute in 1969; he had little or no hope in the students’ political activism, in contrast to the 
Situationists’ frequently stated revolutionary ambitions and their involvement in May ’68.  Whereas, 
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for Adorno, an ‘autonomous’ art and independent intellectual inquiry were the limits of possible 
resistance to the status quo, the Situationists’ denunciation of all forms of spectacular knowledge held 
that art and philosophy were no different: both required ‘suppression and realisation’ and thus no 
concept of ‘validity’ could avoid implying a spectacular hierarchisation of knowledge.  Though both 
Adorno and Debord criticised Lukács’ commitment to the Communist party — as Debord wrote: 
‘Lukàcs [sic] vérifie au mieux la règle fondamentale qui juge tous les intellectuels de ce siècle: ce 
qu’ils respectent mesure exactement leur propre réalité méprisable’ (Thesis 112) — Adorno, in his 
fetishisation of ‘intellectual independence’, upheld the validity of philosophy and art as separate, 
autonomous realms.  The writings of Debord and the Situationists respected or affirmed nothing other 
than the rejection of all pre-established cultural forms and set about a project of engendering such a 
prise de conscience on behalf of everyone else.  The Situationist definition of détournement, 
presented in the first issue of their journal, declared that there could be no Situationist painting or 
music, only a Situationist use of these means in the form of ‘educative propaganda’; it is tempting to 
consider their theoretical writings in these terms.  In Chapter Two I wish to examine the pedagogic 
and propagandistic elements of détournement, whilst in Chapter Three I will seek to examine the 
ethical nature of the prise de conscience that their theory seems to imply.   
Jappe contends that the S.I. refused to proselytize, in contrast to this characterisation of their 
works as best understood as propaganda and seduction: ‘In sharp contrasts to organisations of 
“militants”, the S.I. not only refused to proselytize, it also made entry into the group particularly 
difficult: one of the conditions required was to be “possessed of genius” (IS, 9/43)!’87  Though they 
did not seek to recruit members in ever greater numbers, they certainly proselytised their cause and 
were not shy of referring to their work as propaganda in pursuit of this goal.  Lukács famously 
repudiated History and Class Consciousness, in a preface to the 1967 edition, where he described the 
identical subject-object that Jappe sees Debord as inheriting as a ‘fundamental and crude error’ which 
he says ‘certainly contributed greatly to the book’s success’.88  Such notions, along with those such as 
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‘humanity’ and ‘life’, which Jappe criticises in Situationist theory, are often employed as rhetorically 
expedient: attractive notions that clothe their writings within the intellectual history of the past just as 
the barricade served as an emblem of previous revolutionary struggles during May.89  By 
understanding Situationist theory first and foremost as a provocation rather than an exposition in 
coherent theoretical discourse, what Jappe discerns as this inheritance from Lukács might better be 
explained as an opposition to that which exists.  As Debord writes: 
Les ‘sociétés froides’ sont celles qui ont ralenti à l’extrême leur part d’histoire; qui ont 
maintenu dans un équilibre constant leur opposition à l’environnement naturel et humain, et 
leurs oppositions internes…  Dans chacune de ces sociétés, une structuration définitive a 
exclu le changement.  Le conformisme absolu des pratiques sociales existantes, auxquelles se 
trouvent à jamais identifiées toutes les possibilités humaines, n’a plus d’autre limite extérieure 
que la crainte de retomber dans l’animalité sans forme.  Ici, pour rester dans l’humain, les 
hommes doivent rester les mêmes.  (Thesis 130) 
What Debord denounces is the return of the same, the perceived immutability of economic and 
cultural organisation.  The idea of ‘human possibilities’ need not seek to designate an identical 
subject-object or ‘unalienated’, ‘healthy’ consciousness but rather seek to name a desirable concept in 
the direction of social change.  Likewise, Debord’s condemnation of ‘le temps général de la société, 
ne signifiant que les intérêts spécialisés qui le constituent, n’est qu’un temps particulier’ (Thesis 146) 
need not invoke a Hegelian teleology of history, but instead denounces a particular form of social 
organisation which serves particular interests.  To quote Henri Lefebvre’s account of ‘dialectical 
method’, it is possible to read his assessment of the infinite task of criticism as the ultimate conclusion 
that Situationist theory presents but cannot allow itself to admit owing to the avowedly ‘political’ 
nature of their goals:  
                                                          
89 See Keith Reader, ‘The Symbolic Violence of the May 1968 Events in France’, in Violence and Conflict in 
Modern French Culture, ed. by Renate Gunter and Jan Windebank (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994), 
57-69. 
49 
 
Dialectical method excludes the possibility that there can be nothing more to say about the 
human or about any domain of human activity.  On the contrary, it supposes that the 
knowledge of man and his realization are mutually inseparable and constitute a total process.  
To penetrate ever more deeply into the content of life, to seize it in its shifting reality, to be 
ever more lucid about the lessons it has to teach us — this is the essential precept of 
research.90 
Whilst this may indeed be the aim of research, it constitutes an implicit renunciation of praxis, of 
action and of the struggle for immediate social change (as opposed to a pedagogy of delay).  The 
tactical invocation of a rhetoric of a revolutionary utopianism carries with it a galvanising potential 
for action in the here and now, and it is this which the Situationists saw their work as pursuing.   
 
Technology and Desire 
In order to better understand this mode of theory-as-rhetoric, it is worth examining the Situationists’ 
writings on the technological and its role in the shaping of desire.  Debord’s embellishment of Marx’s 
work hinges on the technological development which took place over the intervening century between 
their respective times of writing.  By examining Debord and the Situationists’ understanding of the 
technological, we can better understand both Debord’s relationship to Marx and the theoretical 
propositions made.  The acceleration of scientific progress and concomitant technical development 
was rapid during the first half of the twentieth century and has, of course, continued since Debord’s 
time of writing.  Debord and the Situationists’ analysis of this changing environment reveals both a 
striking pertinence of their thought to the contemporary moment and, inevitably, certain limits to the 
theory of spectacle’s enduring relevance.  This section will offer a critique of the Situationist 
conceptualisation of the technological alongside consideration of Marx and the more recent 
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theorisations of philosopher Bernard Stiegler’s technics, further demonstrating the incompatibility of 
Situationist theory with metaphysical or humanistic readings.  
There is a distinct ambivalence throughout the Situationists’ corpus towards the question of 
technology.  The Situationists’ writings demonstrate an equivocal prognosis concerning the 
emancipatory potential of technological advance.  In the 1950s, the early and pre-Situationist 
movement was characterised by experimentation within the urban milieu in the form of the dérive, 
psychogéographie and urbanisme unitaire.  These investigations reach their futuristic apogee in 
Constant Nieuwenhuys’s plans, sketches, manifestos and models for ‘New Babylon’— a utopian city 
of the future where ‘constructed situations’ could be realised.  Helicopters were to fly above as road 
and rail operated beneath a city-on-stilts.91  In the first issue of the journal Internationale 
situationniste, an article entitled ‘Positions situationnistes sur la circulation’ went as far as to assert 
that:  
Ceux qui croient l’automobile éternelle ne pensent pas, même d’un point de vue étroitement 
technique, aux autres formes de transport futures.  Par exemple, certains des modèles 
d’hélicoptères individuels qui sont actuellement expérimentés par l’armée des États-Unis 
seront probablement répandus dans le public avant vingt ans.92 
This is perhaps one of Debord’s less prescient assertions yet displays a belief in the radical potential 
for the transformation of everyday life in the second half of the century.93  More explicitly 
optimistically, Debord would go on to write in the next issue: ‘L’automatisation de la production et la 
socialisation des biens vitaux réduiront de plus en plus le travail comme nécessité extérieur, et 
donneront enfin la liberté complète à l’individu.’94  He posits that technological development not only 
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has the capacity to, but in fact will, liberate the individual from an alienated labour born of social 
necessity via automation.  The same Debord, however, wrote contemptuously of ‘la puérilité de 
l’optimisme technique’ three years earlier.95  By the same token, the Situationists railed against the 
post-war trente glorieuses era renovations of Paris and the sarcellisation of the banlieue.  They took 
inspiration from the middle ages,96 from the Native-American gift-giving ceremony of ‘potlatch’, to 
which the name of the International Lettrists’ journal was given, as well as lauding the nomadism of 
gypsy peoples as an anthropological model to emulate for a post-revolutionary society.  Debord’s later 
filmic work and in particular his memoir Panégyrique (1989) carry a mood of elegiac nostalgia 
redolent of a writer-director fatigued of his times and pining for a bygone era.97   
Patrick Marcolini rehearses these contradictions at length in his chapter on the ‘Romantisme’ 
of the S.I.98  His contention is that the Romantic inspiration of the critique of spectacle and the 
Situationists’ technological-utopian declarations can be likened to the latent and manifest content of a 
dream in Freudian analysis.  Marcolini alleges that progessivist and productivist ideology of the post-
war era was profoundly embedded in the consciousness of the time and that owing to this any critique 
of modernity was bound necessarily to defend this modernity itself.  He alleges that this injunction 
was: 
redoublée par le marxisme régnant dans l’intelligentsia française d’après-guerre: un marxisme 
portant encore les stigmates des orthodoxies social-démocrate puis stalinienne, économiciste, 
productiviste à outrance, et vecteur d’une idéologie du progrès fatal de l’humanité. […] De 
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façon assez étonnante, les situationnistes sont restés tributaires de ce marxisme-là, en dépit 
des critiques qu’ils lui ont dressés.99 
Accusing the Situationists of such a profoundly incongruous automatism — that they were guilty of 
internalising the fundaments of an intellectual climate they so explicitly denounced — attributes great 
significance to the dubious question of influence.  Marcolini’s characterisation of Debord’s post-
Situationist output as anti-industrial and rather more ‘mélancholique’100 is less problematic than his 
desire to trace this unquestioningly to the Debord of La Société du spectacle and the I.S. journal, 
particularly as the smooth timeline between the ‘young’ and the ‘mature’ Debord is complicated by 
the latter’s vacillation between embrace and denunciation of the technical throughout the fifties and 
sixties, rather than moving gradually from one to the other.  Though Marcolini rightly identifies the 
common idealism between the two seemingly contradictory paths of a Romanticism bound to the 
notion of an inalienable human nature and utopian technical determinism, his attempt to impute both 
of these positions to the S.I. belies a more elusive and complex understanding of the human and the 
technical that can be drawn out from their work.  Marcolini is quite accurate in describing Debord and 
the Situationists’ critique of technology as ‘inachevée’,101 less so in his reductive Freudian analogy of 
why this is: 
Les contradictions qui apparaissent dans la théorie et la pratique situationnistes peuvent donc 
être lues comme des formes imparfaites de compromis ou de conciliation entre ce 
tempérament romantique, pour lequel les formations sociales prémodernes servaient de repère 
imaginaire, et les interdits posés à ce type de sensibilité par le surmoi progressiste de leur 
temps.102 
Rather than leaving the question of this ambiguity to insubstantial notions of temperament, sensibility 
or superegoic injunctions, it is the contention of what follows that the manifest tension present in 
Situationist writings on the technological can be traced to a theoretical impasse within Marx’s work.   
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In order to explore this tension, then, it is necessary to once again return to Marx, this time via 
contemporary discussions of the philosophy of technology.   
Derrida has described Marx as ‘le premier penseur de la technique’,103 and in his book on 
‘originary technicity’ — that is, the notion of the human and the technical as inseparable from the 
former’s inception and that biological evolution occurs in a mutually shaped process alongside the 
technical — Arthur Bradley describes an aporia in Marx’s thinking between this notion of originary 
technicity, moving beyond the Aristotelian notion of the technical as a tool employed by the human in 
the pursuit of pre-determined ends and the residual humanism of his German Idealist education.104  
Bradley refers to Capital’s meditations on thermo-dynamic theory, on workers’ bodies being 
themselves technical entities, how labour and the transformation of our external environment in the 
development and use of machines in turn modifies our bodies.  He argues that whilst Marx is the first 
to think the human and the technical together, the notions of a collective human essence of labour, a 
philosophy of alienation and a politics of emancipation prevent him from understanding the human in 
any other way than preceding or exceeding the technical.105   
Bradley argues against philosopher Bernard Stiegler’s contention that Marx simply upholds 
the Aristotelian instrumentalist conception of technics.  Stiegler similarly accuses Debord of having 
overlooked the role of the technological in the process of proletarianisation.106  Stiegler’s primary 
contention is that the human and technics are constitutive of one another.  What distinguishes the 
human is evolution by means other than genetics, the recording and distribution of experience in the 
form of technics, or ‘la matière inorganique organisée’.107 Stiegler calls this process of external 
evolution epiphylogenesis (as opposed to biological evolution: phylogenesis).  Importantly, this 
externalisation signals, for Stiegler, the invention of the human.  It is impossible, therefore, for 
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Stiegler, to speak of any notion of the human which is not inherently bound to technics, whether in 
terms of consciousness or biology.  It is the concept of tertiary memory, which emerges towards the 
end of the first volume of La Technique et le temps series, that is most crucial for Stiegler’s 
relationship to Debord’s spectacle.  Referring to the recording and distribution of experience inscribed 
upon external objects, as opposed to primary memory (genetics) and secondary memory (lived 
experience), tertiary memory becomes a dominant theme, notably in the third volume, Le Temps du 
cinéma et la question du mal-être.  The externalisation of memory — beginning with the written word 
and culminating in the digital technologies of today — establishes an historical context into which the 
individual is thrust.  It is the industrialisation of these tertiary retentions which constitutes his 
understanding of proletarianisation — a disenfranchising estrangement from knowledge, as Stiegler 
defines it.  He argues that this constitutes a process of ‘the loss of knowledge(s): savoir-faire, savoir-
vivre, theoretical knowledge (savoir théoriser), in the absence of which all savor [sic] is lost.’108  It is 
the industrialisation of tertiary memory which broaches the possibility of political disenfranchisement 
in the hands of monopolistic and self-interested corporations, rather than the originary process of 
exteriorisation itself.  The industrialisation of tertiary memory becomes close to the culture industry of 
the Frankfurt School analysis in Stiegler’s account, without the pessimistic outlook for the future.109  
Indeed, Stiegler borrows from his mentor Derrida by discussing technics as pharmakon — that is, 
poison, cure and scapegoat for contemporary social conditions: ‘a technology of the spirit which, as 
tertiary retention, can just as well lead to the proletarianisation of the life of the mind as it can to its 
critical intensification.’110  These technologies then, have the capacity to stultify and enchain the 
consciousness of the individual but also to engender critical responses towards the status quo.  
Stiegler suggests that new technologies are equally capable of realising new desires, new social and 
political configurations outside of those which already exist. 
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Stiegler states that ‘what Marx was unable to forsee […] was the way in which consumption 
would be reconfigured in the twentieth century in an essential relation to desire and to the 
economy.’111  Stiegler acknowledges that Debord extends the concept of proletarianisation to the 
consumer, but ‘Debord was unable, however, to connect this change in the capitalist system to the 
pharmacological question of the exteriorisation techniques.’112  Where Stiegler alleges he moves 
beyond Debord is in comprehension of these technical apparatuses’ irrevocable modification of what 
constitutes the human itself, rather than as a tool of a class of producers over a class of spectators.113  
Debord and the Situationists certainly did not form a critique that examines the intrinsic and 
fundamental entwinement of life and technicity: this is perhaps partly why we see such conflicting 
and confused pronouncements regarding the technological.  The inheritance of Marx’s aporetic 
understanding of technology, however, lends an ambiguity that is not immediately apparent to 
Debord’s contribution in La Société du spectacle: 
Mais le spectacle n’est pas ce produit nécessaire du développement technique regardé comme 
un développement naturel.  La société du spectacle est au contraire la forme qui choisit son 
propre contenu technique.  Si le spectacle, pris sous l’aspect restreint des ‘moyens de 
communications de masse’, qui sont sa manifestation superficielle la plus écrasante, peut 
paraître envahir la société comme une simple instrumentation, celle-ci n’est en fait rien de 
neutre, mais l’instrumentation même qui convient à son auto-mouvement total.  Si les besoins 
sociaux de l’époque où se développent de telles techniques ne peuvent trouver de satisfaction 
que par leur médiation, si l’administration de cette société et tout contact entre les hommes ne 
peuvent plus s’exercer que par l’intermédiaire de cette puissance de communication 
instantanée, c’est parce que cette ‘communication’ est essentiellement unilatérale; de sorte 
que sa concentration revient à accumuler dans les mains de l’administration du système 
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existant les moyens qui lui permettent de poursuivre cette administration déterminée.  (Thesis 
124)  
This passage initially seems to place Debord back in the realm of the anti-technological thinker.  He 
begins by cautioning against the notion of ‘natural’ technological development — that an objective 
scientific knowledge develops for its own sake according to its own logic — locating this passage far 
away from any notion of technical determinism.  The next sentence takes a vast stride in the direction 
of cultural constructivism, ascribing the spectacle an agency which ‘chooses’ its technical content.  
Debord similarly refutes the notion of the neutrality of technical apparatuses with which the spectacle 
constitutes itself materially.  The unilaterality of these apparatuses is what maintains the subordination 
of the spectator: the mediation of communication sees it ‘flow’ only one way, hierarchically.  
Certainly, during the 1960s, French radio and television were centrally controlled by the state in the 
guise of the Office de Radiodiffusion Télévision Française (ORTF), instituted in the Assemblée 
nationale on the 26th June 1964, which preserved a near monopoly over broadcasting.114  Luminaries 
of the left such as Sartre and de Beauvoir refused to appear on the radio and television, as well as 
refusing permission for productions of their work to be broadcast, owing to this monopolistic state 
control.  This conception, however, of technological apparatuses appears undermined today by 
Stiegler’s more anti-deterministic theorisation, not to mention the multilaterality of the digital media.  
It is obvious that the capacity to not only select between virtually infinite forms of information and 
images as well as uploading material oneself — in addition to the omnipresence of this material in the 
age of the smartphone and twenty-four hour connectivity — is indicative of a media landscape which 
has changed beyond recognition from the late 1960s.  Yet whilst the growth of digital technologies 
has certainly permitted a greater participation in the creation of ‘content’ consumed, what is 
nevertheless apparent is that this more often than not takes place on websites such as YouTube or 
Facebook, owned by global multinational corporations far more powerful and influential than the 
ORTF — the new ‘administration du système existant’.  Indeed, in the above thesis of Debord’s, if we 
consider the spectacle as closer to Stiegler’s industrialisation of tertiary memory, rather than 
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‘technics’ or ‘contenu technique’ per se, then Stiegler’s conception of of proletarianisation, in its 
equally nebulous and totalising character, seems to differ little from Debord’s, despite his claim have 
better understood the nature of technicity. 
Of this corporatism between state and industry, Armand Mattelart and André Vitalis chart a 
genealogy of technologies of control from the nineteenth century ‘livret ouvrier’, via Fordism, to the 
modern day user profiling by companies and nation states alike who track the every movement of 
entire populations online.115  The ‘livret ouvrier’ was a compulsory document introduced under 
Napoleon in 1803 in order to track the movements of workers; Mattelart and Vitalis track the 
phenomenon of the ever-growing registration and classification of populations in accordance with the 
advance of technological capabilities culminating in Edward Snowden’s revelation of the NSA’s 
PRISM surveillance program of 2013.  Though they do not use the term itself, their argument evokes 
the notion of proletarianisation in its description of techniques used initially to control workers being 
extended and perfected to encompass entire populations.  Such surveillance techniques demonstrate 
the capacity of governments and industry to employ new technologies to this end, however, an 
arguably far more insidious form of control requires the willing submissive co-operation of the 
individual.  This co-option of the individual into his or her own subjugation has been the focus of the 
Western Marxist tradition since the Frankfurt school’s conflation of Freud and Marx.  Debord’s 
theory of spectacle considers this internalisation of society’s values and standards both aesthetically 
and technologically, in a manner which does not preclude the possibility of new technologies 
engendering progressive and emancipatory outcomes.  In this light we can partly redeem Debord’s 
notion of unilaterality, even in the context of the apparent multilaterality of our contemporary digital 
technologies.  Internet-focused utopianism surrounded the advent of the ‘Web 2.0’in 2003: the notion 
of the supposedly emancipated ‘prod-user’ who both consumes and produces was heralded as a 
democratic development.116  Mattelart and Vitalis quote Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg 
describing how although advertisers can come up with the most original material imaginable, there is 
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no greater recommendation to purchase a commodity than seeing one’s friends consuming it.117  
Mattelart and Vitalis concentrate on the clandestine commercial interests of the company, but the 
most interesting aspect of the Zuckerberg quotation is the implication that individuals are now 
supposed to act as advertisers to those in their social circle.  It is incumbent upon the spectator to 
produce the images which ensure their continued submission to the commodity.  Indeed, the 
emulation of the fashions, tastes, even facial expressions seen in more traditional forms of media by 
individual users of social media websites such as Facebook, Instagram or YouTube users is an 
observable phenomenon.118  This identification with and internalisation of the values of the 
commodity — recognisable in Debord’s theory of spectacle where he describes the ‘imposture de la 
satisfaction’ (Thesis 70) and the ‘fabrication ininterrompue des pseudo-besoins’ (Thesis 51) — is also 
thought by Stiegler.  In the third volume of La Technique et le temps: le temps du cinéma et la 
question du mal-être (2001), Stiegler argues through a discussion of tertiary memory (a recorded 
temporal object, the technology of the moving image generally) and its ineluctable modification of 
primary retention, or perception, that consciousness is essentially structured cinematically.  This 
explains why, for Stiegler, cinema can be understood as a singularly persuasive force, going as far as 
describing cinema as having ‘persuaded the whole world to adopt the American way of life’.119  
Consequently, as Stiegler contends elsewhere, the political question is an aesthetic question.  As 
Daniel Ross has described:  
 [Stiegler] specifies that aesthetics, here, is to be taken in the widest sense, that is, as sensation 
in general, not only ‘perceptibility’ but taste, feeling, sensibility.  The point here is that 
perception, sensation, feeling, taste, are not only individual but immediately social 
phenomena, and thus that the question of living together, of becoming together, of living in 
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common with the other through a process of common becoming, is something which can only 
occur through an understanding of, and a feeling for, one another, and which can therefore 
only occur via a medium which makes this possible, that is, an aesthetic medium.120 
The industrialisation of tertiary memory then — that is, the cinematic image broadly considered, 
encompassing television in particular — constitutes an aesthetic form of mediation which is able to 
harness consciousness.  Debord comments in the above cited thesis 24 that ‘Le spectacle est le 
discours ininterrompu que l’ordre présent tient sur lui-même, son monologue élogieux.  C’est l’auto-
portrait du pouvoir à l’époque de sa gestion totalitaire des conditions d’existence.’  Debord’s 
understanding could also be read as far more relevant to today’s new media landscape if we consider 
his notion of spectacle as the result of this industrialisation of tertiary memory.   
If, as I have attempted to demonstrate, we can free Debord’s theory from the yoke of a 
Romantic evocation of ‘human essence’ in the form of an avowal of unalienated life and understand 
Situationist theory as tactical intervention aimed at critiquing the dominance of a particular form of 
social organisation, then it is possible to view the critique of spectacle as acknowledging the 
inevitability of mediation and communication, and consequently exteriorisation and alienation, in the 
construction of human society.  Indeed, it is tempting to read Debord’s earlier enthusiastic comments 
on the technological in a more ambiguous and pragmatic (rather than Romantic) manner: ‘Une 
nouvelle force humaine, que le cadre existant ne pourra pas dompter, s’accroît de jour en jour avec 
l’irrésistible développement technique, et l’insatisfaction de ses emplois possibles dans notre vie 
sociale privée de sens.’121  Firstly, it is an ‘untameable’ human force which grows with an 
‘irresistible’ — that is to say, inevitable and impossible to reverse — technical development.  The 
vocabulary of the animal is here as one with the technical in the description of this human force, 
blurring the boundaries between life and technics.  Though such utopianism unquestionably receded 
as the 1960s wore on, this conflation of the human and the technical demonstrates a willingness to 
understand the two together, if not perhaps outside of the Aristotelian schema of technics as tool 
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which Stiegler accuses Marx of upholding, then at least in a rather less formally deterministic (that is, 
technological advance is ‘chosen’ by the agency of the spectacle which then determines future social 
relations) conception of social relations that Marcolini’s reading of the Debord and the Situationists 
yields.  There is no question that Debord fails to think the human and the technical as mutually 
constitutive, yet as Bradley notes, charges of anthropocentrism have been levelled at Stiegler, as have 
accusations of technological determinism.  Indeed, Bradley critiques the concept of originary 
technicity, from Marx to Derrida, as itself failing to be truly ‘technical all the way down’:122 
Perhaps this aporia at the heart of Marxian philosophy of technology — man versus matter; 
idealism versus materialism; anthropocentrism versus technological determinism — is what 
really makes Marx our contemporary because […] it is nothing less than the aporia of 
originary technicity itself.123 
What Bradley fails to adumbrate is why such a philosophy is desirable, let alone whether it is in fact 
achievable.  As we have seen above, he describes Marx’s adherence to a politics of emancipation as 
an impediment to a thoroughgoing theory of technicity.  Stiegler’s denunciation of the 
proletarianisation propagated by the industrialisation of tertiary memory is at once the anthropocentric 
and attemptedly politically galvanising aspect of his thought on technics.  Similarly, for Debord and 
the Situationists, whether their critique of technology can be considered ‘achevée’ (in Marcolini’s 
terms) or not is of secondary importance to the insight their writings can offer in the construction of a 
politics of emancipation.  The inheritance of Marx’s contradictions regarding technology invite a 
reading of the Situationists’ ambiguous attitude towards the technological in a more interesting and 
productive manner than Marcolini’s diagnosis of a suppressed Romanticism combined with a 
technophilia born from an ambient epochal optimism of the trente glorieuses.   
For the Situationists, writing, filmmaking, and indeed the idea of politics exist in order to 
fashion a better society based on the goals and aims deemed ‘possible’ at the time.  This takes place in 
opposition to a spectacle which seeks to perpetuate the return of the same, the engineering of 
                                                          
122 Bradley, p.15.  Emphasis is Bradley’s.  
123 Ibid., p.41. 
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consensus via a stultifying consumerism based on the consumption of images and the congelation of 
history.  Nevertheless, as Debord writes: ‘vous savez que la création n’est jamais pure’,124 there is no 
possibility of desire that can be enacted which comes from outside this spectacle.  The spectacle is ‘le 
moment historique qui nous contient’ (Thesis 11), the inevitable context in which our desires and 
identities are forged.  In the last instance then, the spectacle should be understood not as the 
instrumentation, the means of its production, nor merely in terms of the media, it’s ‘most immediate 
and superficial representation’, but as the social relations between people enacted according to the 
desires and possibilities which are themselves inseparable from the mediation of spectacle.  Desire, 
politics and everyday life are irrevocably bound up in this mutually reinforcing feedback loop with the 
systems of communication and mediation at any given point in history.  It is the role of a critical 
theory and praxis to attack the dominance of the particular forms of social organisation: a consumer 
capitalism which was observable in the 1960s and in a distinct but recognisable form today.  In 
Chapter Three I wish to argue that Situationist theory comprises an ethical understanding of how we 
respond to this irrevocable mediation, after looking at the concept of détournement in the next 
chapter: this tactical intervention which best encapsulates their model of oppositional activity.  
  
                                                          
124 Debord, Rapport sur la construction des situations, p.22. 
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2 
 
The Theory and Practice of Détournement 
 
The Situationist practice of détournement translates variously as diversion, hi-jacking, re-routing, 
subversion, derailment or overturning, and refers to the appropriation of ‘spectacular’ forms in the 
service of oppositional ends.  The Situationists never claimed to have invented the practice of 
employing pre-existing aesthetic elements in their works and acknowledged the role collage and 
montage played in movements such as Dada and Surrealism, as well as the considerable use already 
made of such techniques by the advertising industry of their time.1  Today, the recycling of cultural 
artefacts, references and conventions is abundant on a quotidian basis, from the sampling (and its 
frequently consequent legal battles) in popular music, to the seemingly inexhaustible capacity for 
‘reboots’ in mainstream cinema and television, to mention only two of the most obvious incidences of 
this practice.  The particularly Situationist character of this phenomenon most noticeably endures in 
the form of ‘culture jamming’ — the irreverent modification of advertisements or other forms of 
mass culture — a term made popular by the (predominantly) North American collection of writers, 
artists and academics Adbusters, whose founder Kalle Lasn describes the group as ‘students of the 
Situationist movement’.2  In one of the emblematic images of the Occupy Wall Street movement, with 
which Adbusters sought to align themselves, Wall Street’s ‘iconic’ bull statue — the symbol of the 
supposed energy and dynamism of the financial sector — is counterposed with an elegantly poised 
ballet dancer perched on top: this juxtaposition is designed to confront the cultural and social 
dominance of high finance in the name of a contrasting form of beauty and virtue.  Similarly, 
                                                          
1 Guy Debord and Gil J. Wolman, ‘Mode d’emploi du détournement’, Les Lèvres nues, 8 (1956). 
2 Justin Elliot, ‘The Origins of Occupy Wall Street Explained’, Salon (4 October 2011) 
<http://www.salon.com/2011/10/04/adbusters_occupy_wall_st/> [Accessed 25/11/13]. 
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California police officer Lt. John Pike found unwanted notoriety when he pepper-sprayed peaceful 
protesters during a demonstration at the University of California, Irvine; the photograph ‘went viral’ 
and was appropriated in many forms.  In one he attacks the personification of Liberty in Eugène 
Delacroix’s famous 1830 painting La Liberté guidant le peuple.  What the Situationists attempted to 
provide was a theoretical programme for how détournement should be employed in the service of new 
cultural and artistic practices that took aim at the functioning of the spectacular status quo.   
This chapter will begin by examining the concept of détournement elaborated in the 
Situationists’ first theoretical meditation on the subject, ‘Mode d’emploi du détournement’, written in 
1956 by Guy Debord and Gil J. Wolman when they were both members of the pre-Situationist 
International grouping, the Lettrist International, in tandem with examples of Situationist 
détournements, as well as the further contributions to the theory published in the Internationale 
Situationniste journal and Debord’s La Société du spectacle.  Subsequent analysis of the relationship 
between the theory and practice of détournement will lead on to an assessment of the strengths and 
limits of the technique.  First, this will take the form of a critique of the achievability of 
détournement’s stated intention to remake a society ‘sans reproduire’3 the power relations inherent 
within the status quo, an extravagant pronouncement which though certainly problematic leads on to a 
further appraisal of the role of rhetoric in Situationist writing, particularly their journal.  Following on 
from this line of inquiry, Jacques Rancière’s critique of Debord’s theory of spectacle will be 
examined in response to his assessment of Debord’s La Société du spectacle.  Finally, an analysis of 
the dialectical and strategic nature of détournement as exhibited in Debord’s film will be undertaken, 
acknowledging its explicitly propagandist nature.   
 
 
                                                          
3Authorship unattributed, ‘“Je suis forcé d’admettre que tout continue” (Hegel)’, Internationale situationniste, 9 
(1964), 20.  
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Plagiarism and le communisme littéraire 
The Situationists took the concept of détournement from the nineteenth-century poet Isidore Ducasse, 
who wrote under the pseudonym of the Comte de Lautréamont, a figure whom they and their Lettrist 
precursors held in great esteem and whom Debord détourns4 in thesis 207 of La Société du spectacle 
in order to justify this notion of appropriation: ‘Les idées s’améliorent.  Le sens des mots y participe.  
Le plagiat est nécessaire.  Le progrès l’implique.  Il serre de près la phrase d’un auteur, se sert de ses 
expressions, efface une idée fausse, la remplace par l’idée juste.’  Lautréamont wrote the exact words 
in his Poésies, a work itself made up of many ‘developed’ or ‘modified’ uncited maxims of Pascal 
and Vauvenargues,5 yet this is not mere quotation as the demarcation of the inverted comma is 
eschewed: Debord plagiarizes a eulogy to plagiarism.  Lautréamont’s words did not, in Debord’s 
estimation, require the adaptation of a word or phrase, the replacement of a bad idea with a better one.  
This is a détournement which operates by relocating a fragment within a new whole.  In the context of 
La Société du spectacle, Lautréamont’s words are given new meaning.   
 A hostility to the notion of private property underpins this conviction that plagiarism is 
crucial to oppositional activity in the realm of aesthetics: ‘A vrai dire, il faut en finir avec toute notion 
de propriété personnelle en cette matière.’6  Creative endeavour is conceived as individualistic under 
capitalism; ideas are owned by those who put their name to them.  This is why ‘intellectual property’ 
is enforced by law and why plagiarism is seen as an immoral theft of another’s labour.  The 
Situationists, following Marx, denounced the capitalist axiom of private property and extrapolated 
that opposition into the realm of aesthetics, understanding cultural creation as a form of social practice 
and advocating a ‘literary communism’:  
Non seulement le détournement conduit à la découverte de nouveaux aspects du talent, mais 
encore, se heurtant de front à toutes les conventions mondaines et juridiques, il ne peut 
                                                          
4 Throughout this analysis, as is now customary in the related literature, the French noun and verb will be 
anglicised in order to speak of the notion of détournement the Situationists avowed due both to the inadequacy 
of the various translations and the specific meaning the word has attained as a theoretical concept.   
5 Lautréamont, ‘Poésies II’, in Œuvres complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1970), p.281.  
6 Debord and Wolman, ‘Mode d’emploi du détournement’.  
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manquer d’apparaître un puissant instrument culturel au service d'une lutte de classes bien 
comprise.  Le bon marché de ses produits est la grosse artillerie avec laquelle on bat en brêche 
toutes les murailles de Chine de l’intelligence.  Voici un réel moyen d’enseignement 
artistique prolétarien, la première ébauche d’un communisme littéraire.7 
Conventional notions of ‘talent’ or ‘genius’ correspond to what they considered a bourgeois notion of 
creativity: the reverence for individual labour which can therefore be owned by its creator.  Debord 
and Wolman comment in the same article, ‘Mode d’emploi du détournement’, ‘l’idée d’expression 
dans l’absolu est morte, et il ne survit momentanément qu’une singerie de cette pratique, tant que nos 
autres ennemis survivent.’8  The reference to ‘nouveaux aspects du talent’ serves almost as a 
concession to readers with a more conventional understanding of artistic practice, luring them in with 
a concept of originality comfortably in keeping with an orthodox understanding of ‘talent’ before 
describing at length what they consider the aspects of détournement with revolutionary implications.  
Confronting head-on social and legal conventions — that is, both copyright law and the conventional 
moralistic denunciation of plagiarism as ‘wrong’ — is, for Debord and Wolman, the first step in any 
creative act.  This negation of the status quo, the critical dismantling of one of the foremost existing 
rules of cultural production (and what we might call cognitive or immaterial labour in the information 
age) is presented as a weapon in the service of class struggle due to both its explicitly oppositional 
character and its opening up of alternative horizons of artistic and social practice.  The cheapness and 
ready availability of détournable texts and images such as paperback novels, magazines or comic 
strips which the above quotation goes on to mention is a reference to the explosion of mass culture in 
the post war era.9  The reference to artillery breaking down Chinese Walls is an unacknowledged 
quotation of Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto.10   
                                                          
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid. 
9 For an account of post-war French history emphasising this phenomenon see Kristin Ross, Fast Cars, Clean 
Bodies: Decolonisation and the Reordering of French Culture (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).  
10 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, ‘The Communist Manifesto’, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels Selected 
Works, Volume 1 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1962), p.38: ‘The cheap prices of its commodities are the 
heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls.’  
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The problematic notion of ‘enseignement artistique prolétarien’ will be examined below in 
connection with Jacques Rancière’s critique of Debord’s theory of spectacle.  For the moment, 
however, this ‘first sketch’ of a literary communism here invoked testifies to the influence of 
Lautréamont, who wrote that ‘la poésie doit être faite par tous. Non par un.’11  ‘Le Communisme 
littéraire’, the potential creation of new aesthetic, theoretical and political realities was for the 
Situationists a collaborative, social activity and as such the concept of private ownership of an 
individual work is unviable, serving only to perpetuate capitalist hierarchies.  Each issue of I.S. 
included a notice inciting others to reproduce its contents as they saw fit, assuring the reader that 
copyright laws did not apply and insisting upon the collaborative character of the journal:  
La règle dans ce bulletin est la rédaction collective.  Les quelques articles rédigés et signés 
personnellement doivent être considérés eux aussi comme intéressant l’ensemble de nos 
camarades, et comme des points particuliers de leur recherche commune.  Nous sommes 
opposés à la survivance de formes telles que la revue littéraire ou la revue d’art. 
Tous les textes publiés dans Internationale Situationniste peuvent être librement reproduits, 
traduits ou adaptés, même sans indication d’origine.12 
This declaration makes clear the centrality of détournement to the project the Situationists saw the 
journal as articulating.  Printed on the inside of the cover, it would be the first words those who picked 
up the journal would read as they opened it.  First, the importance of the collective and collaborative 
form of the work put into the various articles is emphasised: cultural production as social practice.  In 
the second short paragraph, readers are urged to reproduce, translate and adapt (i.e. détourn) the 
material at will.  These two corollary notices establish two key justifications for détournement: as any 
form of work is a social and collaborative endeavour, concepts of authorship and ownership are 
outmoded; this being the case, the Situationists assert no such rights towards their own texts and 
encourage their détournement. 
                                                          
11 Lautréamont, ‘Poésies II’, in Œuvres complètes, p.327. 
12 Printed on the inside page of the first issue (and in the subsequent eleven issues) of Internationale 
Situationniste (June, 1958).  Italics in original.  
67 
 
In ‘Mode d’emploi du détournement’, Debord and Wolman also signal that merely intending 
to cause outrage by impertinent appropriation is not alone sufficient criterion for successful 
détournement.  Acknowledging Surrealism’s attempted negation of bourgeois conceptions of genius, 
it is nevertheless argued that Marcel Duchamp’s addition of a moustache on the Mona Lisa can no 
longer be seen as an ‘interesting’ gesture.  Debord and Wolman counsel that ‘il faut maintenant suivre 
ce processus jusqu’à la négation de la négation’:13 such is the chameleonic nature of spectacle, it 
adapts according to the march of time.  Thus détournements must themselves be détourned when they 
come to be revered as authoritative.  Détournement necessitates, in most cases, the adaptation of a 
work in order to reveal its pertinence to the current historical moment and to demonstrate how the 
original notion must be modified for this to be achieved.  Debord clarifies in thesis 208 of La Société 
du spectacle: 
Le détournement est le contraire de la citation, de l’autorité théorique toujours falsifiée du 
seul fait qu’elle est devenue citation; fragment arraché à son contexte, à son mouvement, et 
finalement à son époque comme référence globale et à l’option précise qu’elle était à 
l’intérieur de cette référence, exactement reconnue ou erronée.  Le détournement est le 
langage fluide de l’anti-idéologie.  Il apparaît dans la communication qui sait qu’elle ne peut 
prétendre détenir aucune garantie en elle-même et définitivement.  Il est, au point le plus haut, 
le langage qu’aucune référence ancienne et supra-critique ne peut confirmer.  C’est au 
contraire sa propre cohérence, en lui-même et avec les faits praticables, qui peut confirmer 
l’ancien noyau de vérité qu’il ramène.  Le détournement n’a fondé sa cause sur rien 
d’extérieur à sa propre vérité comme critique présente.  (Thesis 208) 
There is no possibility of a definitive détournement: détournements themselves are necessarily always 
open to later détournement.  Détournement as a concept resists being wholly in the service of a 
particular cause or ideology precisely because it attains purpose only from sa propre vérité comme 
critique présente; it is a process that is constantly in need of re-making and re-working in accordance 
                                                          
13 Debord and Wolman, ‘Mode d’emploi du détournement’.  It should be acknowledged that Debord and 
Wolman’s is a rather restrictive reading of what they call Duchamp’s ‘gesture’.   
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with time and historical circumstance.  The most eloquent of détournements — in theory — both 
presents a critical analysis of the détourned element and an expression of an alternative, contestatory 
meaning that can be imparted to it given its relation to the contemporary moment: 
Il va de soi que l’on peut non seulement corriger une œuvre ou intégrer divers fragments 
d’œuvres périmées dans une nouvelle, mais encore changer le sens de ces fragments et 
truquer de toutes les manières que l’on jugera bonnes ce que les imbéciles s’obstinent à 
nommer des citations.14 
After this fashion, and as we have seen in Chapter One, Debord’s détournement of Marx constitutes 
the very first sentence of La Société du spectacle: ‘Toute la vie des sociétés dans lesquelles règnent 
les conditions modernes de production s’annonce comme une immense accumulation de spectacles’, 
where Marx wrote, in (the French translation of) Das Kapital: ‘La richesse des sociétés dans 
lesquelles règne le mode de production s’annonce comme une immense accumulation de 
marchandises.’  As we have seen, Debord demonstrates his departure from Marxist theory, his 
updating of Marx’s work in the context of a century of capitalist development.  Marx’s wording is 
recognisably maintained but the sentence is modified in accordance with his assessment of the 
‘society of the spectacle’: ‘spectacles’ replaces ‘marchandises’ as ‘toute la vie’ does ‘la richesse’ in 
expression of the omnipresent aesthetic and political form of organisation which now governs all of 
social and political life, the apotheosis of Marx’s commodity, rather than just the means of economic 
production to which Marx refers here.  Debord and Wolman suggest that this is the only way of 
staying loyal to Marx’s writings against the Marxisms of others on the left: Stalinists, Trotskyists, 
parliamentary socialists.  These currents, for the Situationists, demonstrate critical theory’s 
petrification into ideology.  Détournement is described by Debord as the langage fluide d’anti-
idéologie, as the détournement exists in a dynamic relation to the original rather than the static form 
of citation.  This approach requires a critical distance from the work détourned, a resistance to the 
authority that is implied in direct quotation, as Debord goes on to explain in thesis 209, there is a 
                                                          
14 Debord and Wolman, ‘Mode d’emploi du détournement’ 
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violence in this refusal to accept the autonomy and authority of any theoretical discourse.  There is 
violence in the act of appropriating and re-contextualising a fragment from one whole into another 
that creates fissures in the original meaning of this fragment, permitting a new message to be 
communicated.  This violence is similarly directed at the conventions and orthodoxies of intellectual 
property and by extension the very notion of private property itself, as well as at the individual 
détourned elements.   
Debord and Wolman’s ‘Mode d’emploi du détournement’ begins with what would come to be 
a characteristically Situationist belligerence: a condemnation of the art world turns into an 
unrestrained call to arms:  
Tous les esprits un peu avertis de notre temps s’accordent sur cette évidence qu’il est devenu 
impossible à l’art de se soutenir comme activité supérieure, ou même comme activité de 
compensation à laquelle on puisse honorablement s’adonner.  La cause de ce dépérissement 
est visiblement l’apparition de forces productives qui nécessitent d’autres rapports de 
production et une nouvelle pratique de la vie.  Dans la phase de guerre civile où nous nous 
trouvons engagés, et en liaison étroite avec l’orientation que nous découvrirons pour certaines 
activités supérieures à venir, nous pouvons considérer que tous les moyens d’expression 
connus vont confluer dans un mouvement général de propagande qui doit embrasser tous les 
aspects, en perpétuelle interaction, de la réalité sociale.15  
The art world is, for Debord and Wolman, inherently mortgaged to the productive forces of the 
spectacle and so alternative creative practices must be sought which contest the status quo.  Cultural 
production that takes place according to these rules, that is, recognisable ‘artistic practices’, is 
condemned by Debord and Wolman ‘parce qu’ils dépendent en réalité des formations idéologiques 
d’une société passée qui a prolongé son agonie jusqu’à ce jour’ and which ‘ne peuvent avoir 
d’efficacité que réactionnaire’.16  The contention is that a ‘civil war phase’ in which apparently 
superior activities to come will come together in a general movement of propaganda, which ‘in 
                                                          
15 Debord and Wolman, ‘Mode d’emploi du détournement’. 
16 Ibid. 
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perpetual interaction’, will encompass all aspects of social reality.  This is, then, a distinctly ambitious 
programme. Towards the end of ‘Mode d’emploi’, Debord and Wolman declare that, ‘les procédés 
que nous avons sommairement traités ici ne sont pas présentés comme une intention qui nous serait 
propre, mais au contraire comme une pratique assez communément répandue que nous nous 
proposons de systématiser.’17  This proposed systematisation never really came to fruition in the work 
of the Situationists.  Indeed, ‘Mode d’emploi’ is the closest they come to articulating a method 
presenting the objectives and parameters of détournements.   
 Debord and Wolman distinguish between two major forms of détournement: what they call 
‘mineur’ — the appropriation of an element with no political significance in and of itself until its 
recontexualisation: a photograph of a random subject, a press clipping, an innocuous phrase — and 
‘abusif’, or ‘détournement de proposition prémonitoire’ — the adaptation or invocation of an author’s 
phrasing which is ‘significatif en soi’ and acquires new scope in an updated context — as we have 
seen with Lautréamont and Marx above.  Debord had earlier in that year collaborated with his friend 
Asger Jorn — the Danish artist who founded the avant-garde collective COBRA (COpenhagen, 
BRussels, Amsterdam: named for the cities from which its members came), one of the groups who 
came together in Cosio d’Arroscia in 1957 to form the Situationist International, and who would later 
fund the Situationists’ activities with proceeds from his art sales — on a book composed entirely of 
détourned elements and Jorn’s abstract daubings entitled Mémoires.  Mémoires comprised 
détournements of Marx, Baudelaire, a Dutch historian and particular favourite of the Situationists’ 
Johan Huizinga (among many others) in addition to extracts taken from advertisements, popular 
magazines, travel writing, sociological tracts and other sources.  As the title suggests, it purported to 
offer a biographical account of a particular period of Debord’s life, in which he broke from Romanian 
poet Isidore Isou’s Lettrist group and formed his own Lettrist International, the immediate precursor 
to the S.I.  The book was bound in sandpaper, with the intention of rubbing abrasively against other 
                                                          
17 Ibid. 
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books it would be placed next to on a shelf, whilst the text itself was composed of a series of 
détournements, both ‘mineurs’ and ‘abusifs’.   
The next claim that Debord and Wolman make is that the principal strength of a détournement 
is its recognisability: 
Les déformations introduites dans les éléments détournés doivent tendre à se simplifier à 
l’extrême, la principale force d’un détournement étant fonction directe de sa reconnaissance, 
consciente ou trouble, par la mémoire.  C’est bien connu.  Notons seulement que si cette 
utilisation de la mémoire implique un choix du public préalable à l’usage du détournement, 
ceci n’est qu’un cas particulier d'une loi générale qui régit aussi bien le détournement que tout 
autre mode d’action sur le monde.18   
Debord would, in 1964, remark to similar effect in his annotations accompanying the scripts of his 
first three films, published as ‘Contre le cinéma’:  
D’autres aspects sont à considérer dans l’optique des positions situationnistes qui se sont 
définies depuis: au premier rang, l’usage des phrases détournées.  Entre toutes les phrases 
étrangères — venues des journaux ou de Joyce, aussi bien que du Code Civil — mélangées au 
dialogue de ce film, c’est-à-dire à l’emploi également dérisoire de différents styles d’écriture, 
la présente édition de l’Institut scandinave de Vandalisme Comparé n’a retenu l’usage de 
guillemets que pour quatre d’entre elles, considérées comme des citations conventionnelles du 
fait de la difficulté que présenterait probablement leur reconnaissance.19 
This recognisability is a necessary criterion for a détournement, a fluency with the codes and 
conventions of the existing cultural regime is required not just on behalf of those responsible for the 
détournement but its intended targets also.  This introduces the question of the intended target’s 
breadth of reading; this requisite erudition implies a certain kind of reader.  To take Debord’s La 
Société du spectacle, a reader would have to have close knowledge particularly of the works of Marx 
                                                          
18 Ibid.  
19 Guy Debord, ‘Fiches Techniques’, in Contre le cinéma (Aarhus: Institut Scandinave de Vandalisme Comparé, 
1964).  
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and Hegel in order to recognise Debord’s uncited quotations and modified passages.  If recognition of 
a détourned element is necessary for a détournement to have been ‘successful’, then we must 
conclude that this is a highly problematic notion: a discriminating requirement of knowledge excludes 
those who are not familiar with the intellectual horizons of Debord’s work.  It is not a reductive 
assumption to conclude that this exclusion operates to disenfranchise those without access to 
education.  La Société du spectacle can still be read and understood effectively without appreciating 
each of Debord’s détournements (of which there are hundreds) but it unquestionably loses this rich 
allusiveness which demonstrates both the scope of Debord’s scholarship and the skill involved in 
redeploying the maxims of past critique.  This demonstration of a wit at once erudite and mischievous 
again serves an important role in Debordian and Situationist writing: it is a seductive device used to 
convince and engage the reader.    
 Certainly then, Debord and Wolman argue in ‘Mode d’emploi’ that recognisibility is a pre-
requisite for a ‘successful’ détournement.  The second half of the above quotation, however, can allow 
us to understand an important theoretical axiom of détournement which can elucidate the concept.  In 
making explicit their recognition that any action in the world necessarily takes place within a 
particular context — and that in the case of a détournement, this context necessarily includes those 
who are the intended targets — it is apparent that for the Situationists, this context determines the 
effectiveness of the action, as we have seen above ‘l’idée d'expression dans l'absolu est morte’.20  A 
Situationist conception of time and history recognises all social, political and cultural forms of 
organisation as contingent upon this context.  The concept of ‘absolute’ expression is therefore 
understood as reactionary.  This is why appropriation is the Situationist tactic of choice: there is no 
hope of transcending the spectacle, so it must be détourned.  Their goal, in excavating the spectacle’s 
own materials is, as Tom McDonough has argued, to ‘throw themselves into every kind of filth […] in 
order, by way of its appropriation, to make it speak otherly.’21 
                                                          
20 Debord and Wolman, ‘Mode d’emploi du détournement’. 
21 Tom McDonough, ‘Guy Debord, or the Revolutionary without a Halo’, October, 115 (2006), 39-45 (p.45). 
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 In the ninth edition of their journal, in 1964, the Situationists declared their intention to act 
‘effectivement, à tous les niveaux, contre la société dominante: pour la détourner intégralement, sans 
la reproduire en rien’.  A practice which employs, and indeed relies on, the signs and messages of the 
society it seeks to oppose cannot possibly succeed in this stated aim to never reproduce the logic of 
this society.  There is an inherent danger of retaining and perpetuating certain assumptions within the 
détourned object.  The employment of sexualised pictures of young women in various states of 
undress, taken from unacknowledged popular ‘men’s’ magazines are interpreted by Kelly C. Baum as 
representing the ‘alienation of desire’, in her article ‘The Sex of the Situationist International’.  Baum 
seeks to refute the argument that the depiction of scantily clad women in sexualised poses constitutes 
mere titillations.  Nevertheless, it is only masculine desire denounced here as alienated and the 
reproduction of such images clearly demonstrate how the Situationists were in no small part guilty of 
misogyny.22  This space for interpretation can potentially lead to a détournement’s failure to impress 
its critical message, as the residual remainder — that which is undétourned within an appropriated 
work — prejudices the extent to which a détournement can be said to be successful in its stated aim of 
not reproducing the society it seeks to détourn, given that it is primarily a practice of partial 
reproduction.   
Détournement, as a theoretical concept, derives its coherence from its fluidity.  Certainly, any 
détournement must seek to offer an intelligent and constructive riff on the chosen element; it must do 
so in a fashion recognisable to its intended public; it must endeavour to not overlook pernicious 
aspects of the détourned element which reproduce the status quo.  It is, by design, difficult to respond 
to the question ‘what is a détournement?’ as it is impossible to describe as a unified theory: ‘Le 
détournement n’a fondé sa cause sur rien d’extérieur à sa propre vérité comme critique présente’ 
(Thesis 208).  The Situationist technique of détournement is a ludic concept, linked to the spirit of 
playfulness, wit and intellectual mischievousness.   
                                                          
22 Kelly Baum, ‘The Sex of the Situationist International’, October, 126 (2008), 23-43. 
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During the May 1968 événements, the Situationists were responsible for establishing a 
Conseil pour le Maintien des Occupations who released several posters and other forms of 
communiqué.  One such provocation, dated the 30th May 1968, sees the tiles of a comic book strip 
depicting a scene from an unspecific action-adventure, entitled Adresse à tous les travailleurs in 
which the captions related that a revolutionary movement had come to pass.  A revolutionary 
movement that ‘ne manque plus que la conscience de ce qu’il a déjà fait’.  The popular form that is 
the bande dessinée is here imbued with the force of a political treatise.  This is a détournement first of 
all of form: appropriating the genre of the comic and attributing to it words of (as it was intended) 
revolutionary import.  It was designed to attract the eye: there is no coincidence that Debord and 
Wolman acknowledge the advertising industry’s use of détournement.  There is humour in this 
juxtaposition of genre but it is a humour which conceals a profound seriousness:  
Le parodique-sérieux recouvre les contradictions d’une époque où nous trouvons, aussi 
pressantes, l’obligation et la presque impossibilité de rejoindre, de mener, une action 
collective totalement novatrice.  Où le plus grand sérieux s’avance masque dans le double jeu 
de l’art et de sa négation; où les essentiels voyages de découverte one été entrepris par des 
gens d’une si émouvante incapacité.23  
Both ‘Mode d’emploi’ and ‘Le Détournement comme négation et prélude’ — a short article from the 
third issue of the journal — invoke this notion of play.  Debord and Wolman refer to ‘ultra 
détournement’, which they describe as the capacity for détournement to play a role in everyday life, 
not just aesthetic creation, arguing that ‘le besoin d’une langue secrète, de mots de passe, est 
inséparable d’une tendance au jeu’, thereby extending even further the definition of what constitutes 
détournement. 24  It is ‘la sphère du jeu’ which is similarly invoked in ‘Le Détournement comme 
négation et prélude’.  This playfulness seeks to seduce the reader: it is the key to understanding 
détournement as a pedagogical technique. 
                                                          
23Authorship unattributed, ‘Le Détournement comme négation et prélude’, Internationale situationniste, 3 
(1959), 10-11 (p.11). 
24  Debord and Wolman, ‘Mode d’emploi du détournement’. 
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The Strengths and Limits of Situationist Propaganda 
Understanding détournement as pedagogical technique brings us necessarily to consider the 
propagandist nature of the practice, and the consequent importance of the journal’s rhetorical brio.  A 
comprehension of the Situationists’ employment of grandiose proclamations not only allows us to 
better refine our understanding of the theory of détournement by placing such grandiloquence at a 
critical distance, but to also consider it as constitutive of the theory itself.  Détournement is incarnated 
in an attempt to improve — tactically, strategically — the original message, it never endeavours to be 
a definitive ‘truth’, as détournements are always susceptible to future détournement.  In the first issue 
of the journal, ‘Détournement’ is defined as:  
[A]bréviation de la formule: détournement d’éléments esthétiques préfabriqués.  Intégration 
de productions actuelles ou passées des arts dans une construction supérieure du milieu.  Dans 
ce sens il ne peut y avoir de peinture ou de musique situationniste, mais un usage 
situationniste de ces moyens.  Dans un sens plus primitif, le détournement à l’intérieur des 
sphères culturelles anciennes est une méthode de propagande, qui témoigne de l’usure et de la 
perte d’importance de ces sphères.25  
What this admission of the propagandist element here demonstrates is the immediate purpose of such 
détournements.  This ‘primitive’ or elementary function serves a rhetorical purpose in the re-
application of the détourned elements to encourage the recognition of the need for construction of an 
alternative (‘superior’) political environment: ‘Un revirement complet de l’esprit est devenu 
indispensable, par la mise en lumière de désirs oubliés et la création de désirs entièrement nouveaux.  
Et par une propagande intensive en faveur de ces désirs.’26  The question of desire is therefore 
paramount in this regard.  Critically, this desire is not a metaphysical concept for the Situationists: the 
distinction between ‘new desires’ and ‘pseudo-needs’ is necessarily only a political one.  This requires 
                                                          
25 ‘Définitions’, p.13. 
26 Chtcheglov, ‘Formulaire pour un Urbanisme nouveau’, p.18. 
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understanding the difference between what we might unsatisfactorily term ‘legitimate’ or ‘genuine’ 
desire, as opposed to those inculcated by the spectacular status quo and which perpetuate its existence.  
The desire for consumer goods is cultivated in order to support the commodity economy; the desire, 
however, to ensure a minimum living standard, to create a more equitable society (unquestionably 
idealized visions which our unremittingly inequitable society purports to uphold) are worthy of 
‘legitimate’ status, though still mediated by the socio-historical context.  The question 
of appropriation is therefore the terrain of Situationist struggle within and against culture.  Any 
concept of political will is a selective appropriation of the cultural, social and historical context in 
which we find ourselves.  The beginning of political action entails the détournement of existing 
materials of the dominant prescriptive aesthetic of the spectacle in order to change them, to use them, 
to transform them from their original purpose into one serving a revolutionary political agenda.  In 
light of this later refinement by Debord, the reference to ‘la création de désirs entièrement nouveaux’ 
risks appearing naive.  If desire of any sort, ‘legitimate’ or otherwise, can only be fashioned socially 
and is therefore mediated, creating entirely new desires ex nihilo becomes an impossibility.  This need 
not be seen, however, as a development of Situationist theory in the eleven years between the 
publication of the journal article and the theoretical treatise.  Rather, it is indicative of a recourse to a 
Romantic, passionate variety of rhetorical flourish which would come to permeate the I.S. journal, as 
it characterised the writings of Debord’s Internationale Lettriste grouping.  Debord would to some 
extent consciously relinquish this playful — if still serious — verve in favour of the icily clinical tone 
of La Société du spectacle, which he fully intended to be the culmination of Situationist theory, in 
contrast to the plaire et instruire tenor of the journal.  The importance of the rhetorical flourish, the 
seductive poetic turn of phrase, cannot, however, be ignored as a constitutive element of the theory of 
détournement itself.   
The seductive (‘Il est vrai que la plus grande difficulté d’une telle entreprise est de faire 
passer dans ces propositions apparemment délirantes une quantité suffisante de séduction sérieuse.’)27 
                                                          
27 Guy Debord, ‘Introduction à une critique de la géographie urbaine’, Les Lèvres nues, 6 (1955).  
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and didactic (this is a ‘propagande éducative’)28 elements of this programme, as well as the invocation 
of the problematic idea of propaganda, invites Jacques Rancière’s criticism of Debord’s theory of 
spectatorship in his 2008 essay Le Spectateur émancipé.  Rancière casts Debord as part of: ‘le modèle 
global de rationalité sur le fond duquel nous avons été habitués à juger les implications politiques du 
spectacle théâtral.’29  The theory of spectacle, once considered so mordantly provocative, is, for 
Rancière, an orthodoxy inherently bound to the status quo.  Building on his theory of intellectual 
equality and emancipation as delineated in his Le Maître ignorant (1987), Rancière seeks therefore to 
demonstrate that the fundamental suppositions made by Debord reproduce the hierarchical 
conceptions of knowledge and its transmission.  Rancière deconstructs the binary oppositions Debord 
takes as pre-requisites in order to demonstrate how these terms function as a prescription of 
inequality:  
Ces oppositions — regarder/savoir, apparence/réalité, activité/passivité — sont tout autre 
chose que des oppositions logiques entre termes bien définis.  Elles définissent proprement un 
partage du sensible, une distribution a priori des positions et des capacités et incapacités 
attachées à ces positions.  Elles sont des allégories incarnées de l’inégalité.30  
Rancière is attempting to establish that when Debord writes of the spectator that ‘plus il contemple, 
moins il vit’ (Thesis 30), he is constructing an artificial opposition between contemplation and living 
which serves to perpetuate the hierarchical model of the dissemination of knowledge upon which the 
‘spectacle’ relies.  Rancière states his desire to ‘reconstituer le réseau des présuppositions qui placent 
la question du spectateur au centre de la discussion sur les rapports entre art et politique’,31  
particularly the negative connotations which Debord imputes to spectatorship: those of passivity (as 
opposed to activity) and ignorance (as opposed to knowledge).  The spectacle separates the spectator 
from life by consigning him to a passive role; Debord’s theory seeks to overcome this separation by 
bridging the gap between the spectator and reality by creating an art practice that breaks the unilateral 
                                                          
28 Debord and Wolman, ‘Mode d’emploi du détournement’.   
29 Rancière, Le Spectateur émancipé, p.7-8. 
30 Ibid., p.18 
31 Ibid., pp.7-8. 
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movement of communication, forcing the spectator into an active role.  Rancière rejects this approach: 
‘Mais ne pourrait-on pas inverser les termes du problème en demandant si ce n’est pas justement la 
volonté de supprimer la distance qui crée la distance?’32  In conceiving of the distance between 
activity and passivity — and in according the latter an inferior status to the former — the critique of 
the spectacle succeeds only in recreating the form of social relations (active/passive; 
enfranchised/disenfranchised) which it accuses its object of perpetrating.  For Rancière, Debord’s 
critique of the spectacle-spectator relationship, in so far as it seeks to invert it and render the spectator 
‘active’, only reproduces the binary logic of master and ignoramus: ‘Elle peut railler ses illusions, 
mais elle reproduit sa logique.’33  In place of this stultifying logic, Rancière proposes a model of 
emancipation which,  
commence quand on remet en question l’opposition entre regarder et agir, quand on 
comprend que les évidences qui structurent ainsi les rapports du dire, du voir et du faire 
appartiennent elles-mêmes à la structure de la domination et de la sujétion.34 
In re-evaluating these binary oppositions, Rancière encourages his reader to recognise viewing as an 
active engagement with a text, emancipating the spectator not by means of transmitting the knowledge 
denied by the separation of spectatorship but by understanding this knowledge in terms of ‘narrating’ 
and ‘translating’ one’s own interpretations and acknowledging the validity of this activity.  Rancière’s 
emancipated spectator engages actively with all texts and images he or she encounters as a matter of 
course.   
We are urged by Rancière to forego precisely the ‘savoir de l’ignorance’35 —which seeks to 
assert the distance between knowledge and ignorance — on the basis of an axiom of intellectual 
equality.  The spectator is understood as necessarily emancipated, a fact which misadventures in 
critical thought such as Debord’s obfuscate in their preservation of the hierarchical model according 
to which knowledge is communicated.  Whilst Rancière characterises Debord as merely inverting the 
                                                          
32 Ibid., p.18 
33 Ibid., p.52 
34 Ibid., p.19. 
35 Ibid., p.15.  
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hierarchical suppositions he denounces, there is evidence that Debord is aware of this essential 
hierarchism in his willingness to acknowledge the nature of a critique bound to its object.  As early as 
‘Mode d’emploi’, Debord and Wolman’s discussion of the weaknesses of détournement by simple 
reversal recognises this impasse:   
Le détournement par simple retournement est toujours le plus immédiat et le moins efficace.  
De même la messe noire oppose à la construction d’une ambiance qui se fonde sur une 
métaphysique donnée, une construction d’ambiance dans le même cadre, en renversant les 
valeurs, conservées, de cette métaphysique.36 
In La Société du spectacle, Debord reflects upon the inevitability of spectacular mediation and the 
necessity of confronting the spectacle in its own terms in order to understand, critique, then contest: 
En analysant le spectacle, on parle dans une certaine mesure le langage même du 
spectaculaire, en ceci que l’on passe sur le terrain méthodologique de cette société qui 
s’exprime dans le spectacle.  Mais le spectacle n’est rien d’autre que le sens de la pratique 
totale d’une formation économique-sociale, son emploi du temps.  C’est le moment historique 
qui nous contient.  (Thesis 11)   
What this short quotation can lead us to recall is the important formative influence Hegel had upon 
Debord:37 in ‘passing through the same methodological terrain’, we understand Debord’s critique first 
and foremost as a negation of the spectacle.  A Rancièrian rejoinder might here suggest that this 
cannot be a genuinely dialectical movement due to this preservation of the essential logic he has been 
seen to denounce.  For Debord, however, the inevitability of preserving the logic of the spectacle 
stems from its totalising occupation of the historical moment.  Debord’s conception of human 
knowledge is irrevocably bound to the historical context of an epoch: ‘L’homme, “l’être négatif qui 
est uniquement dans la mesure où il supprime l’Être”, est identique au temps’ (Thesis 125), here 
quoting Hegel directly.  It is the attempt to diagnose the hypocrisies and contradictions of the 
                                                          
36 Debord and Wolman, ‘Mode d’emploi du détournement’. 
37 For the best example of an exploration of Hegel’s influence on Debord, see Anselm Jappe, Guy Debord.  See 
also Tom Bunyard, ‘“History is the Spectre Haunting Modern Society”’.  
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spectacle by positing the theory of its negative that drives Debord’s critique.  The title of ‘Le 
détournement comme négation et prélude’ expresses this tactic precisely.  In La Société du spectacle, 
Debord precedes his theses on détournement by delineating the workings of ‘dialectical theory’:  
Dans son style même, l’exposé de la théorie dialectique est un scandale et une abomination 
selon les règles du langage dominant, et pour le goût qu’elles ont éduqué, parce que dans 
l’emploi positif des concepts existants, il inclut du même coup l’intelligence de leur fluidité 
retrouvée, de leur destruction nécessaire. 
Ce style qui contient sa propre critique doit exprimer la domination de la critique présente sur 
tout son passé.  Par lui le mode d’exposition de la théorie dialectique témoigne de l’esprit 
négatif qui est en elle. […] Cette conscience théorique du mouvement, dans laquelle la trace 
même du mouvement doit être présente, se manifeste par le renversement des relations 
établies entre les concepts et par le détournement de toutes les acquisitions de la critique 
antérieure. […] Le détournement ramène à la subversion les conclusions critiques passées qui 
ont été figées en vérités respectables, c’est-à-dire transformées en mensonges. […] C’est 
l’obligation de la distance envers ce qui a été falsifié en vérité officielle qui détermine cet 
emploi du détournement.  (Theses 205-206) 
The dialectical and dynamic process of détournement is fluid and constantly renewed in its endeavour 
to re-problematize the previously established conclusions of critical discourse, as Debord détourns 
Marx, and prevent them from stagnating into the authoritative ‘truths’ of ideology.  The theory of 
détournement urges the recognition that all forms of cultural production are fair game.  They are to be 
re-interpreted and re-used — this is the requisite precondition: the prelude — for emancipation, rather 
than its realisation.  In suggesting that emancipation is a potentiality inherent within the role of 
spectator, Rancière seems to posit that we live in ‘le meilleur des mondes possibles’, emancipation is 
here to be seized immediately: 
Les animaux humains sont des animaux distants qui communiquent à travers la forêt des 
signes.  La distance que l’ignorant a à franchir n’est pas le gouffre entre son ignorance et le 
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savoir du maître.  Elle est simplement le chemin de ce qu’il sait déjà à ce qu’il ignore encore 
qu’il peut apprendre non pour occuper la position du savant mais pour mieux pratiquer l’art 
de traduire, de mettre ses expériences en mots et ses mots à l’épreuve, de traduire ses 
aventures intellectuelles à l’usage des autres et de contre-traduire les traductions qu’ils lui 
présentent de leurs propres aventures.38  
Debord sees the kernel of a coming emancipation in ‘la conscience possible de notre époque’;39  
Rancière seeks to uncover the emancipatory ideal in the world which we inhabit but in rejecting the 
theory of spectacle he fails to recognise that the form of opposition that is détournement, which is the 
obverse of spectacle — both at once aesthetic and political — constitutes this negation and prelude to 
a realisation (and not the realisation itself) which cannot take place under current conditions.  
Rancière’s critique of Debord understands the theory of spectacle as predicated upon a 
Romantic idealism in which political subjectivation occurs only when some essential human essence 
is realised and revealed unobstructed.  Jeremy F. Lane has written on Rancière’s criticism of the 
idealism implicitly functioning in the social sciences, showing the divergence between Pierre 
Bourdieu’s positivist idealism — where class identity is based on the observable measurements and 
‘scientific’ analysis of the social sciences, where this is taken to form ‘an ideal core, a unity and 
identity of experience and feeling incorporated into a shared ethos and habitus’40 — and Rancière’s 
anti-Platonist and non-deterministic account of political subjectivation.  Lane demonstrates this 
divergence with reference to a passage from Rancière’s La Mésentente (1995), in which Rancière 
describes how political subjectivation is not a matter of realising any essential core of social being, 
but when the reaction to a wrong in the form of cries of pain and distress (phônè) becomes posed in 
the form of rational argument (logos):  
                                                          
38 Rancière, Le Spectateur émancipé, pp.16-17. 
39 Authorship unattributed, ‘Propos d’un Imbécile’, Internationale situationniste, 10 (1966), 75-76 (p.76). 
40 Jeremy F. Lane, ‘Rancière’s Anti-Platonism: Equality, the “Orphan Letter” and the Problematic of the Social 
Sciences’, in Rancière Now: Current Perspectives on Jacques Rancière, ed. by Oliver Davis (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2013), pp.28-46 (p.37).  
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La ‘prise de parole’ n’est pas conscience et expression d’un soi affirmant son propre.  Elle est 
occupation du lieu où le logos définit une autre nature que la phônè.  Cette occupation 
suppose que des destins de ‘travailleurs’ soient d’une maniere ou d’une autre détournés...41 
Lane quotes this section at much greater length but still interrupts Rancière mid-sentence at the word 
‘détourné’.42  The importance Lane rightly accords this diversion or deviation from any pre-
established essential notion of what constitutes political subjectivation in Rancière’s analysis similarly 
attests to Debord’s refusal to understand political activity in idealist terms, given the importance 
accorded to détournement in his and other Situationist writings.     
The divergence between Debord and Rancière can be further elucidated by understanding the 
former’s keen sense of the centrality of tactics and strategy to revolutionary struggle.  The 
Situationists’ privileging of détournement as the technique that combats the spectacle also constitutes 
an admission that there is nothing outside the spectacle: that appropriation of spectacular forms is the 
only means available as mediation is an inevitability.  A keen reader of German military theorist Carl 
von Clausewitz, Debord referred to himself not as a philosopher but as a strategist.43  Indeed, the 
recent BnF exhibition dedicated to his work entitled ‘L’Art de la Guerre’ heavily emphasised this 
facet of his work, particularly the board game he created with Alice Becker-Ho, Kriegspiel.  
McKenzie Wark has written about this board game and its value in understanding the role of strategy 
in the work of Debord,44 as has Stevphen Shukaitis:45 both emphasise how Situationist movement was 
characterised by a will to attain a theoretical coherence only as far as this would lead to real 
transformation of the conditions of existence.  Hence their willingness to counsel this appropriation in 
and against the cultural sphere: 
                                                          
41 Jacques Rancière, La Mésentente: Politique et philosophie (Paris: Galilée, 1995), p.61.   
42 Lane, ‘Rancière’s Anti-Platonism’, p.38.  
43 Giorgio Agamben, ‘Difference and Repetition: on Guy Debord’s Film’, trans. by Brian Holmes, in Guy 
Debord and the Situationist International, ed. Tom McDonough, pp.313-19 (p.313). 
44 McKenzie Wark, ‘The Game of War: Debord as Strategist’, Cabinet Magazine, 29 (2008). Available online 
here: <http://www.cabinetmagazine.org/issues/29/wark.php> [Accessed 11 May 2016]. 
45 Stevphen Shukaitis, ‘“Theories are made only to die in the war of time”: Guy Debord & the Situationist 
International as Strategic Thinkers’, Culture and Organisation, 20.4 (2014), 251-68.  
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A la question: Pourquoi avons-nous favorisé un regroupement si passionné dans cette sphère 
culturelle, dont pourtant nous rejetons la réalité présente? — la réponse est: Parce que la 
culture est le centre de signification d’une société sans signification.  Cette culture vide est au 
cœur d’une existence vide, et la réinvention d’une entreprise de transformation générale du 
monde doit aussi et d’abord être posée sur ce terrain.  Renoncer à revendiquer le pouvoir dans 
la culture serait laisser ce pouvoir à ceux qui l’ont.46  
The Situationists make concessions to the spectacle in the interests of furthering a revolutionary cause 
in the here and now.  There is little concern for philosophical or theoretical purity but a practical 
desire to overcome the condition of alienation in the present by any available means.  The practice of 
détournement offers a path to negate the ‘vérités officielles’ of the spectacle in the hope of prefiguring 
a possible future.  The necessary question is a tactical one for the Situationists, as the revolutionary 
struggle is viewed as a civil war.  This locates political struggle within the aesthetic realm: 
détournement appropriates and ‘re-routes’ fragments of the dominant aesthetic towards oppositional 
ends, seeking to reveal the hypocrisies, iniquities and unfulfilled promises of the status quo and 
conceiving of ways to combat it.  The didactic and propagandist character of Situationist writing 
serves the specific purpose of enunciating the need for oppositional thought and action, rather than 
being the sufficient criterion constitutive of oppositional thought and action itself.  If détournement 
acts as both negation and prelude, it functions as a provocation to recognise the necessity for this 
action.  It is Patrick Marcolini’s contention that: ‘Dans le “Mode d’emploi du détournement”, Debord 
et Wolman insistent sur le fait que le détournement est à la fois le moyen et le but du combat qu’ils 
sont en train de mener.’47  This performative coincidence of theory and practice endows the 
‘movement’ with a much sought-after ‘authentic’ revolutionary praxis that belies much of the 
Situationists’ own references to the ‘provisional’ or ‘transitional’ nature of their activity: 
                                                          
46 Authorship unattributed, ‘L’aventure’, Internationale situationniste, 5 (1960), 3-5 (p.5). 
47 Marcolini, Le Mouvement situationniste, p.151. 
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La théorie du détournement par elle-même ne nous intéresse guère.  Mais nous la trouvons 
liée à presque tous les aspects constructifs de la période de transition présituationniste.  Son 
enrichissement, par la pratique, apparaît donc comme nécessaire.48 
Though it may not have ‘interested’ them particularly, the strength of Situationist propaganda lies 
primarily in the theory of détournement whilst the individual instances can appear inconsequential in 
the context of the political programme’s grand vision.  The aesthetic practice of détournement has 
tended not to fulfil the underlying theory of political action.  It is the enrichment of the practice by 
means of theory that offers the possibility of more productive excavations of the Situationist 
movement.  The identification of a ‘pre-Situationist’ period of transition in which propaganda and 
rhetorical seduction are tools, as are the explicitly stated techniques of appropriation, permits a 
theoretical exploration of its potential.  Marcolini uncritically accepts the grandiloquent proclamations 
of Debord and Wolman; in a similar fashion to Greil Marcus in his essay on Debord and Jorn’s 
Mémoires when he contends that for the Situationists, ‘the pursuit of the utopia was the utopia.’49  
Whilst unquestionably loyal to the Situationists’ insistence on the importance of everyday life and the 
obsolescence of academic contemplation, these earnest proclamations obscure the extent to which 
Situationist theory offers a pragmatic and strategic programme for oppositional action by revering the 
Romantic, bohemian, extra-institutional forms of their organisation.  They both attempt to ascribe to 
the Situationists and to the practice of détournement a hallowed kind of coincidence of theory and 
practice which the reality does not bear out.  Détournement as a concept is strong for its fluidity and 
multi-facetedness but this mercuriality cannot be confused with a coherence of praxis. 
Patrick Greaney’s article ‘Détournement as Gendered Repetition’ critiques the theory of 
détournement in a similar manner to Rancière’s critique of spectacle, contending that the opposition 
between passive and active is a gendered one.  He rightly concludes, however, that Debord’s texts can 
‘nonetheless be reread, détourned, as texts about tensions within Situationist practices and not just 
                                                          
48 Debord and Wolman, ‘Mode d’emploi du détournement’. 
49 Greil Marcus, ‘Guy Debord’s Mémoires: A Situationist Primer’, in On the Passage of a few people through a 
rather brief moment in time: The Situationist International 1957-1972, ed. by Elisabeth Sussman (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1991), pp.124-31 (p.131). 
85 
 
proposals to overcome spectacular passivity’.50  Détournement is fluid and dynamic, in response to 
historical contexts, time and history; thought this way, ‘spectacular passivity’ becomes not a 
hypostatised concept but a term denoting the relationship between the material economic and social 
relations as they exist.  Greaney fails to recognise the extent to which Situationist reflections on the 
nature of détournement (that is, the theory of détournement) perform this task of critical self-reflection 
as a means of resisting ‘spectacular passivity’ — they are not separate tasks.  In his short essay on 
Debord’s cinema, Giorgio Agamben characterises détournement thus: 
What does it mean to resist?  Above all it means de-creating what exists, de-creating the real, 
being stronger than the fact in front of you.  Every act of creation is also an act of thought, 
and an act of thought is a creative act, because it is deﬁned above all by its capacity to de-
create the real.51 
Détournement is best understood as this de-creation of the real by means of critical engagement — 
which requires analysis and understanding — with the détourned element.  It is necessary to 
understand détournement against the Situationists’ claims of a unity of theory and practice, instead 
acknowledging the provisional, propagandist character of its political and strategic aims.  By 
recognizing the limits of détournement in this way, a theory that calls for dynamic and constantly 
evolving criticism of the historical moment is brought into relief. 
   
Avec et contre le cinéma 
In the pre-Situationist ‘user’s guide’ to détournement, Debord and Wolman declare that: ‘C’est 
évidemment dans le cadre cinématographique que le détournement peut atteindre à sa plus grande 
efficacité, et sans doute, pour ceux que la chose préoccupe, à sa plus grande beauté.’52  The cinema 
                                                          
50 Patrick Greaney, ‘Insinuation: Détournement as Gendered Repetition’, South Atlantic Quarterly, 110.1 
(2011), 75-88 (p.84). 
51 Agamben, ‘Difference and Repetition: on Guy Debord’s Film’, Guy Debord and the Situationist 
International, ed. Tom McDonough, p.318. 
52 Debord and Wolman, ‘Mode d’emploi du détournement.’ 
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owes this privileged position in the theorisation and practice of détournement to its status as ‘l’art 
central de notre société’ as an editorial text entitled ‘Avec et contre le cinéma’ sets out in the first 
issue of I.S. 53  This centrality is attributed to the fact that it is the most technologically advanced art 
form as well as its role offering compensatory images and narratives in the leisure time of alienated 
workers.  This latter notion is more readily associated with popular evocations of the ‘society of the 
spectacle’ but it is the former which the I.S. editorial emphasises: the cinema offering ‘la meilleure 
représentation d’une époque d’inventions anarchiques juxtaposées (non articulées, simplement 
additionnées).’54  The article refers to potential technological advances in the cinema, giving the 
example of ‘un cinéma odorant’, seeking to render more perfect the illusion of the spectacle’s 
incorporation of individual experience and offer a substitute for the unitary artistic activity they 
alleged is now possible in everyday life.  The confluence of the cinema’s material infrastructure and 
capacity for aesthetic conditioning gives it its unique importance as the defining art form of the 
twentieth century.   
It is an escapist or compensatory cinema which presents a consumable and diversionary 
spectacle that the Situationists attack first and foremost.  Debord would write in 1961, that ‘La 
révolution n’est pas “montrer” la vie aux gens, mais les faire vivre’,55 and that the aim of any 
revolutionary organisation was not to encourage people to listen to convincing explanations from 
expert leaders but to provoke them into speaking themselves.  The cinematic spectacle was a form of 
‘pseudo-communication — qui a été développée, de préférence à d’autres possibles, par la présente 
technologie de classe — où ceci est radicalement impraticable’.56  It was this conviction which led to 
the initial positing of an ‘anti-cinema’.  The first tenet of Situationist cinema then, was to radically 
break with the dominant conception of what cinema could be.  The notion of aesthetics is already 
marginalised in the ‘Mode d’emploi’, ‘beauty’ is considered an incidental aspect of the potential 
détournement cinema could permit.  Aesthetic achievement is a potential preoccupation of others, a 
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consideration uniquely motivated by the requirements of the revolutionary project to inspire action in 
a text’s readers or a film’s spectators.  Debord’s first film, Hurlements en faveur de Sade (1952), 
made during his time among the Lettrists, took this rejection of traditional aesthetic criteria in the 
cinema to the extreme of completely eliminating the image.  He would later describe the film as an 
‘entreprise de terrorisme cinématographique’.57  The screen would alternate between black and white 
blocks as the voice-over played.  The final twenty-minute sequence consisted only of silence and a 
blank screen.  This anti-image, Dada-esque gesture asserted the negation of art and cinema: all forms 
of culture were to be considered co-opted and ideologically mortgaged to the economic and social 
forces which controlled them.  After presenting the title and director of the film and a dedication (to 
Wolman), the soundtrack quotes article 115 of the French penal code, the legal definition of 
disappearance, an oblique warning to the audience of the absence to come.  A more explicit warning 
followed soon after:  
Au moment où la projection allait commencer, Guy-Ernest Debord devait monter sur la scène 
pour prononcer quelques mots d’introduction.  Il aurait dit simplement: Il n’y a pas de film.  
Le cinéma est mort.  Il ne peut plus y avoir de film.  Passons, si vous voulez, au débat.58  
The pronouncement of the death of cinema and this radical negativity are indicative of the Lettrist 
leader Isodore Isou’s Esthétique du cinema which argued that any art form would pass through two 
distinct stages: ‘la phase amplique’ and ‘la phase ciselante’.59  During this amplic phase, a mode of 
expression is constructed, its stylistic vocabulary and grammatical rules are brought into being and 
formal conventions and narrative techniques are established.  The ‘chiselling’ phase is one of 
destruction, where the form turns in on itself having exhausted its capacity for communication.  This 
phase is characterised by the self-conscious examination of the capacities and limits of the form itself.  
This influence endures until after the establishment of the Situationist International. ‘Avec et contre’ 
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laments the absence of such formally destructive works in the cinema, and attributes this lack 
precisely to the social role the cinema plays in modern society: 
Le retard de l’apparition des symptômes modernes de l’art dans le cinéma (par exemple 
certaines œuvres formellement destructrices, contemporaines de ce qui est accepté depuis 
vingt ou trente ans dans les arts plastiques ou l’écriture, sont encore rejetées même dans les 
ciné-clubs) découle non seulement de ses chaînes directement économiques ou fardées 
d’idéalismes (censure morale), mais de l’importance positive de l’art cinématographique dans 
la société moderne.  Cette importance du cinéma est due aux moyens d’influence supérieurs 
qu’il met en œuvre; et entraîne nécessairement son contrôle accru par la classe dominante.  Il 
faut donc lutter pour s’emparer d’un secteur réellement expérimental dans le cinéma.60   
These superior means of influence which constitute the ‘positive importance’ of cinema’s societal role 
correspond to the spectacle’s seductive capacities.  It is these capacities which make the cinema the 
battleground for revolutionary struggle and therefore the stage most requiring détournement.  Despite 
the avowed intention to seize control of a truly experimental sector of cinema, there is at this stage, 
beyond the negativity of the blank screen and the stated theoretical aims of negation, no suggestion of 
what an experimental cinema might look like.  This espousal of a radical negativity continues in the 
third issue of the journal, in which an article entitled ‘Le cinéma après Alain Resnais’ provides a 
(rare) approving assessment of a work of contemporary cinema, Resnais’s Hiroshima mon amour 
(1959).  The film received much critical praise at the time, and has gone down as one of the most 
significant landmarks in French cinema in the twentieth century.  Perhaps predictably, it was the 
critical and popular appreciation of the film at which the Situationists took aim in their review: ‘Les 
partisans de Resnais parlent assez libéralement de génie, à cause du prestigieux mystère du terme, qui 
dispense d’expliquer l’importance objective d’Hiroshima: l’apparition dans le cinéma “commercial” 
du mouvement d’auto-destruction qui domine tout l’art moderne.’61  Rather than understanding 
Resnais’s achievement in terms of ‘genius’ then, as the quasi-metaphysical product of individual 
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inspiration, the Situationists claimed the merit of the film lay in its recognition of the cinema’s 
necessary passage into la phase ciselante.  Echoing the earlier ‘Avec et contre’, the assessment of 
Hiroshima mon amour’s reception continues: ‘En fait, chacun insiste sur le temps bouleversé du film 
de Resnais pour ne pas en voir les autres aspects destructifs […] Le temps d’Hiroshima, la confusion 
d’Hiroshima, ne sont pas une annexion du cinéma par la littérature; c’est la suite dans le cinéma du 
mouvement qui a porté toute l’écriture, et d’abord la poésie, vers sa dissolution.’62  This radically 
negative conception of the virtue of cinematic practice must end in the destruction, dissolution and 
death of the cinema.   
This emphasis on negativity in political and artistic practice more generally is insisted upon in 
the 1962 journal article, Du rôle de l’IS: ‘Le défaut d’autres groupes, qui ont vu plus ou moins la 
nécessité de la mutation qui vient, c’est leur positivité.  Que ces groupes essaient d’être avant-garde 
artistique ou bien nouvelle formation politique, ils croient tous devoir sauver quelque chose de 
l’ancienne praxis, et par là ils se perdent.’63  This dependence on historical political struggle ensures 
the failure of these other groups aspiring to the status of the avant-garde.  What the Situationists allege 
sets them apart then, is their resistance to such positivity, to a praxis which accepts any existing 
forms.  They cite their recent decision at the Gothenburg conference of the same year — to expel the 
‘Nashist’ and ‘Spurist’ factions, the former a predominantly Scandinavian grouping around the 
Danish painter (and brother of Asger Jorn) Jorgen Nash and the group SPUR (a German artistic 
collective), on grounds of their desire to continue to produce works for sale on the art market and 
subsequent declaration of all art works to be ‘anti-Situationist’ — as evidence for the rather grandiose 
claim of the S.I. holding a dominant position within modern culture.  This negationist stance is 
reiterated at the conclusion of the article: ‘Et si l’on tient vraiment à trouver quelque chose de positif 
dans la culture moderne, il faut dire que son seul caractère positif apparaît dans son auto-liquidation, 
son mouvement de disparition, son témoignage contre elle-même.’64   
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Extracts of journal articles, an essay on Debord’s cinema by Asger Jorn, full scenarios as well 
as  technical notes for Debord’s first three films, Hurlements en faveur de Sade, Sur le passage de 
quelques personnes à travers d’une assez courte unité de temps (1959) and Critique de la séparation 
(1961), were released in 1964 under the title Contre le cinéma.65  The title is indicative of the 
emphasis on negativity that can be taken from Debord’s early Situationist and particularly Lettrist 
cinema.  It is nevertheless significant that this categorisation of Debord’s early work forgoes the 
positive or affirmative aspect initially outlined in ‘Avec et contre’: the ‘With and’ has been lost.  
Debord’s cinema in this guise (and we might add, the Situationist project more generally) does invite 
itself to be considered as a form of radical negativity, a wholesale rejection of existing forms which 
seeks to posit nothing itself.  Alain Badiou has described the Situationists in terms of an ‘active 
nihilism’, a doctrine whose indifference to the labour of reconstructing the world squanders any merit 
of their critical intent.66  This characterisation, however, not only ignores the means of operational 
organisation necessary in the formation of the S.I. as a group but also their repeated identification of 
the positive potential of the cinema.  In ‘Avec et contre’, this double-edged nature of the cinema is 
repeatedly emphasised:  
Nous pouvons envisager deux usages distincts du cinéma: d’abord son emploi comme forme 
de propagande dans la période de transition pré-situationniste; ensuite son emploi direct 
comme élément constitutif d’une situation réalisée. 
Le cinéma est ainsi comparable à l’architecture par son importance actuelle dans la vie de 
tous, par les limitations qui lui ferment le renouvellement, par l’immense portée que ne peut 
manquer d’avoir sa liberté de renouvellement.  Il faut tirer parti des aspects progressifs du 
cinéma industriel, de même qu’en trouvant une architecture organisée à partir de la fonction 
psychologique de l’ambiance on peut retirer la perle cachée dans le fumier du fonctionnalisme 
absolu.67 
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Whilst the notion of the constructed situation is one that I have marginalised in my analysis of 
Situationist theory in line with my argument that the rhetorical role of such effusions outweighs their 
substantive theoretical significance, it is important to acknowledge this affirmation of the potential 
revolutionary value of the cinema.  Notably, it is certainly not inconsistent with the denunciation of a 
certain kind of spectacular cinema: the pearl can be sought amongst the manure, to quote the above 
(seemingly slightly confused) metaphor.  Whilst the initial negativity may be most evident in 
Hurlements, as a rebellion against the image, Rancière has in fact written of Debord’s cinematic work 
in strikingly antithetical terms, citing Debord’s description of détournement as ‘positif ou “lyrique”’.68  
Rancière’s article, ‘Quand nous étions sur le Shenandoah’, appeared in an edition of Cahiers du 
cinéma on the occasion of the DVD release of Debord’s films which had until then been out of 
circulation at their director’s behest.  Rancière’s comments draw attention to the presence of an 
almost naïve identification invited by the selection of certain détourned images and filmed shots of 
Debord and his Situationist counterparts: ‘A l’exacte opposé de toute la pédagogie brechtienne en 
vogue dans les années 1960, le détournement est un exercice d’identification au héros.’69  Rancière’s 
assessment is particularly apt for moments such as Debord’s détournement of Nicholas Ray’s Johnny 
Guitar (1954), where he allows the sound track (albeit it in a poorly dubbed version) of the film to 
interrupt his monologue, as the hero (Sterling Hayden) talks to Joan Crawford’s character about love, 
and significantly how he is drinking in order to ‘tuer le temps’.  Debord would dedicate a whole 
chapter of his memoir Panégyric to alcohol, and left instructions to translators detailing his use of 
alcohol to describe the passage of time.  In this détournement, what we see is not the standard 
contempt for the image in its entirety, but an element of pathos with the diegetic characters.  Here, 
Debord takes the spectacle at its word, and seeks to present the images themselves uncritically, whilst 
retaining the critical distance toward the original as a cultural object, it is removed from its original 
context and spared the typical caustic bite which usually accompany Debord’s détournements.  
Sequences described below in which Debord presents photographs of himself and his Situationist 
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colleagues are invited to be considered in the same way.  Once again, these are heroes of the story, 
and we can afford to take the spectacle at its word, by identifying with these heroes, just not certain 
others.  Rancière’s mention of Bertolt Brecht invites comparison with the work of Jean-Luc Godard 
— Debord and the Situationists denounced Godard repeatedly, an antipathy that will be explored 
below — with whom the notion of Brechtian distanciation in the cinema is widely associated.70  This 
distanciation sought to animate a passive spectator by drawing attention to the necessarily constructed 
and artificial nature of the cinematic spectacle.  Such a tactic involved introducing elements which 
self-consciously flouted conventions of narrative and form, such as explicit references to the film’s 
production, characters ‘breaking the fourth wall’ by speaking directly to the camera or discontinuous 
editing.  Whilst Rancière is right to signal the positivity that is not so much discernible as 
exaggeratedly blatant, by describing this as ‘remontant le cours de l’utopie esthétique’ he ignores the 
ways in which Debord moves between these two registers — identification and distanciation — with 
scant regard to a doctrinaire commitment to one or the other, in order to finally draw attention away 
from both aesthetics and utopia, and seeking to bridge the gap between theory and practice.   
This oscillation between affirmation and negation calls to mind the dialectical functioning of 
détournement.  Debord’s repeatedly avowed Hegelianism makes recourse to referring to dialectics 
very tempting in examining the polarisations which feature throughout his work.  Given the frequency 
(not least in Debord’s writing itself) with which the concept of the dialectic is invoked in an imprecise 
and catch-all fashion, the analysis that follows seeks to show how the technique of détournement 
radically resists any consignment into a static doctrine.  How this ‘double jeu de l’art et de sa 
négation’ plays out during the course of Debord’s cinematic career will be examined over the course 
of the rest of this chapter.  Benjamin Noys’s characterisation is useful here: 
A dialectical thought must at once sharpen the contradiction between time and space, to avoid 
a false monism, a solution merely in thought, and sublate or supersede that contradiction so as 
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not to fall into a dualism; we could say this is precisely the dialectical function of 
détournement.71   
In what follows, I will attempt to demonstrate the cinematic techniques Debord uses in order to carry 
out this perpetually evolving task.   
The interplay of an all–encompassing negativity and a seemingly naive hyper-identification 
with the images employed is borne out in Debord’s two ‘Situationist’ films (by which all I mean is 
that they were made during the years of the Situationist International’s existence — as will become 
clear, those that came after I am still considering as examples of ‘Situationist cinema’): Sur le passage 
de quelques personnes à travers une assez courte unité de temps (1959) and Critique de la séparation 
(1961).  Both were produced by the ‘Dansk-Fransk experimentalfilms kompagni’, funded by Asger 
Jorn via sales of his artworks.  Sur le passage tells the story in the form of a ‘documentaire 
détourné’72 of the Lettrist international and Debord’s comrades on the Parisian left bank during the 
mid-late 1950s where: ‘ici était mis en actes le doute systématique à l’égard de tous les 
divertissements et travaux d’une société, une critique globale de son idée de bonheur.’73  The title’s 
identification with Debord and his Lettrist cohorts immediately signals a greater level of conciliation 
with conventional cinematic form than the oblique reference to Sade of his previous film (the fourth 
voice, ‘jeune fille’, on the soundtrack to Hurlements remarks: ‘Mais on ne parle pas de Sade dans ce 
film’.)74  The titles of Sur le passage are shown over a black screen as a recording plays from the 3rd 
conference of the S.I. which took place in Munich.  We hear a somewhat hectic discussion of 
urbanism being simultaneously translated into German as the speaker holds forth, before Debord 
(after what one assumes is a cut) is heard discussing memory and art.  This somewhat confusing and 
disjointed debate is contextualised by a title which notifies us of the recording’s provenance.  The first 
images show a stationary camera panning left to right over the facades of Saint-Germain-des-Prés 
with a subtitle situating the shot: ‘Paris 1952’.  Debord intones over images of crowds walking in the 
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streets that this neighbourhood, designed for the petit bourgeois, honourable employees and 
intellectual tourism is ‘l’environnement étranger de notre histoire’.75  Already the consistency of 
sound and image offers a coherence which constitutes a clear distinction between this and Debord’s 
first film.  A still photograph of Asger Jorn, Michèle Bernstein, Debord himself and Collette Gaillard 
drinking and smoking in a café is then shown.  These take the form of a shot of the photograph itself, 
followed by panning over and zooming in on each individual, Jorn’s eyes, Debord’s cigarette, 
Bernstein’s drink, as what Debord’s notes describe as a ‘thème cérémonieux des aventures’ plays on 
the soundtrack.76  It is clear at this point that we are dealing with an autobiography of sorts, and a 
laudatory one: ‘Notre objectif a saisi pour vous quelques aspects d’une micro-société provisoire.’77  
Michel Richard Delalande’s (1657-1726) ‘Thème noble et tragique’ lends more portentous strings to 
the soundtrack, with the suitably self-aggrandising title demonstrating further Debord’s intention to 
present his and his colleagues’ adventures of the 1950s in the form of this identification with the 
‘heroes’ of the narrative.   
What is equally obvious, however, is that this is not the only register on which Sur le passage 
is operating.  A sequence which initially portrays shots of a sparsely populated St Germain street 
demonstrates the refusal of continuity editing which demonstrates Debord’s enduring opposition to 
conventional modes of narrative construction.  The cut to the same camera at a different time, after 
three seconds, sees the street filled with throngs of youths walking in the same direction having left 
their school, towards the camera.  A third cut, again to the same camera, jumps forward a few 
seconds.  Immediately after this, the next jump sees the same flow of pedestrians interrupted by a 
delivery vehicle that has materialised half-way down the street.  The next cut, again after only a 
second or so, is revealed to have taken place at least a few seconds before the previous one, as the 
same vehicle turns the corner at the head of the street fifty meters back from where it appeared 
previously, moving slowly through the crowd.  This shot is then again almost immediately superseded 
by a shot of another street, shot at a similar angle which it is easy to assume was an intentional visual 
                                                          
75 Ibid., p.21.  
76 Ibid., p.21. 
77 Ibid., p.23. 
95 
 
quotation of the previous, in which students battle riot police.  This sequence demonstrates the 
arbitrary manipulation of cinematic time of which a director has command, seeking to draw attention 
to the constructed nature of the film and the false coherence of narrative.  It also serves as a depiction 
of the equally arbitrary currents of pedestrianisation in the modern city, in keeping with the 
Situationist preoccupation with urbanism and the structuring of public space with this juxtaposition of 
a peaceful, compliant youth, obeying the commodity time of capital as they leave school in unison 
and the revolting students violently confronting the state’s physical manifestation and defenders of 
this packaged time: the police.  Though Debord’s cinematic oeuvre invites itself to be considered as 
film essay precisely because of the pre-eminence of the written script and its literary character — and 
the fact that for a long time, it was only his film scripts that were available for public consumption — 
in his complete cinematic works, this sequence is described extremely succinctly as ‘Sortie d’un lycée 
de jeunes filles.  Des policiers français dans la rue’.78  It is also noteworthy that Debord’s use of the 
jump cut precedes Godard’s celebrated employment of the technique in A Bout de Souffle (1960) by a 
year.   
As mentioned above, the I.S. journal describes Sur le passage as a détourned documentary.  
Debord distinguishes what he is doing from conventional documentary during the course of the film, 
as the voiceover states: 
Ce qui, le plus souvent, permet de comprendre les documentaires — c’est la limitation 
arbitraire de leur sujet.  Ils décrivent l’atomisation des fonctions sociales, et l’isolement de 
leurs produits.  On peut, au contraire, envisager toute la complexité d’un moment qui ne se 
résout pas dans un travail, dont le mouvement contient indissolublement des faits et des 
valeurs, et dont le sens n’apparaît pas encore.  La matière du documentaire serait alors cette 
totalité confuse.79  
This critique of specialisation contrasts the manufactured coherence of spectacular representation with 
the possibility of a film seeking to challenge the spectator by presenting an incoherent documentary 
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which reflects the incoherence of lived reality.  It is not a simple matter of everyday life being more 
complex than the spectacle permits, as a documentary that sought to portray an issue in all its 
complexity could, theoretically, do so according to the conventions of the genre.  The restriction of a 
documentary’s subject matter to neatly parcelled categories allows it to be comprehensible in the 
context of what has gone before.  Sur le passage seeks to dismantle this artificial construction, not in 
the name of acknowledging the enhanced complexity of the world, but in terms of negation and a 
refusal of the construct of narrative coherence.80  Thomas Y. Levin, in his seminal article on Debord’s 
cinema, describes this as a ‘mimesis of incoherence’, which makes the relationship of détournement 
to the cinema analogous to the relationship between the psychogeographic dérive and everyday life.81  
The dérive involved embarking on an adventure across the city, seeing where the influences of the 
environment would take you.  This involved disabusing onself of the instrumental logic of traditional 
urbanism and engaging with one’s surroundings entirely as one saw fit, with no regard to convention 
or custom.   The refusal of cinematic convention is evinced by the very fact that this programmatic 
statement takes place over a blank screen, quoting the negativity of Hurlements.  This negation is 
itself negated, however, later in the film: ‘Evidemment, on peut à l’occasion en faire un film.  
Cependant, même au cas où ce film réussirait à être aussi fondamentalement incohérent et 
insatisfaisant que la réalité dont il traite, il ne sera jamais qu’une reconstitution — pauvre et fausse 
comme ce travelling manqué’, over a travelling shot of a group of Debord’s cohorts assembled in a 
cafe which his notes indicate should be the ‘worst’ of their recorded takes, in which the watching 
public should encroach, the shadow of the camera be seen.82  Even the mimesis of incoherence then, is 
too coherent once designated a filmmaking strategy.  Détournement requires not only the negative 
devaluation but the re-inscription into a new affirmative context.  That this reinscription, to some 
extent at least, can be seen as a preservation is similarly revealed in Debord’s notes where he states 
that an earlier series of images of café-dwelling Situationists is shot ‘dans la manière du reportage 
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cinématographique ou télévisé’ as well as by the embrace of the identification with our ‘heroes’, with 
whom, though hardly the stuff of traditional cinema, we are invited to empathise despite the 
Situationists’ opposition to this technique on behalf of spectacular forms.83    
Another visual quotation of Hurlements sees a female voice enunciate over a blank screen 
that: ‘On ne conteste jamais réellement une organisation de l’existence sans contester toutes les 
formes de langage qui appartiennent à cette organisation.’84  In the sequence of the youth in the 
streets, Debord is contesting the convention of continuity editing, the grammar of cinematic language, 
at the same time as demonstrating its practical and political corollary.  This is not purely the refusal of 
convention in negative form but a tactical use of this negation in the formation of a critical statement.  
This necessarily returns to an extent to a recognisable language of cinema in order to communicate 
this idea, after all, Sur le passage cannot but remain a film and thus a means of communication, 
however imperfect.  Whilst the blank screen denotes the pure negativity of Hurlements, the 
employment of conventional codes of identification with the heroes or shots aping the documentary 
form of cinema and television reveal the undesirability for Debord of foregoing this language entirely, 
in the manner of a non-figural form of representation, for example, or in the manner of François 
Dufrêne’s Tambours du jugement premier (1952), a film without film, screen or image at all.  What is 
meant by contesting this language is therefore beyond mere renunciation.  There is rather something 
of a playful, tactical interplay between the two modes of identification and distanciation, of coherence 
and incoherence which denotes that one necessarily relies on the other: the negative only means 
anything in relation to the positivity of language and it is tactically desirable for a détournement to 
have a substantive meaning in and of itself.  This substantive meaning can still be a denunciation, 
however, in that the necessary conclusion of the film will permit the creation of a narrative by giving 
it an end, just as a sentence only makes sense with a full-stop.  Debord refuses this affirmation, 
however, constantly fighting to resist either pole of the negative/affirmative binary: the screen 
remains plain white, Debord’s instruction indicates for twenty seconds after the pronouncement of the 
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last word: ‘Pour décrire effectivement cette époque, il faudrait sans doute montrer beaucoup d’autres 
choses.  Mais à quoi bon?  Il faudrait comprendre la totalité de ce qui s’est fait; ce qui reste à faire.  Et 
non ajouter d’autres ruines au vieux monde du spectacle et des souvenirs.’85 
The constant flitting between affirmation and negation is repeated in 1961’s Critique de la 
séparation, Debord’s next film.  The unsatisfying nature of everyday life is reiterated in the context of 
the false coherence created by spectacular convention: ‘Le spectacle cinématographique a ses règles, 
qui permettent d’aboutir à des produits satisfaisants.  Cependant, la réalité dont il faut partir, c’est 
l’insatisfaction.’86  This renewal of the conceptual architecture of Sur la passage is extended 
throughout the opening of the film as Debord reemphasises the importance of a film’s dissolution of 
its so-called subject in demystifying the cinema as well as reaffirming the essential 
incomprehensibility of everyday life.  The predominantly autobiographical approach of Sur le passage 
has been largely replaced by an increased attention to society itself, particularly ‘les pouvoirs’ which 
are used interchangeably with ‘notre époque’, ‘temps morts’ and ‘temps perdu’.87  This equation of 
power and time is a manifestation of Debord’s theorisation of human knowledge as irrevocably bound 
to time and history.  It is the dominant conception of knowledge and of reason which constitutes 
power and at which Debord takes aim.  This time is lost or dead because the individual is dispossessed 
of his or her own time in the service of the spectacle-commodity economy.  As Critique has it: ‘Le 
spectacle, dans toute son étendue, c’est l’époque.’88  This notion of power is given a new visual 
referent in Critique: footage of and taken from aviation.  Debord’s notes refer to individual shots: 
‘Aviateur, équipement stratosphérique’,89 ‘photographie aérienne’,90 whilst mention of dead and lost 
time is accompanied by a view of the Place de la Concorde taken from a helicopter.  Footage of two 
separate rockets taking off are aligned with two lines of Debord’s monotone describing this 
dispossession: ‘Notre époque accumule des pouvoirs et se rêve rationelle.  Mais personne ne reconnaît 
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comme siens de tels pouvoirs.’91  The God-like view from above is an effective metaphorical 
counterpart to Debord’s description of power as it entails the employment of technical means which 
literally elevate the camera above and beyond the capabilities of the human.  It is the super-human 
presentation of these images which echo power’s false coherence and the spectacle’s representation of 
life as more or greater than lived individual reality.  The portrayal of power then moves into a less 
metaphorical stage with photographs and détourned news footage of world leaders: Krushchev, De 
Gaulle, the UN Security Council, Eisenhower and the Pope, Eisenhower in the arms of Franco.  These 
images are specifically linked with the role of the cinema:  
La société se renvoie sa propre image historique, seulement comme l’histoire superficielle et 
statique de ses dirigeants.  Ceux qui incarnent la fatalité extérieure de ce qui se fait.  Le 
secteur des dirigeants est celui-là même du spectacle.  Le cinéma leur va bien.  D’ailleurs, le 
cinéma propose partout des conduites exemplaires, fait des héros, sur le même vieux modèle 
de ceux-ci, avec tout ce qu’il touche.92    
What we see is a very coherent and intelligible relationship between the voiceover’s criticisms and the 
images presented, yet, Debord reminds us that: ‘Toute expression artistique cohérente exprime déjà la 
cohérence du passé, la passivité.’  Again, the correlation here between the image of the prison guard 
(the incarnation of order and confinement) and the voiceover’s denunciation of coherent artistic 
expression is itself relatively coherent and therefore seems to undermine Debord’s critique.  This is 
only the case, however, if we limit the theoretical and philosophical assertions of the film to the 
aesthetic medium of film itself.  This is something Debord explicitly cautions the spectator against, in 
that his cinema — more so even than his written works, given the noted centrality of the cinema 
within the spectacle — must always be initially opposed in favour of reading his films as an 
intervention in the everyday life of the spectator.  The means he uses to depict his arguments are 
therefore never coherent in themselves, even when they borrow uncomplicatedly from existing 
cinematic language in order to be understood.  Instead, their coherence is employed as a means of 
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demonstrating the futility of creating a film in and of itself, if it cannot hope to engage the spectator as 
a part of the process.  This is nevertheless incoherent to the extent that it refuses to tie the film 
together in a neat narratival bow and there is no summative conclusion from which we can take 
Debord’s moral of the story.     
This process of engaging the viewer moves once again towards the hyper-identification of 
Debord and the Situationists with the traditional role of the hero, so categorically denounced in the 
same eighteen minute film.  ‘La seule aventure, disions-nous, c’est contester la totalité’,93 pronounces 
Debord over a photograph from a film of King Arthur and his knights of the round table.  The cut into 
a picture of an unnamed friend (‘un situationniste’, in the script’s notes) is followed by a photograph 
of Asger Jorn, then a close up of one of the knights from the original photograph.  We are then shown 
another image of Jorn, before the camera cuts back to the knights, this time panning over the 
photograph, before cutting to a photograph of four Situationists, including Debord and Bernstein, 
themselves around a table in a café on the Rue de la Montagne-Sainte-Geneviève, a regular 
Situationist haunt.  The symmetry of the images of the Knights and the Situationists themselves posits 
once again, and not subtly, this extreme identification.  This mythologisation of Debord and his band 
of warriors seems at once ironic and extremely unironic: whilst this manoeuvre could be interpreted as 
an ironic identification fulfilling the role of distanciation, it is worth noting that this sequence comes 
before the above discussed critique of cinema and its heroism.  The heroism presented here calls into 
question such notions as seen in traditional narrative cinema, or in the portrayal of political leaders on 
television, yet it is difficult not to understand Debord’s eulogy to himself and his friends as willingly 
preserving this tactic of exemplarity.  I have noted above, in connection with the discussion of 
Rancière’s critique of spectatorship, that Debord states it necessary to speak the language of spectacle, 
to pursue the spectacle’s own methodology in order to analyse it.  As he writes in La Société du 
spectacle, the spectacle is the ‘moment historique qui nous contient’ (Thesis 11).  What is meant here 
by the verb ‘contient’ is perhaps vague, but indicates the spectacle’s status not just as mere cultural 
and political power but as the constant and inevitable mediation of cultural memory in the 
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construction of our identities and social relations.  This being the case, the purpose of détournement is 
excavating the good from this cultural heritage in the service of transforming the economic and social 
realities of the everyday.  The spectacle, then, is all there is: détournement merely seeks to repurpose 
what can be repurposed in the interests of a new, qualitatively superior whole.  This takes place 
within, as Critique continues, ‘[l]e décalage entre cette image et les résultats’;94 the gap between the 
images the spectacle recognises itself in and the social and historical consequences of that image.  The 
unfulfilled promises of an era can be discerned within the representation of experience and memory 
the spectacle offers.  After mention of this ‘décalage’, we see swimmers filmed from under the water: 
like the swimmers, we flail about in time, in images and within the spectacle itself.   
In the ‘fiches techniques’ published as part of Contre le cinéma, Debord describes his 
intentions in Critique: ‘Le rapport entre les images, le commentaire et les sous-titres n’est ni 
complémentaire, ni indifférent.  Il vise à être lui-même critique.’95  The sporadic inclusion of subtitles 
introduces another ingredient to Debord’s composition, an addition which he, in the same short piece, 
acknowledges is difficult to follow at the same time as the commentary.  This confusion can on the 
one hand be considered a distanciation device, rendering the film virtually incomprehensible.  Upon 
second viewing perhaps, or with the script to hand, we can draw out the interplay between the image, 
voiceover and subtitles.  One scene in which this ‘critical’ relationship can be dissected involves an 
aerial view of a pinball machine from which only the playing area is visible, not the player.  Debord’s 
commentary describes how the spectacle impoverishes everyday life whilst presenting images of 
supposedly great richness.  We are shown a game being played which the player cannot win (the end 
of the game always and inevitably comes when the ball falls into the hole, this is ensured from the 
beginning), whilst the commentary describes the spectacle in precisely these terms: though one may 
find some measure of solace in the spoils of the spectacle, any such consolation is necessarily partial 
and in need of constant renewal.  It is a game fixed from the beginning.  Meanwhile, the apparently 
incongruous subtitles read: ‘Qui souhaiterait d’avoir pour ami un homme qui discourt de cette 
                                                          
94 Ibid., p.55. 
95 Debord, Contre le cinéma.  
102 
 
manière?  Qui le choisirait entre les autres pour lui communiquer ses affaires?  Qui aurait recours à lui 
dans des afflictions?  Et enfin à quel usage de la vie on le pourrait destiner?’96  This apparent auto-
critique immediately undermines the assertions of the voiceover and by extension any link such as the 
one I have made between the image of pinball and Debord’s casting of the spectacle.  This self-
conscious critique of Critique asserts Debord’s understanding of the contingency of cinematic 
communication and this self-critique continues throughout.  Towards the end, a black screen, yet 
again recalling Hurlements, describes the film as ‘un document sur les conditions de la non-
communication’,97 a film which interrupts itself and never comes to a coherent conclusion, leaving all 
calculations to be remade, a ‘monologue d’ivrogne’98 with incomprehensible allusions and tired 
delivery (Debord’s dry monologue is an ever present characteristic of all his films), a film which, as 
he continues, has no profound reason to have begun and no profound reason to end.  These are 
precisely the ways Debord’s film resists conventional narrative form, but in making this explicit he 
somewhat concedes the necessity of a narrative, albeit one that attacks itself.  Following this, the final 
line of the film pronounces, ‘Je commence à peine à vous faire comprendre que je ne veux pas jouer 
ce jeu-là’, over a still photograph of himself.  Even while declaring his unwillingness to play the 
game, he plays the game, illustrating his mission statement, almost as if signing his work, whilst 
directly addressing the spectator.  These explicit assertions and disavowals, however, invite the 
spectator’s critical engagement with the work and with Debord himself, to understand the issues he 
raises alongside his renunciation of the means he uses to do so.  It is a constant struggle Debord 
participates in with and against the cinema, reflecting the unending struggle of the individual within 
the spectacle: ‘C’est un monde où nous avons fait l’apprentissage du changement.  Rien ne s’y arrête.  
Il apparaît sans cesse plus mobile; et ceux qui le produisent jour après jour contre eux-mêmes peuvent 
se l’approprier, je le sais bien.’99  Debord’s was a cinema of fluidity, then, that sought to depict 
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(indivisibly in form and content) this struggle in terms which brought about the realisation that this re-
appropriation was necessary, desirable and possible.  
One man the Situationists denounced in no uncertain terms for playing this game too readily, 
was Jean-Luc Godard.  This ire directed at Godard was due to the widespread praise accorded his 
work, in which the Situationists detected nothing more than the popularisation of techniques 
belonging to a co-opted, spectacle-friendly aesthetic: ‘Dans le cinéma, Godard représente 
actuellement la pseudo-liberté formelle et la pseudo-critique des habitudes et des valeurs, c’est-à-dire 
les deux manifestations inséparables de tous les ersatz de l’art moderne récupéré.’100  So began a 1966 
article entitled ‘Le rôle de Godard’, which (without, it must be said, referring in any sustained way to 
any of Godard’s films) described how: 
L’art ‘critique’ d’un Godard et ses critiques d’art admiratifs s’emploient tous à cacher les 
problèmes actuels d’une critique de l’art, l’expérience réelle, selon les termes de l’I.S., d’une 
‘communication contenant sa propre critique’. En dernière analyse, la fonction présente du 
godardisme est d’empêcher l’expression situationniste au cinéma.101 
This criticism contrasts a cinema which constantly signals its own contingency and imperfection in 
the name of constant revaluation and experimentation, against Godard’s perceived cooperation with 
the dominant conceptual architecture of the cinema.  It is tempting to suspect that this antipathy is on 
account of the considerable commercial success and critical approval Godard received.  This success 
seems to be a guarantee of Situationist disapproval, given their estimations of a cinema-going public 
and the critical capacities of virtually anyone not writing in their journal.  It is perhaps on the basis of 
this popular acknowledgment of Godard’s work that the article declares: ‘Nous ne parlons pas ici de 
l’emploi, finalement conformiste, d’un art qui se voudrait novateur et critique.  Nous signalons 
l’emploi immédiatement conformiste du cinéma par Godard.’102 Godard is described as the cinematic 
equivalent of Henri Lefebvre’s contribution to social critique: ‘il possède l’apparence d’une certaine 
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liberté dans son propos (ici, un minimum de désinvolture par rapport aux dogmes poussiéreux du récit 
cinématographique).  Mais cette liberté même, ils l’ont prise ailleurs: dans ce qu’ils ont pu saisir des 
expériences avancées de l’époque.  Ils sont le Club Méditerranée de la pensée moderne.’103  The 
article then refers to another piece in the same issue entitled ‘L’emballage du temps libre’, referring to 
the packaged and neatly commodifiable units of time by which capital could be seen to be 
‘colonising’ leisure, that is, time spent not working, in their analysis.  Godard was declared then, 
along with Lefebvre, a product of the spectacle they both ostensibly sought to oppose.  In De la 
misère en milieu étudiant, Mustapha Kayati would describe Godard in precisely these terms, this time 
comparing him to Coca-Cola, referencing Godard’s frequent invocation of the drinks company as the 
representative of American consumer-capital.      
The journal returns to Godard in the twelfth and final issue with an article entitled ‘Le cinéma 
et la révolution’, beginning with Le Monde’s approving review of Godard’s Le Gai Savoir (1969).  
The article cites J.-P. Picaper’s admiring account of Godard’s ‘auto-critique’ manifesting itself as 
leaving the audience in the presence of a blank screen for what is described as an interminably long 
period of time.  The fact that Picaper does not disclose what constitutes this interminablity is mocked 
in what cannot but be a reference to Debord’s Hurlements and this accusation of plagiarism becomes 
clear throughout the rest of the article:  
 L’œuvre de Godard culmine dans un style destructif, aussi tardivement plagié et inutile que 
tout le reste, cette négation ayant été formulée dans le cinéma avant même que Godard n’ait 
commencé la longue série de prétentieuses fausses nouveautés qui suscita tant d’enthousiasme 
chez les étudiants de la période précédente.104 
The reiteration of Godard’s lack of novelty points towards the Lettrist cinema of the early 1950s 
employment of the blank screen, certainly, but this passage also signals the fact that this technique 
remained in the register of pure negation, whilst the purpose of détournement was constituted not only 
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in its initial refusal, but in the reconstitution of a superior construction.  Godard’s cinema, then, at best 
remains a merely negative reaction against the status quo, in the manner of Dada or Surrealism, two 
currents the Situationists allege have already been co-opted by the spectacle.  The article would go on 
to refer to René Viénet’s ‘Les Situationnistes et les nouvelles formes d’action contre la politique et 
l’art’ from the previous issue, which made this accusation of stealing Debord’s techniques explicit:  
Il ne pourra jamais faire autre chose qu’agiter des petites nouveautés prises ailleurs, des 
images ou des mots-vedettes de l’époque, et qui ont à coup sûr une résonance, mais qu’il ne 
peut saisir (Bonnot, ouvrier, Marx, made in U.S.A., Pierrot le Fou, Debord, poésie, etc.).  Il est 
effectivement un enfant de Mao et de coca-cola. 105  
This passage also demonstrates a divergence in the Situationists’ and Godard’s understanding of the 
contemporary political landscape: whilst Godard would frequently refer to ‘les enfants de Mao et de 
Coca-Cola’ as a tongue-in-cheek shorthand to refer to those of the East and West, Debord would 
theorise both Blocs as different incarnations of the spectacle, the West ‘diffuse’ and the East 
‘concentrée’ (Thesis 64). Viénet’s insult, citing Godard as both, whilst using his own terms in the 
form of a somewhat glib détournement, also alludes to the fact that it is his failure to effectively 
conceptualise the functioning of spectacle which impedes his understanding of politics and of the 
cinema.  It is Godard’s theoretical failings, it would seem, that culminate in his conformist and 
ultimately spectacular cinema.  This is why, as ‘Le Cinéma et la révolution’ has it, that Godard was 
rendered ‘démodé’ by the events of May ’68, and heckled by those revolutionaries who encountered 
him on the streets.106  His work, so the article contends, was consigned to the ‘poubelles du passé’.   
It is well worth acknowledging that this considerable vitriol was meted out to Godard in part 
due to his work’s apparent proximity to the theories the Situationists were putting forward themselves 
in the 1960s.  Godard was, after all, marching in support of the student rioters and striking workers 
during May.  Moreover, Godard’s post-’68 career saw a movement away from what he had been 
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doing before with his establishment of the Dziga Vertov collective, named after the Soviet filmmaker 
and theorist.  Though the group disbanded in 1972, the commitment to collective authorship and the 
explicitly Marxist rejection of conventional narrative modes saw the beginnings of the more 
‘experimental’ phase of Godard’s career which has signalled a less commercially recognisable 
aesthetic that characterises his work right up until 2014’s Adieu au Langage 3D.  Godard’s Histoire(s) 
du cinéma (1998) is a voluminous work of over four hours featuring innumerable citations from the 
history of film, in which his conflation of the history of cinema and the history of the twentieth 
century is comparable to Debord’s theoretical examination of the cinema as a symptom of spectacular 
society.  Also recognisably Debordian is Godard’s employment of détourned images alongside 
footage of himself, lending an autobiographical air as in Debord’s Sur le Passage and later In girum 
imus nocte et consumimur igni (1978).  Indeed, there is explicit invocation of Debord and the concept 
of the society of the spectacle in Histoire(s).  Describing the televised celebrations of the fiftieth 
anniversary of the liberation as a grand spectacle, Godard announces the essential accuracy of 
Debord’s diagnosis whilst wryly lamenting the fact that Debord is not widely credited for this 
discovery.  There are instances in Histoire(s) which bear the imprint of Debord’s influence.  In section 
1A, Godard intertwines images of Stalin with those of Hollywood starlets, as part of a section which 
outlines his conflation of the history of the twentieth century and that of the cinema.  In La Société du 
spectacle, Debord directly compares the role of the ‘star’ in the ‘diffuse’ spectacle — the West — and 
the dictator in the ‘concentrated spectacle’— the East — : ‘Là, c’est le pouvoir gouvernemental qui se 
personnalise en pseudo-vedette; ici c’est la vedette de la consommation qui se fait plébisciter en tant 
que pseudo-pouvoir sur le vécu’ (Thesis 60).  Debord contends that the role of this exemplary 
spectacular individual is to incarnate the possibilities of life on both sides of the Iron Curtain.  In the 
East, this takes the form of the cult of personality, in the image of Stalin’s ultimate capacity to rule as 
an effective leader.  In the West, the star is an idealisation of the life the pleasures of the commodity 
can bring, the apparent embodiment of the spectacle’s spoils.  Debord had earlier formulated this 
criticism of stardom in Sur le passage, where, over an image of Anna Karina in a bathtub in an advert 
for Monsavon, a brand of bath product, Debord drones: ‘Le cinéma est à détruire aussi.  En dernière 
analyse, ce n’est ni le talent ni l’absence de talent, ni même l’industrie cinématographique ou la 
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publicité, c’est le besoin qu’on a d’elle qui crée la star.’107  The impoverishment of actually lived life, 
so the argument runs, is what necessitates this representation of an ideal, which, by way of 
identification, consoles the spectator for the unsatisfied desires of their own.  This image-echo of 
Debord’s form, in addition to Godard’s explicit invocation of his name, offer glimpses of the potential 
understanding of the proximity of the two theorists and filmmakers’ bodies of work.   
Furthermore, an immediate similarity between the two is their treatment of images of women.  
For both, female nudity is a repeated feature of their films.  Laura Mulvey accuses Godard of equating 
femininity and sexuality in his films,108 whilst in her article on the repeated employment of sexually 
charged images of women in both Situationist cinema and their journal, Kelly Baum quite rightly 
acknowledges that the Situationists reproduced the gender biases of their time.  She does, however, 
impose the caveat that these images were not meant to titillate or allure, nor provide a ‘decorative’ 
aside: ‘far from a frivolous addendum to or a curious departure from an otherwise progressive 
political and philosophical agenda, images of women were in fact one of the many platforms from 
which the Situationists launched their rebuke to capitalism and spectacle.’109  There are similarly 
frequent depictions of scantily clad and topless women in La Société du spectacle (1973), the film 
version Debord made of his book.  A sequence of ten photographs of various ‘cover girls’, as 
described in the Oeuvres Cinématographiques Complètes, in various states of undress, accompany a 
section from Debord’s voiceover describing at length the spectacle’s exaltation of ‘la marchandise et 
ses passions’.  We are then reminded, over the same series of pictures, that the spectacle realises ‘le 
devenir-monde de la marchandise, qui est aussi bien le devenir-marchandise du monde’.  We are 
invited to see this becoming-commodity of the world through the images of these women.  The 
gendering of the French language permits all the more effectively this conflation of woman and 
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commodity, where Debord has used a pronoun in his description of the commodity, what this ‘elle’ 
perpetrates is described over the images of the topless women.  Mid-thesis (the voiceover comes 
exclusively from the text of Debord’s 1967 book), the cut is to a car show, where the newest models 
are displayed in front of an admiring crowd.  From what we know of Debord’s employment of pre-
existing images and their détournement, we can acknowledge that he is critiquing the spectacle’s 
commodification of women’s bodies, yet in a manner than cannot but appear to reproduce an 
exclusively masculine version of what Baum describes as the ‘alienation of desire.’110  At the 
beginning of the film, Debord’s dedication to Alice Becker-Ho, his wife and the woman with whom 
he would spend the rest of his life, is preceded by topless photographs of her.  After the dedication, 
the next of the détourned images we see are one of space travel, followed by what is described as ‘un 
long striptease’, as a topless woman gyrates on a stage.  Footage of the earth seen from a satellite 
upon which an astronaut works (images of space travel feature repeatedly throughout La Société du 
spectacle) can be immediately associated with Debord’s use of the motif of aviation in Critique as 
described above, that is, in connection with the spectacle of which this film declares itself a critique.  
The strip tease, then, is a continuation of the portrayal of the spectacle, now targeting this 
spectacularisation of the female body and of sexuality (that the next shot is of the Paris Metro and the 
recording of its passengers on CCTV screens seems consistent with this depiction of the spectacle).  
There appears to be a qualitative distinction in the two different depictions of topless women, then, 
within the first three minutes of the film.  In the first, the few grainy photographs depict Becker-Ho 
smiling, stretching, regarding the camera in an informal and personal manner, whilst the second 
depicts (in motion) performance of a choreographed dance for, one presumes, a crowd.  These two 
differing sequences are accompanied by differing text: the first by subtitles, the second by Debord’s 
voiceover.  The final sentence accompanying Becker-Ho’s photographs declare that, ‘Dans l’amour, 
le séparé existe encore, mais non plus comme séparé: comme uni, et le vivant rencontre le vivant.’111  
This Romantic effusion seems quite out of place in one of Debord’s films.  On the other hand, the 
striptease begins when Debord is halfway through reciting the end of his book’s first thesis: ‘Tout ce 
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qui était directement vécu [and it is at this precise point that the strip tease cuts in] s’est éloigné dans 
une représentation.’112  It is tempting to equate the first topless images we see, those of Alice, with the 
first half of the sentence, the directly lived, and the strip tease with the half it appears in concert with.  
We might add that to juxtapose the image and sound in this way would have been a step too far in the 
direction of the ‘coherence’ of sound and image described above, and therefore that the subtitles 
signify a less sardonically critical form of address to the spectator.  This apparent juxtaposition, then, 
seems to posit a notion of ‘genuine’ desire which remains masculine and beholden to the portrayal of 
a naked woman, as opposed to the strip tease (and the later topless images of the ‘cover girls’) which 
follows.  This depiction of desire as the product of the ‘male gaze’, as Mulvey might have it,113 rather 
undermines their critique of the spectacle’s commodification of female sexuality.  This equation of 
femininity and commodity is taken to problematic extremes in the Situationist-influenced group 
Tiqqun’s Premiers matériaux pour une théorie de la Jeune-Fille.  Though the French collective are at 
pains to declare that theirs is not a gendered concept (‘Entendons-nous: le concept de jeune-fille n’est 
évidemment pas un concept sexué’114), their identification of the young woman specifically for 
identifying too much with capitalism’s ideal citizen of consumption seems, at best, a tactically 
undesirable rhetorical device or at worst, as it has been interpreted by some commentators, the 
product of misogyny.115  
It is worth recalling the critical distance Debord seeks by employing détourned images.  In In 
girum imus nocte et consumimur igni (1973), Debord states: ‘Voici par exemple un film où je ne dis 
que des vérités sur des images qui, toutes, sont insignifiantes ou fausses; un film qui méprise cette 
poussière d’images qui le compose.’116  In contrast to Godard, it is worthy of mention that Debord’s 
images of naked women were détourned or photos of Alice, his wife, where Godard would frequently 
                                                          
112 Ibid., p.64.  
113 Laura Mulvey, ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’, in Feminism and Film Theory, ed. by Constance 
Penley (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013), pp.57-68.  
114 Tiqqun, Premiers matériaux pour une Théorie de la jeune-fille (Paris: Mille et une nuits, 2001), p.9. 
115 See Nina Power, ‘She’s Just Not That Into You’, and Moira Weigel and Mal Ahern, ‘Further Materials 
Toward a Theory of the Man-Child’, in The New Inquiry (9 July 2013). Available online here: 
<http://thenewinquiry.com/essays/further-materials-toward-a-theory-of-the-man-child/> [Accessed 12 May 
2016]. 
116 Debord, Œuvres cinématographiques complètes, p.212. 
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pay actresses in order to film them naked.  Scenes such as that from Godard’s British Sounds (1969), 
of the nude actress in lingering close up from navel to thigh — whilst ostensibly seeking to de-
eroticise the portrayal of the female anatomy (a point which in itself is, as Mulvey states, highly 
questionable in its feminist credentials) — still involves a gendered form of exploitation of the actress 
in a way not required of, for example, the male ‘right-wing newsreader’ in another of the segments 
into which British Sounds is divided. 
Despite this minor comparison, it should be reiterated that the Situationists unquestionably 
upheld patriarchal attitudes: McKenzie Wark notes that Michele Bernstein would do the typing for the 
journal, as this was considered ‘woman’s work’.117  Bernstein also related, at an event in 2013, 
pleading ignorance in response to a question about the Situationists’ treatment of gender issues, that 
she and Jacqueline De Jong would be addressed by their surnames, ‘like the men’, whereas other 
women would be addressed by their first names.  This reinforces the notion of a gendering of 
Situationist activity, in that two of the women whose contribution to the group is best known, were 
addressed ‘as the men were’.118  Their silence on feminism was broken only once, in reference to May 
’68, where they declared: ‘L’importance de la participation des femmes à toutes les formes de lutte est 
un signe essentiel de sa profondeur révolutionnaire.’119  That the misogyny of the times endures in 
Debord’s cinema, and Situationist practice more generally, is perhaps unsurprising, as they said of 
Marx: the faults in his revolutionary theory were the faults of the revolutionary struggle of his time 
(Thesis 85).  In my discussion of the ‘limits of détournement’ above, I have spoken of the 
‘undétourned element’, that which is not identified as pernicious and thus not dealt with critically.  It 
is clear that this is what we are discussing when we talk of gender.  As I have attempted to make clear 
throughout this chapter, this is precisely the intention of the concept of détournement, as Debord and 
the Situationists themselves defined it; they were no more supposed to be absolved from future 
                                                          
117 See Wark, The Beach Beneath the Street. 
118 ‘Revenge of the Situationists’, London Literary Festival, Southbank Centre, 26th May 2013, with McKenzie 
Wark, Michele Bernstein and Jacqueline De Jong.  
119 Guy Debord, ‘Le Commencement d’une époque’, Internationale situationniste, 12 (1969), 3-34 (p.4). 
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détournement than those they themselves détourned.  As an article in the final issue of the journal, 
‘Qu’est-ce qu’un situationniste?’ puts it, of those who are not members of the group:  
Ce que peuvent faire de mieux ces révolutionnaires ‘situationnistes’, c’est de garder pour eux-
mêmes (donc, pour le mouvement prolétarien qui monte) ce qu’ils ont pu approuver de nous, 
en tant que perspective et en tant que méthode; c’est de ne pas trop nous évoquer comme 
référence, mais, au contraire, de nous oublier un peu.120 
Ultimately, Debord’s fluid cinematic dialectics come to nothing, in that the sole purpose of these 
works is to encourage the action outside of the cinema.  This is not a case of fulfilling aesthetic 
criteria in order to come up with an achieved style of agit-prop, but to draw attention to the 
inconsistencies of representational authority, of the role of spectacle in everyday life, and to call it 
into question.  This is why the theoretical pronouncements of La Société du spectacle and the journal 
are the focus of this chapter and embody this notion better than any actual practice, Debord’s films 
offering particular interest to the extent that they can be considered theoretical texts themselves, 
though not in the traditionally didactic manner of an instructive ‘theory’, but a set of techniques or 
tactics, perhaps something even as vague as an ‘approach’ in its resistance to positivity as well as to 
nihilism.
  
                                                          
120 Authorship unattributed, ‘Qu’est-ce qu’un “situationniste”?’, Internationale situationniste, 12 (1969), p.83. 
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3 
 
Ethics 
 
In the Rapport sur la construction des situations et sur les conditions de l’organisation et de l’action 
de la tendance internationale situationniste, to give it its full title, the foundational text of the 
Situationist International, penned by Debord in 1957, he writes: ‘le jeu situationniste n’apparaît pas 
distinct d’un choix moral, qui est la prise de parti pour ce qui assure le règne futur de la liberté et du 
jeu.’1  Why are a group who repeatedly derided those they termed ‘les moralistes’ and who professed 
to challenge all accepted social norms prepared to acknowledge the proximity of their project to this 
‘moral choice’?2  What is meant by this notion of ‘play’ or ‘game’ which figures at the beginning and 
is then repeated at the end of the sentence?  Why the apparent equivocation in the fact that this 
Situationist game ‘n’apparaît pas distinct’ from a moral choice?  What is the significance of the prise 
de parti?  How can we begin to understand what precisely is meant by the future reign of freedom and 
play?  And how might we begin to think what it is that could assure this future reign, here only named 
in the indeterminate form of the pronoun ‘ce qui’?  Following on from the previous chapter’s 
discussion of Debord’s cinema as insistently resisting and yet self-consciously acknowledging its own 
incapacity to fully transgress narratival coherence, the argument will draw on the writing of Jacques 
                                                          
1 Guy Debord, ‘Rapport sur la construction des situations et sur les conditions de l’organisation et de l’action de 
la tendance situationniste internationale’, Inter:art actuel, 44 (1989), 1-11 (p.9). 
2 In the journal, the Situationists frequently use the notion of ‘la morale’ in order to refer to those in thrall to any 
particular ideology or ‘-ism’: the first issue describes a contemporary art scene ‘fardé d’idéalismes (censure 
morale)’ (p.9) as well as De Gaulle’s France as being led towards ‘un ordre morale poujado-militaire’ (p.32).  
I.S. no.11 bears an article entitled ‘Un Moraliste’ (p.57) relating to the essayist and critics Louis Janover, who 
had ventured a criticism of the S.I. in the anarchist journal, Les Cahiers de front noir.  Janover’s declaration in 
favour of monogamy is singled out by the S.I. as evidence of a reactionary, moralising brand of thought.  The 
ethical commitment at work in the work of the S.I. distinguishes itself from this moralising in accordance with 
what we have seen on Debord’s thinking of human knowledge being irrevocably bound to time and history, 
incommensurable with any kind of stable doctrine or dogma, emphasising the perpetual need for revaluation and 
updating.   
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Derrida to explore the particular kind of ethical commitment at work in Situationist theory in order to 
respond to these questions. 
 
Derrida, Play and the Decision 
Derrida’s prolific output spanning five decades is primarily characterised by his many adherents and 
critics as the ‘deconstruction’ of the Western philosophical tradition.  At the heart of this ambitious 
project stands the concept of logocentrism, that is, the notion that speech and writing form a binary 
pair in which the latter is subordinated to the former.  In De la Grammatologie (1967), Derrida seeks 
to demonstrate how this opposition results in irreconcilable aporia in the work of various thinkers, 
notably that of the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure.3  For Derrida, language is itself defined by an 
originary lack, for, as Saussure states, words only derive meanings from other words via a system of 
differences, not from any objective relation to the things they signify.  Writing is therefore the sign of 
a sign.  Derrida argues that writing is not a mere function of speaking, but a ‘supplément’ which seeks 
to rectify this originary lack but can never do so due to the absence of a direct and stable relationship 
of meaning between sign and referent.4  Where the logocentric tradition depends on writing 
‘correcting’ this originary lack, it gives rise to what Derrida calls a ‘métaphysique infinitiste’.5  This 
metaphysical conception of writing characterises the Western philosophical tradition.  Deconstruction 
seeks to uncover where this metaphysical construction reveals its internal inconsistencies by 
examining aporetic binary oppositions within a text.6  
In The Ethics of Deconstruction (1993), Simon Critchley analyses Derrida’s work alongside 
that of Emmanuel Levinas, presenting a reading of deconstruction as founded upon an ethical 
commitment to Otherness — ‘altérité’ — which simultaneously founds the political commitment of 
                                                          
3 Jacques Derrida, De la grammatologie (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1967), p.23.   
4 Ibid. On p.17 Derrida first invokes this ‘supplément’, see also: ‘Ce dangereux supplément…’ (pp.203-34).  
5 Ibid., p.104.    
6 For a more comprehensive exposition of Derrida’s overall project, see, for example, Geoffrey Bennington, 
Interrupting Derrida (London: Routledge, 2000), Ch.1, ‘Jacques Derrida’, pp.7-17. 
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deconstruction.7  For Critchley, it is the responsibility to this Other which motivates the necessity for 
deconstructive reading.8  Critchley’s book seeks to anchor the political commitments which emerge 
from Derridean deconstruction in this ethical responsibility, responding to the more overtly ethical, 
Levinassian direction of Derrida’s work in the 1990s.  This ethical reading is in contrast to much of 
the earlier — predominantly North American — responses to Derrida, which took up deconstruction 
in the form of self-reflexivity and debunking of conceptual oppositions.  One significant exponent of 
this tendency was American philosopher Richard Rorty, who would emphasise the ‘splendidly ironic’ 
character of Derrida’s writings, seeking to distance the latter from the academic field of philosophy in 
the name of ‘literary studies’.9  Derrida was concerned with demonstrating that philosophy deserves 
no privileged status as a form of writing, so the argument goes, and therefore is revealed to be another 
form of literature, subject to the same methods of inquiry.  For Christopher Norris, Derrida’s 1974 
book Glas — in which two separate columns in different sized fonts, one dealing with Hegel, one 
with the autobiographical writings of Jean Genet, extend throughout the work, in between and around 
which reside various notes and marginalia — is ‘the nec plus ultra of philosophy’s undoing at the 
hands of rhetoric and intertextual freeplay’.10  Rorty has argued that while Derrida’s earlier works are 
more traditionally philosophical, or ‘professorial’, Glas signals a watershed after which his writings 
become more eccentric, personal and ‘original’.11  Rorty argues that Derrida’s later period sees him 
turn his back on the political sphere (and certainly any ethical considerations) entirely in favour of 
indulging in sophisticated intellectual experiments and provocations for the entertainment of those 
who share his esoteric sense of humour.  In opposition to this critical tendency would come, most 
notably, Rodolph Gasché’s The Tain of the Mirror (1986) and Inventions of Difference (1994), in 
which Derrida’s work was repatriated into the realm of philosophy in the name of rigorous argument 
and philosophical engagement.12  Gasché emphasises the letter of Derrida’s writings, considering the 
                                                          
7 Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999).  
8 Ibid., p.4. 
9 Richard Rorty, ‘Is Derrida a Transcendental Philosopher?’, in Derrida: A Critical Reader, ed. by David Wood 
(London: Blackwell, 1992), pp.235-46 (p.235).    
10 Christopher Norris, ‘Thinking the Unthought’, The Times Literary Supplement (December 1987), p.1407. 
11 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, Solidarity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.123. 
12 Rodolphe Gasché, The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection (London: Harvard 
University Press, 1986) and Inventions of Difference (London: Harvard University Press, 1994). 
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rhetorical and stylistic effusions Derrida employs as a function of his philosophical argumentation.  
Against the conception of Derrida’s work fitting comfortably into the lineage of postmodern 
particularism or anti-philosophical aestheticism — the idea that since thought can never be verified by 
any authority external to thought itself, ‘anything goes’ and any one interpretation or position is 
equally as valid as any other — Gasché’s Derrida remains loyal to the philosophical tradition in which 
he follows, that of diligent scholarship and rigorous argumentation.  Critchley’s ethical reading is far 
closer to the latter reading than to the former, which admires Derrida precisely for his supposed break 
from old philosophical concepts such as ethics.  Critchley’s Derrida intervenes in the terrain of 
philosophy in order to demonstrate the impossibility of fully transcending the ‘métaphysique 
infinitise’ of the logocentric tradition, yet to endeavour to act responsibly in this situation.   
In his later book Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity, Critchley discusses the Situationists in terms of 
this metaphysics.  During the course of a discussion of Jean-Luc Nancy and Martin Heidegger, 
Critchley offers a brief aside quoting Nancy’s dismissal of Situationist theory as ‘la dernière ressource 
critique dans un monde sans critique’.13  Critchley goes on to present Nancy’s casting of the S.I.: 
However, the Situationist critique, although necessary, was available for complete 
recuperation because of its metaphysical assumptions.  That is, situationism [sic] criticises the 
society of the spectacle, a society based on entirely imaginary constructions, but it does two 
things as a consequence: first, it attempts to replace this capitalist imaginary with a concept of 
creative imagination that remains tributary to a romantic conception of genius.  Second, it 
understands appearance as mere appearance, namely as that which is opposed to an authentic 
reality or presence.  Thus, the Situationist critique remains unwaveringly obedient to the 
Platonist tradition, opposing an order of essential truth (‘desire’, ‘imagination’) to the false 
order of spectacle.14  
The previous two chapters have already sought to dispute this reading of the Situationists as 
maintaining a Romantic conception of genius.  It should immediately be noted that Debord’s use of 
                                                          
13 Nancy, p.70.  
14 Simon Critchley, Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity (London: Verso, 1999), p.243.  
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the term ‘imagination’ in La Société du spectacle only occurs in terms of the ‘maîtres propriété 
personelle de l’histoire’, and their maintenance of that privilege ‘mythiquement’ or in reference to the 
maintenance of an impoverishment of social life (Theses 132 and 25).  That is, the imaginary is 
exclusively the realm of the spectacle and not retained so unproblematically as a mode of opposition.  
The Situationists would write in 1962: ‘À ceux qui croient que l’I.S. construit une forteresse 
spéculative, nous affirmons au contraire: nous allons nous dissoudre dans la population qui vit à tout 
moment notre projet, le vivant d’abord, bien sûr, sur le mode du manque et de la répression.’15  How 
this commitment to the everyday lives of the population at large translates into a political and ethical 
mode of resistance will be explored below in an attempt to read Debord and the Situationists 
alongside Derrida.  In distinguishing the particular nature of what Critchley and Nancy are content to 
describe as an ‘essential truth’, it is my intention to problematize this idea of an unwavering 
obedience to the Platonist tradition.  Critchley’s brusque dismissal of the Situationists echoes Rorty’s 
praise for Derrida, in that both allegedly seek to utterly transcend the metaphysical traditions in the 
wake of which their work intervenes (‘the spectacle’ and ‘philosophy’ respectively).   
De la Grammatologie was one of three books which Derrida published in 1967 — the same 
year as the publication of Debord’s Société du spectacle and Vaneigem’s Traité — alongside La Voix 
et le Phenomène and L’Ecriture et la différence.  The latter featured an essay entitled ‘La Structure, le 
signe et le jeu dans le discours des sciences humaines’ which has come to be acknowledged as the 
essay which saw Derrida break with the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss (whom he discusses in the 
essay) and heralded the burgeoning of the interest in ‘post-structuralism’ in Anglophone academia.16  
In the essay, originally given as a paper at a colloquium in Montreal, Derrida analyses the concept of 
the ‘centre’ in structuralist analyses, the grounding of structures of discourse around which meaning is 
derived.  Derrida argues that this centre is another form of ‘presence’ characteristic of the logocentric 
tradition: ‘On pourrait montrer que tous les noms du fondement, du principe ou du centre ont toujours 
                                                          
15 Authorship unattributed, ‘Du rôle de l’I.S.’, Internationale situationniste, 7 (1962), p.17. 
16 For an account of the selective appropriation and transmogrification of various continental thinkers under the 
name of ‘Theory’ in North American academia, see Francois Cusset, French Theory, Foucault, Derrida, 
Deleuze & Cie et les mutations de la vie intellectuelle aux États-Unis (Paris: Editions La Découverte, 2003). 
117 
 
désigné l’invariant d’une présence (eidos, archè, telos, energeia, ousia (essence, existence, substance, 
sujet) alethia, transcendalité, conscience, Dieu, homme, etc.).’17  For Derrida, this centre cannot exist: 
we must understand structures as being without centre and that the ‘play’ of meaning is thus entirely 
without grounding.  Indeed, in translation, Derrida’s ‘jeu’ is often translated as ‘freeplay’ rather than 
just ‘play’; this is indicative of the Rortian tendency to emphasise the puckish intransigence of 
deconstruction which depends on infinite contextualisation and the radical refusal of all imposed 
meaning.18  It is important to note, however, that Derrida does not seek to ‘critique’ the philosophical 
tradition of logocentric metaphysics, as he contends it is impossible to exceed it, to go beyond or 
outside it:   
Or tous ces discours destructeurs et tous leurs analogues sont pris dans une sorte de cercle.  
Ce cercle est unique et il décrit la forme du rapport entre l’histoire de la métaphysique et la 
destruction de l’histoire de la métaphysique: il n’y a aucun sens à se passer des concepts de la 
métaphysique pour ébranler la métaphysique; nous ne disposons d’aucun langage — d’aucune 
syntaxe et d’aucun lexique — qui soit étranger à cette histoire; nous ne pouvons énoncer 
aucune proposition destructrice qui n’ait déjà dû se glisser dans la forme, dans la logique et 
les postulations implicites de cela même qu’il voudrait contester.19    
There is no hope of fully transgressing the confines of the metaphysical tradition.  Indeed, attempting 
such a transgression ex nihilo — producing ‘pure’ thought, unbound to the logic, reason and language 
of that which precedes — would be the most consummately metaphysical of gestures: seeking to 
avow a complete break with this tradition binds the writer all the more thoroughly to this tradition in 
his or her ignorance.  This irreconcilable tension between transgression and reinscription directs many 
of the essays in l’Ecriture et la différence: in his essay ‘Freud et la scène de l’écriture,’ Derrida 
describes ‘la trouée’ or ‘la percée freudienne’ which ‘se laisse mal contenir dans la clôture 
                                                          
17 Jacques Derrida, ‘La Structure, le signe et le jeu dans le discours des sciences humaines’, in L’Ecriture et la 
différence (Paris: Seuil, 1967), pp.409-28 (p.411).  
18 For a description and rebuttal of this interpretation of Derrida, see: Nicole Anderson, ‘Freeplay? Fair Play! 
Defending Derrida’, Social Semiotics, 16.3 (2006), pp.407-20.   
19 Derrida, ‘La Structure, le signe et le jeu dans les discours des sciences humaines’, p.412.  Emphasis is 
Derrida’s.   
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logocentrique’.20  In an essay on Foucault’s Folie et Déraison: Histoire de la Folie à l’âge classique 
(1961), Derrida argues that to write a history of madness in the language of reason demands a writing 
that ‘ne saurait se laisser contenir’ in the metaphysical closure.21  Derrida seeks to demonstrate that in 
endeavouring to write a history of madness from the point of view of the mad and the excluded 
necessarily renews this exclusion by virtue of its being written in the language of reason.  Any 
‘history’ necessarily implies a narrative which presents its own logic, in its necessary intelligibility.  
Derrida alleged that Foucault cannot but commit the same exclusion of the mad and irrational in the 
act of writing a history.  Geoffrey Bennington refers to the ‘unquestioned philosophical assumptions’, 
or the ‘transcendental contraband’ which is retained in this act.22  The difficulty of Derrida’s 
‘deconstructive readings’ emerges from the way in which the act of closure (in the case of ‘Cogito et 
l’Histoire de la folie’, the historical exclusion of the mad which Foucault describes) is transgressed 
then accompanied by the restoration of the closure (writing a new history), leaving each text on the 
limit between belonging and not belonging to the tradition.  Derrida continues, in the essay on 
Foucault: 
Tout notre langage européen, le langage de tout ce qui a participé, de près ou de loin, à 
l’aventure de la raison occidentale, est l’immense délégation du projet que Foucault définit 
sous l’espèce de la capture ou de l’objectivation de la folie.  Rien dans ce langage et personne 
parmi ceux qui parlent ne peut échapper à la culpabilité historique — s’il y en a une et si elle 
est historique en un sens classique — dont Foucault semble vouloir faire le procès.  Mais c’est 
peut-être un procès impossible car l’instruction et le verdict réitèrent sans cesse le crime par le 
simple fait de leur élocution.23 
In her book Ethics and Representation (1999), Clare Colebrook describes this sort of attempt Derrida 
holds Foucault is making as being ‘haunted by its ontic articulation’, that is, the fact of its 
                                                          
20 Jacques Derrida, ‘Freud et la scène de l’écriture’, in L’Ecriture et la différence, pp.293-340 (p.293).  
21 Derrida, ‘Cogito et Histoire de la Folie’, in L’Ecriture et la différence, pp. 51-98 (p.59.)  
22 Bennington, Interrupting Derrida, p.13. 
23 Derrida, ‘Cogito et Histoire de la Folie’, p.58. 
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reinscription into the very language of reason that he seeks to transgress.24  The same is, however, 
equally true of Derrida’s subsequent reading of Foucault and of deconstruction in general: 
deconstructive reading attempts to open out the possibility of alterity within a text by demonstrating 
the aporetic foundational assumptions upon which the text is based, but each individual act of 
deconstruction is then susceptible to a similar process.25  The incessant equivocation and self-
conscious reflexivity of Debord’s cinema outlined in the previous chapter offers a filmic portrayal of 
this ‘ontic haunting’.  For the Situationists, no ontology as traditionally understood is possible given 
the inextricable connection between knowledge, power, time and history.  As we have seen in the 
previous chapter, Debord maintains this conflict throughout his cinematic work.   
In ‘Cogito et histoire de la folie’, Derrida suggests two ways of not effecting the betrayal of 
‘le fou’, following either their silence or their exile.26  This consignment to impotence, however, can 
offer no solace or support, political or otherwise.  Derrida states that the role of madness in Foucault’s 
text takes on that which opposes the totalising violence of reason: ‘En fait, on pourrait montrer que, 
dans l’intention de Foucault, sinon dans la pensée historique qu’il étudie, le concept de folie recouvre 
tout ce qu’on peut ranger sous le titre de la négativité.’27  The blank screen of Hurlements, which 
reappears periodically throughout Debord’s other films, seeks to invoke this pure negativity — a 
refusal to acquiesce to the most fundamental of conventions, the presentation of an image in cinema 
— but cannot do so owing to its place within the ‘work’, within the language of the logos, the 
negotiated system of conventions that is the cinema, just as Foucault’s history of madness takes place 
in the language of reason.  Derrida describes this betrayal further:   
Le langage étant la rupture même avec la folie, il est encore plus conforme à son essence et à 
sa vocation, il rompt encore mieux avec elle s’il se mesure plus librement à elle et s’en 
approche davantage: jusqu’à n’en être plus séparé que par ‘la feuille transparente’ dont parle 
                                                          
24 Clare Colebrook, Ethics and Representation from Kant to Post-Structuralism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1999), p.112. 
25 See Geoffrey Bennington, ‘A Moment of Madness: Derrida’s Kierkegaard’, Oxford Literary Review, 33.1 
(2011), 103-27.   
26 Derrida, ‘Cogito et Histoire de la Folie’, p.58. 
27 Ibid., p.66.  
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Joyce [in Derrida’s epigraph to the paper], par soi-même, car cette diaphanéité n’est rien 
d’autre que le langage, le sens, la possibilité, et la discrétion élémentaire d’un rien qui 
neutralise tout.  En ce sens, je serais tenté de considérer le livre de Foucault comme un 
puissant geste de protection et de renferment […] Une récupération de la négativité.28  
The Situationists would condemn Surrealism and Dadaism for their recuperation into the art world, 
the eventual compatibility of their initial negative gestures of experimentation and defiance with the 
commodified and spectacular form.  Derrida holds that the recuperation of negativity is inescapable in 
writing on madness: the coherent language of the ‘history’ operates the same enclosure or 
confinement of madness — that which is outside reason — as Foucault describes.  For Critchley, the 
only means of moving beyond this impasse is via the ‘clôtural reading’ of deconstruction.  This 
reading depends on what he calls ‘the unconditional ethical imperative’ of deconstruction.29  
Employing a Levinasian vocabulary, he asserts that the clôtural reading uncovers the alterity within a 
text, a rupture in the metaphysical closure where the reduction of this Otherness cannot be total, 
where the imperfection of logical representation is revealed.  What Critchley calls this ‘ethical 
transcendence’, however, only transcends a particular metaphysical construction; there is no absolute 
transcendence, and thus the ethical demand is infinite.30  As such, ‘all deconstructive discourse is 
strategic and adventurous; which is to say it cannot be justified absolutely.’31  Derrida states, ‘on ne 
peut protester contre elle qu’en elle, elle ne nous laisse, sur son propre champ, que le recours au 
stratagème et à la stratégie.’32  Whilst such a reading still commits the violence of subordinating this 
alterity to another logos, another version of reason and of imposed meaning, this resists the worse 
violence of remaining within the pre-existing structure without question.  As Gasché argues: ‘For 
difference to make a difference and hence to be one in the first place, its uniqueness must be 
wrenched from and negotiated within a system of conventions.’33   
                                                          
28 Ibid., p.85.  
29 Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction, pp.xiii and 31.  
30 For his subsequent development of this notion, see: Simon Critchley, Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of 
Commitment, Politics of Resistance (London: Verso, 2007).  
31 Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction, p.35.  
32 Derrida, ‘Cogito et Histoire de la folie’, p.58.  
33 Gasché, Inventions of Difference, p.21.  
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Giorgio Agamben has identified Debord’s spectacle with the logos, with ‘the very linguistic 
and communicative nature of humans’.34  Language is the fundamental constituent of social life, 
without which no communication between one another is possible.  Like Derrida, Debord holds that 
communication is necessarily constituted within language, a mode of reason, of intelligibility and of 
sense-making.  Moreover, politics necessitates communication, the interaction with one’s fellow 
human beings, and thus cannot fail to be governed by the same rules and laws which govern the 
spectacle.  When Debord contends that ‘En analysant le spectacle, on parle dans une certaine mesure 
le langage même du spectaculaire, en ceci que l’on passe sur le terrain méthodologique de cette 
société qui s’exprime dans le spectacle’ (Thesis 11), he gestures towards the untranscendability of the 
spectacle: that any possibility of escaping the relentless submission of human activity to the 
commodifying imperatives of capital necessarily proceeds through and within the spectacle as this 
communicative capacity.  It is the ‘occupation totale de la vie sociale par les résultats accumulés de 
l’économie’ (Thesis 17) that results in a spectacle in the service of this economy.  Capital’s 
colonisation of social life, that is, of language and these communicative capacities, characterises the 
era of spectacle.  This occupation, however, cannot be fully achieved despite its apparent totality.  
Resistance is always possible precisely because of the impossibility of attaining an absolute, universal 
command of language.   
For the Situationists, the opening up of this possibility of opposition within the spectacle is 
theorised under the name of ‘le jeu’, it is play which resists the instrumentalisation of capital:  
À notre époque le fonctionnalisme, qui est une expression nécessaire de l’avance technique, 
cherche à éliminer entièrement le jeu, et les partisans de ‘l’industrial design’ se plaignent du 
pourrissement de leur action par la tendance de l’homme au jeu. […] Nous pensons bien qu’il 
ne faut pas encourager le renouvellement artistique continu de la forme des frigidaires.  Mais 
                                                          
34 Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. by Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
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le fonctionnalisme moralisateur n’y peut rien.  La seule issue progressive est de libérer 
ailleurs, et plus largement, la tendance au jeu.35  
As we have seen in Chapter One, technological advance is, for Debord and the S.I., indissoluble from 
industrialisation, yet the harnessing of technological capacities on behalf of capital cannot be total.  
What is at stake for the Situationists is not preserving this tendency toward play and the resistance to 
rationalisation in traditional forms of artistic practice but to liberate such a tendency in the realm of 
everyday life.  The invocation of industrial design indicates firstly, in being maintained in the English 
language, the particularly Anglo-Saxon flavour of this technical rationality (and we may conjure the 
likes of Apple, in particular, as the contemporary culmination of this tendency), and secondly the 
comparable instrumentalisation of play into art, sport and commerce.  This attempt to functionalise 
and compartmentalise the irrationality and experimentality of play into the commodity form can never 
entirely succeed; for the Situationists, play can neither be channelled towards productive, rational 
goals, nor offered a designated outlet in the form of a commodified and neatly packaged ‘artistic 
creation’: ‘Contre toutes les formes régressives du jeu, qui sont ses retours à des stades infantiles — 
toujours liés aux politiques de réaction — il faut soutenir les formes expérimentales d’un jeu 
révolutionnaire.’36  The declaration with which this chapter begins is preceded by an assertion as to 
what the ‘situationist game’ is not: ‘Le jeu situationniste se distingue de la conception classique du jeu 
par la négation radicale des caractères ludiques de compétition, et de séparation de la vie courante.’  
This gesture seeks to divorce the Situationist conception of the ‘play’ from that of the sporting or 
recreational set piece, a game which permits play only within the enclosure of its own system of rules 
or laws, as in football or chess.  In order for such games to function, there must be a finite amount of 
time dedicated to the game, or a measure of dominance and primacy attained, after which the 
competitors (as opposed to players, perhaps) return to the business of daily life.  It is this enclosure 
which the Situationists eschew in favour of a notion of play not strictly delimited to establishing a 
victor or to the temporal finitude of the game itself.  In the first issue of the journal, this competitive 
                                                          
35 Authorship unattributed, ‘Problèmes préliminaires à la construction des situations’, Internationale 
situationniste, 1 (1958), 11-13 (p.12). 
36 Ibid., p.13. 
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aspect of play is attributed to the tension established between individuals for the appropriation of 
goods; it is ‘le mauvais produit d’une mauvaise société’.37  The sporting spectacle courts the 
identification of spectators with their heroes in the manner of the cinema, it is another ‘opium of the 
masses’, as Marx would have it, exploited by ‘les forces conservatrices qui s’en servent pour masquer 
la monotonie et l’atrocité des conditions de vie qu’elles imposent.’38  The Situationist conception of 
play, therefore, ‘rompant radicalement avec un temps et un espace ludiques bornés, doit envahir la vie 
entière.’  Historian Johan Huizinga’s Homo Ludens (1938), a work which puts forward the concept of 
play as primary in the construction of human communities is cited approvingly.  This destruction of 
the limits of the notion of play in establishing everyday life permits the advent ‘d’une conception plus 
réellement collective du jeu: la création commune des ambiances ludiques choisies’.  It is in this 
formulation that we can most evidently see the close proximity of ‘play’ to the notion of the 
‘constructed situation’, defined in the same issue as: ‘moment de la vie, concrètement et délibérément 
construit par l'organisation collective d'une ambiance unitaire et d'un jeu d'événements.’39   
Both concepts of ‘play’ and the ‘situation’ largely disappear from Situationist writings as the 
sixties advance in favour of the elaboration of societal critique.  The two concepts hold a quasi-
utopian role in Situationist rhetoric: it is in the name of these ideas that revolutionary critique begins.  
It is at once the utopian horizon of Situationist activity, the ‘future reign of freedom and play’ that 
their intervention seeks to bring about and at the same time the foundational notional concept which 
compels this activity.  Towards the end of ‘La Structure, le signe et le jeu’, Derrida signals a notion of 
play which bespeaks a similarly originary conception of play:  
Tension du jeu avec l’histoire, tension aussi du jeu avec la présence.  Le jeu est la disruption 
de la présence.  La présence d’un élément est toujours une référence signifiante et substitutive 
inscrite dans un système de différences et le mouvement d’une chaine.  Le jeu est toujours jeu 
d’absences et de présences, mais si l’on veut le penser radicalement, il faut le penser avant 
                                                          
37 Authorship unattributed, ‘Contribution à une définition situationniste du jeu’, Internationale situationniste, 1 
(1958), 9-10 (p.9). 
38 Ibid., pp.9-10. 
39 ‘Définitions’, p.13. 
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l’alternative de la présence et de l’absence; il faut penser l’être comme présence ou absence à 
partir de la possibilité du jeu et non l’inverse.40   
Here, play is what evades the total capture of the structure or logos, it is the trace which cannot be 
thought by philosophy.  Just as we call ‘play’ an entirely superfluous movement, a gratuitous excess, 
which a cog within an apparatus undergoes whilst exercising its mechanical function, so the play of 
language evades the distribution of definitive meaning.  As Colebrook has it, play is, for Derrida, ‘a 
movement of syntax or inscription beyond sense, world, the purposive or being’.41 Any hope to think 
‘being’ must understand the possibility of play, that which resists definitive expression.  For Derrida 
then, play is both the necessary precondition for the formation of any concept of order, reason, or 
sense and the ultimate recognition that none of these concepts can be justified absolutely.   
Derrida goes on to allege that the imposition of the centre that limits this play results in the 
‘neutralisation’ of history: ‘dans le travail de Lévi-Strauss, il faut reconnaître que le respect de la 
structuralité, de l’originalité interne de la structure, oblige à neutraliser le temps et l’histoire.’42  
Derrida quotes Lévi-Strauss’s declaration that language, the ‘structure of structures’, ‘n’a pu naître 
que tout d’un coup’, not progressively or in a process of transformation.  This assessment of 
structuralism is echoed in Debord’s La Société du spectacle, where he describes it as an attempt at 
‘transhistorical thought’, which finds its mirror in the form of the society of the spectacle: ‘la société 
du spectacle s’imposant comme réalité massive qui sert à prouver le rêve froid du structuralisme’ 
(Thesis 202).  It is in the context of a dynamic process of history as neither neutralised nor frozen 
dream that the Situationists reiterate the interrelation of ethics and play: 
Dans cette perspective historique, le jeu — l’expérimentation permanente de nouveautés 
ludiques — n’apparaît aucunement en dehors de l’éthique, de la question du sens de la vie.  
La seule réussite que l’on puisse concevoir dans le jeu c’est la réussite immédiate de son 
ambiance, et l’augmentation constante de ses pouvoirs.  Alors même que dans sa coexistence 
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41 Colebrook, The Ethics of Representation, p.95.   
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présente avec les résidus de la phase de déclin le jeu ne peut s’affranchir complètement d’un 
aspect compétitif, son but doit être au moins de provoquer des conditions favorables pour 
vivre directement.  Dans ce sens il est encore lutte et représentation: lutte pour une vie à la 
mesure du désir, représentation concrète d’une telle vie.43  
Ethics is here conceived as this question of meaning or purpose of life, how we should seek to act 
politically.  It is worth noting that ‘sens’ is one of the words Derrida most frequently attaches to 
logocentrism, the imposition of meaning, logic or sense being that metaphysical gesture which cannot 
be evaded.  The spectacle posits a model of rationality, the homology of capital and social relations, 
but the former cannot capture the latter perfectly.  Where the Situationists are elsewhere routinely 
suspicious of the notion of representation — as upholding the separation between activity and 
spectacular contemplation— it is here employed to recognise the imperfection of their task, the labour 
and struggle of opposition.  Writing and communication are necessary in the endeavour of political 
action, but subject to the same restrictions — language’s foundational lack, the incapacity of language 
to perfectly capture the entirety of lived experience — as the spectacle itself.   
What Critchley and Nancy, or Jonathan Kaplan’s ‘liberal individualist’ characterisation of the 
Situationists, might term the idealism of the idea of ‘living directly’ and the seeming hypostatisation 
of ‘desire’ here serves a rhetorical function, seeking to posit the beginnings of an affirmative political 
program whilst simultaneously disavowing any claim to universal truth or legitimacy.  No ‘success’ is 
possible, as the tendency towards play perpetually resists the instrumentalisation and rationalisation of 
the political program.  What is instead at stake is the possibility of any alternative: ‘Notre époque est 
caractérisée fondamentalement par le retard de l’action politique révolutionnaire sur le développement 
des possibilités modernes de production, qui exigent une organisation supérieure du monde.’44  The 
assertion that alternative models of organisation could be found within existing forms of production is 
not necessarily utopian: the apparent superiority of any alternative merely implies a certain otherness, 
a limitless opportunity of experimentation, not a definitive model for society.  Such a conception of 
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possibility refuses to understand the capitalistic spectacle as an untranscendable metaphysical 
construct but as an occupation of what we might call the logos, like any other such conception of 
presence or centre before it, notably that of God.   
Rather than positing a particular conception of post-revolutionary organisation, then, the 
Situationists seek to ‘répandre une autre idée du bonheur.  La gauche et la droite étaient d’accord sur 
une image de la misère, qui est la privation alimentaire.  La gauche et la droite étaient aussi d’accord 
sur l’image d’une bonne vie.  C’est la racine de la mystification qui a défait le mouvement ouvrier 
dans les pays industrialisés.’45  The Situationists target the apparent concordance of what constitutes a 
desirable life according to the political establishment.  Rather than offer a comparable image of what 
Debord calls the ‘ce qui est bon’ (Thesis 12), the Situationists offer a residual definition: another idea, 
one that is ‘other’ to that presented by the spectacle.  This ‘other’, whatever it could entail, is 
presented as being better than the ‘boredom’ of everyday life offered by the spectacle: ‘Nous 
ruinerons ces conditions en faisant apparaître en quelques points le signal incendiaire d’un jeu 
supérieur.’46  What is important here is that what the Situationists proffer is not a utopian civilisation 
of liberated desire, but the concept of any alternative, of unrealised possibilities, in which utopian 
concepts such as the constructed situation and ‘living directly’ present the fundaments of an idealised 
vision: 
Il n’y a plus d’‘utopie’ possible, parce que toutes les conditions de sa réalisation existent déjà.  
On les détourne pour servir au maintien de l’ordre actuel, dont l’absurdité est si terrible qu’on 
la réalise d’abord, quel que soit son prix, sans que personne n’ose en formuler la théorie, 
même après.  C’est l’utopie inverse de la répression: elle dispose de tous les pouvoirs, et 
personne ne la veut.47   
                                                          
45 Authorship unattributed, ‘L’effondrement des intellectuels révolutionnaires’, Internationale situationniste, 2 
(1958), 8-10 (p.10). 
46 Ibid. Emphasis is theirs. 
47 ‘Du rôle de l’I.S.’, p.18. 
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Positing this ‘other’ idea is the only way of seeing beyond the untranscendability of the spectacle.  In 
the journal article entitled ‘Du rôle de l’I.S.’, they refer to this aborted utopianism directly in the 
context of the spectacle’s political incarnations:   
Il nous est facile de choisir chaque fois le terrain du conflit.  S’il faut faire face, avec des 
‘modèles’, aux ‘modèles’ qui sont aujourd’hui les points de convergence de la pensée 
technocratique (que ce soit la concurrence totale ou la planification totale) notre ‘modèle’ 
est la communication totale.  Que l’on ne nous parle plus d’utopie.  Il faut reconnaître là une 
hypothèse qui, évidemment, n’est jamais réalisée exactement dans le réel, pas plus que les 
autres.48 
Against the free-market capitalism of the West and the state-planned capitalism of the East the 
Situationists posit a notion of ‘total communication’ — a perfectly egalitarian and liberatory mode of 
social relations — of which they tacitly acknowledge the utopian nature.  That this utopianism needs 
to be surmounted is implied by the explicitly totalitarian nature of these three ideas.  That such 
‘models’ — confined to inverted commas — require a rival model to be presented in their stead, in 
conflict with the actually existing ideologies bespeaks a conviction that politics is a game in which 
these self-justifying dogmas fight for predominance.  This is clearly a problematic theorisation in that 
one form of totalitarianism can only displace another.  To argue, however, that the difference between 
such abstractions negates the need to oppose and displace those which currently predominate forgoes 
the possibility of material change being effected in the realisation of any ‘superior’ construction.  As 
Gasché states compellingly in relation to Derrida:  
To relinquish all attempts at comprehensive, synthetic, even systematic presentation because 
they are totalitarian is not only to bind oneself to perhaps unheard-of possibilities of 
gathering, but also to miss the singular shape that synthetic and unifying thought has taken in 
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a very determined historical conjunction, and what such singular recasting of gathering holds 
for the future.49 
Describing such constructs merely as a ‘hypothesis’ reveals a perhaps surprising measure of 
pragmatism50 which defies the idealist or Neo-Platonist casting of Situationist theory.  No more does 
the notion of total communication have the ambition to be fully realised than free market or 
bureaucratic capitalism can hope to definitively preclude the possibility of opposition.  This (relative) 
pragmatism, contrary to a naïve utopianism of liberated desire and infinite play, holds political 
activism as a constant struggle within and against existing forms of communication with the aim of 
bringing about achievable material change:  
Cependant dans l’action immédiate, qui doit être entreprise dans le cadre que nous voulons 
détruire, un art critique peut être fait dès maintenant avec les moyens de l’expression 
culturelle existante, du cinéma aux tableaux.  C’est ce que les situationnistes ont résumé par la 
théorie du détournement.  Critique dans son contenu, cet art doit être aussi critique de lui-
même dans sa forme.  C’est une communication qui, connaissant les limitations de la sphère 
spécialisée de la communication établie, ‘va maintenant contenir sa propre critique’.51  
The 1967 article ‘Les situationnistes et les nouvelles formes d’action contre le politique ou l’art’ in 
the journal’s eleventh issue counsels occupation of mass media in evoking such change, interrupting 
transmissions or replacing them entirely.52  The ‘liberal individualist’ criticism of the Situationists 
ducks the paradox of advocating the use of the media they wish to ‘destroy’, ignoring this critical 
                                                          
49 Gasché, Inventions of Difference, p.20. 
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interrelation between form and content and subsequently takes pronouncements made within the 
realm of publishing and the cinema too readily at face value.   
This understanding of Situationist writings as self-consciously defying the conditions of their 
status as writings invites consideration of the seemingly utopian question of the ‘règne futur’ invoked 
in the quotation from Debord’s Rapport.  The apparent temporal ineluctability of this reign of 
freedom and play indicates a belief in the eventual realisation of such a utopian civilisation.  Indeed, 
many of the Situationists’ pronouncments could be read in this way, valorising a break with the past 
in the name of such an arrival: ‘Le jeu révolutionnaire, la création de la vie, s’oppose à tous les 
souvenirs de jeux passés.’53  In the 1961 journal article, ‘Instructions pour une prise d’armes’, the 
Situationists assert the impossibility of reanimating any anterior form of revolutionary organisation as 
a useful mode of opposition to the spectacle, likening the French Revolution’s mimicking of 
Republican Rome to the ridiculous attempt by their much hated Club Méditerranée holiday packages 
to mimic some kind of Polynesian island atmosphere (the Club Méditerranée was a frequently 
invoked source of ire, emblematic of the homogenising tendencies of capital, reducing another 
country’s way of life into neatly consumable parcels, eventually rendering them indistinguishable 
from one another).  They then round on their contemporaries on the revolutionary left who ‘se voient 
d’abord eux-mêmes, se définissent, en ce qu’ils tiennent le rôle du militant, de style bolchevik ou 
autre. Et la révolution de la vie quotidienne ne saurait tirer sa poésie du passé, mais seulement du 
futur.’  Firstly, we should note that this is not necessarily a temporal distinction, though it is made as 
such here: the past refers to self-consciously rehearsing former modes of behaviour and action, 
associated with the logos (we recognise what has come before, in the articulation of what ‘makes 
sense’); ‘the future’ means nothing in and of itself, not acting and behaving in an entirely novel way 
but rather refusing to repeat what has gone before in a deliberate, mimetic, fashion.  Secondly, the 
argument put forth so dogmatically is rather undercut by the fact that the title of the short article is 
taken (unmodified) from a tract of the same name by nineteenth century revolutionary Auguste 
                                                          
53 Authorship unattributed, ‘Instructions pour une prise d’armes’, Internationale situationniste, 6 (1961), 3-5 
(p.4).  
130 
 
Blanqui, a détournement which goes unacknowledged in the article itself.  This unacknowledged 
reference to a past authority in a text denouncing such appeals to past authority reveals a certain 
potential for duplicity in the written word.  Those familiar with Blanqui may ‘get it’, but to understand 
the text itself it is not necessary to fully appreciate the ‘joke’.  Just as the Mode d’emploi describes the 
‘parodique sérieux’ as a form of playfulness which nevertheless entails a profound seriousness, the 
self-negating relation of title to article — ‘communication contenant sa propre critique’— takes the 
form of an ‘in-joke’.   
What emerges then, from the Situationists’ ‘communication contenant sa propre critique’ is 
the provisional nature of even their most utopian assertions, and their admission that their tracts, 
journals, books and films constitute an imperfect theory of capitalist society motivated only by the 
aim of exceeding it: 
L’interprétation que nous défendons dans la culture peut être regardée comme une simple 
hypothèse, et nous attendons qu’elle soit effectivement vérifiée et dépassée très vite; mais de 
toute manière elle possède les caractères essentiels de la vérification scientifique rigoureuse 
en ce sens qu’elle explique et ordonne un certain nombre de phénomènes qui sont, pour 
d’autres, incohérents et inexplicables — qui sont donc même parfois cachés par d’autres 
forces —; et en ce qu’elle permet de prévoir certains faits ultérieurement contrôlables.  Nous 
ne nous abusons pas un instant sur la soi-disant objectivité de quelque chercheur que ce soit, 
dans la culture ou ce qu’il est convenu d’appeler sciences humaines.  La règle y est au 
contraire d’y cacher tant les problèmes que les réponses.  L’I.S. devra divulguer le caché, et 
elle-même comme possibilité ‘cachée’ par ses ennemis.  Nous le réussirons — relevant les 
contradictions que les autres ont choisi d’oublier — en nous transformant en force pratique.54   
Imperfect though any purely theoretical construction can possibly be, it can still reveal important 
characteristics of the mechanisms by which society functions, ones which the forces of law and order 
seek to control, as well as modes of opposition which could in fact be recuperated by these forces.  In 
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contrasting rigorous scientific verification to the presumed objectivity of the human sciences, it is 
clear that what is at stake is a perpetual labour of analysis and evaluation, not the pursuit of some 
revelatory truth.  Whilst this in no way remains a comprehensive claim on behalf of their own 
theoretical labours, the admission that the positions they advocate within their work are merely 
hypothetical and strategic, to be surpassed, places Situationist thought on a far less naively and 
dogmatically idealist standing than a reading of their work as a Romantic paen to an unalienated, 
sovereign subjectivity would have it: in more Derridean terms, the Situationists acknowledge the 
impossibility of fully transcending the logos, the metaphysical tradition and language in which their 
interventions necessarily take place, whilst nevertheless seeking to reveal moments of other 
possibilities. 
What follows substantively from this hypothetical position is a commitment to agitate for 
‘une autre idee de bonheur’, in the form of an ethical duty to the non-spectacle, the ‘that which does 
not appear’ (after Debord’s characterisation of the spectacle as ‘ce qui apparaît est bon, ce qui est bon 
apparaît’ (Thesis 12)), the Other-than-spectacle which functions as a permanently postponed 
commitment to a notional utopian horizon of possibility.  The title of the 1970 manifesto 
‘Contribution à une prise de conscience d’une classe qui sera la dernière’ displays the link between 
rhetorical value of utopianism — this ultimate class — in the formation of a ‘prise de conscience’.  
This notion makes clear the Situationists’ belief in the seductive — or ‘incendiary’ — capabilities of 
revolutionary theory but also, the idea of ‘taking’ leads us to consider the ‘prise de parti’, the taking of 
a position, of a stand, of partisanship which is mentioned in the opening quotation of this Chapter.  It 
is the idea of a utopian commitment which demands the ‘prise de parti’, in the name of another 
possibility of politics which resists the metaphysical enclosure of capital’s occupation of social life.  
The means of enacting this ‘prise de parti’, acting upon an ethical decision to ‘take sides’, in turn 
requires such closure in opposition, the necessary precondition of political action.   
In the 1957 text, ‘Encore un effort si vous voulez être situationnistes’, Debord states that the 
only difference between an exhibition showing paintings done by monkeys and his film Hurlements, 
both on show simultaneously at the Institute of Contemporary Arts in London, is that the latter is a 
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‘pari sur certaines formations à venir’. 55   These ‘formations to come’ occupy the same idea as the 
‘règne futur’, a conceptualisation of possibility outside of the spectacle.  This bet, the wager that 
Debord’s film makes is then the hypothesis of another possibility, and a decision made to enter into 
the enterprise of writing or filmmaking.  ‘Mais notre pari est toujours à refaire’, continues Debord, so 
what we have described as the utopian commitment in the name of which the bet is made is 
permanently deferred.  The ethical duty that the Situationists describe as being indistinct from their 
‘game’ refers to the necessity of making this decision, to engage in the ‘cadre que nous voulons 
détruire’; to intervene in the realm of language and communication.  This ‘game’ is not the same as 
the utopian evocation of ‘play’, but where the consequences of this wager play out.  The fact that the 
tactical and strategic battles that this political engagement entails cannot be entirely divorced from the 
notion of ‘play’ in the more Derridian sense — the undecidabilty and perpetual deferment of meaning 
— demonstrates that what is at stake in this Situationist wager: what constitutes an ethical duty 
appeals not to some kind of universal morality but a perpetually revaluated analysis and 
understanding of events and circumstance.  
Despite this perpetual revaluation of what constitutes an ethical act, the ‘prise de parti’ is 
nevertheless, for the Situationists, a decision that must be taken.  This is the decision to oppose and 
contest the status quo:   
Aujourd’hui alors que, malgré certaines apparences, plus que jamais (après un siècle de luttes 
et la liquidation entre les deux guerres par les secteurs dirigeants, traditionnels ou d’un type 
nouveau, de tout le mouvement ouvrier classique qui représentait la force de contestation 
générale) le monde dominant se donne pour définitif, sur la base d’un enrichissement et de 
l’extension infinie d’un modèle irremplaçable, la compréhension de ce monde ne peut se 
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fonder que sur la contestation.  Et cette contestation n’a de vérité, et de réalisme, qu’en tant 
que contestation de la totalité.56 
This decision to oppose the ‘dominant world’ provides the only possible way of understanding it.  It is 
an axiomatic principle with which Situationist thought begins.  This decision must take place at the 
level of the totality owing to the totalising nature of the spectacle itself.  In presenting itself as an 
unassailable totality, the only possible resistance comes in the name of that which is ‘other than 
spectacle’.  The decision comprises a necessary ethical component, rather than the inevitable outcome 
of intellectual analysis, because there is enjoyment to be had in the faithful enacting of the spectacle’s 
allotted roles: 
Qui réduit la vie d’un homme à cette pitoyable série de clichés?  Un journaliste, un policier, 
un enquêteur, un romancier populiste?  Pas le moins du monde.  C’est lui-même, c’est 
l’homme dont je parle qui s’efforce de décomposer sa journée en une suite de poses choisies 
plus ou moins inconsciemment parmi la gamme de stéréotypes dominants. […] Les rôles 
assumés l’un après l’autre lui procurent un chatouillement de satisfaction quand il réussit à les 
modeler fidèlement sur les stéréotypes.  La satisfaction du rôle bien rempli, il la tire de sa 
véhémence à s’éloigner de soi, à se nier, à se sacrificier.57  
The acting out of a role is its own form of play, as in the playing of roles in the theatre.  In this sense, 
the ‘jeu situationniste’ refers to the tactical game of contesting the totality within and against that 
totality.  This can only be achieved having made the decision to undertake a particular kind of 
oppositional role within and against the spectacle, one which militates in favour of ‘play’ in the sense 
of liberatory and spontaneous experimentation (‘le règne futur du liberté et du jeu’) as opposed to the 
mimetic performance of a ‘pitoyable’ cliché.  As we will see below, this decisionism necessarily, and 
problematically, implies exclusion and excision which runs counter to any kind of ethical 
commitment to ‘otherness’.   
                                                          
56 Authorship unattributed, ‘Géopolitique de l’hibernation’, Internationale situationniste, 7 (1962), 3-10 (pp.9-
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For the Situationists, the decision to oppose is the first necessary step in forming a means of 
effecting this opposition.  The categorical nature of this decision is, in the same issue of the journal, 
applied to potential political allies in an article entitled ‘Du rôle de l’I.S.’:  
Quant à ceux qui peuvent être des interlocuteurs valables, qu’ils sachent bien qu’ils ne 
pourront avoir avec nous des rapports inoffensifs.  Nous trouvant à un tournant décisif, et bien 
que nous connaissions la proportion de nos erreurs, nous pouvons quand même obliger ces 
alliés possibles à un choix global.  Il faudra nous accepter ou nous rejeter en bloc.  Nous ne 
détaillerons pas.58 
Once again, a total choice is offered, a yes or no: the Situationists must be accepted or rejected in their 
entirety.  This, despite the imposed caveat of professing to know the proportion of their own errors.  
The same article has already offered an indication of what these errors may be:  
Nous sommes capables d’apporter la contestation dans chaque discipline.  Nous ne laisserons 
aucun spécialiste rester maître d’une seule spécialité.  Nous sommes prêts à manier 
transitoirement des formes à l’intérieur desquelles on peut chiffrer et calculer: ce qui nous le 
permet, c’est que nous connaissons la marge d’erreur, elle-même calculable, qui fait 
forcément partie de tels calculs.  Nous diminuerons alors nous-mêmes nos résultats du facteur 
d’erreur introduit par l’usage de catégories que nous savons fausses.59 
This margin of error is itself a calculation made by the Situationists owing to the inevitable necessity 
of enacting a programme of opposition within and against ‘the disciplines’.  The article offers only a 
vague conception of these disciplines: that is, the reader is invited to understand any form of 
hierarchized organisation with its own particular conventions and orthodoxies (not least the 
university).  The same process stands for writing itself, however, for the inscription of a political 
program into communicable form.  As such, the article itself constitutes an intervention within and 
against a domain with its own conventions.  It is in these circumstances that the ethical decision to 
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oppose must be taken, in something approaching an act of faith: it is a universal choice between 
accepting existing conditions or agitating in favour of that which is ‘other’, the possibility of another 
world which cannot be given the expression of a sovereign programme, but requires the détournement 
of existing forms in the service of the utopian vision, or the commitment to oppose the world as is.   
It is such a decision, however, that Derrida refuses to make, though Derrida’s invocation of 
Lévi-Strauss’s description of the ‘bricoleur’ in ‘La Structure, le signe et le jeu’ does demonstrate a 
notable proximity to Situationist détournement.  Derrida quotes Lévi-Strauss in his La Pensée 
Sauvage (1962) describing the ‘bricoleur’ as one who constructs his designs with the materials he has 
to hand, which are neither consciously selected for his purposes nor themselves made with his ends in 
mind: ‘Si l’on appelle bricolage la nécessité d’emprunter ses concepts au texte d’un héritage plus ou 
moins cohérent ou ruiné, on doit dire que tout discours est bricoleur.’60  Moreover, in a formulation 
distinctly reminscent of Debord on détournement, as we have seen above: ‘Il y a donc une critique du 
langage dans la forme du bricolage et on a même pu dire que le bricolage était le langage critique lui-
même.’61  Where Derrida writes further on in the same essay, written in October of 1966, that this 
‘langage porte en soi la nécessité de sa propre critique’,62 the Situationists, four months earlier, quote 
themselves for the second time in articulation of their proposed practice of a ‘communication 
contenant sa propre critique’, originally set forth in the journal in 1962.63  In the 1971 essay 
‘Signature Evènement Contexte’, in which Derrida reiterates the process of deconstruction, he claims 
that any word can be placed between quotation marks and cited, and that this citationality is 
necessarily true of any word that can be recognised and understood.64  The question of context then, 
becomes a matter of centreless play, similar to the theorisation in the 1967 essay.  Whilst the 
Situationists make explicit the political programme that attends the critique of spectacle and 
détournement, conceiving the latter not only as a literary device but as a programme for social and 
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political transformation, Critchley argues that the political stakes of deconstruction remain largely 
implicit in Derrida’s writings.  Indeed, Derrida was long criticised for political impotence at best, 
wilful obfuscation at worst.65  In ‘Cogito et Histoire de la folie’, Derrida writes: 
La Décision lie et sépare du même coup raison et folie; elle doit s’entendre ici à la fois 
comme l’acte originaire d’un ordre, un fiat, d’un décret, et comme une déchirure, une césure, 
une séparation, une dicession.66   
It is precisely this kind of fiat, however, that Derrida cannot justify making.  He takes a quotation 
from Søren Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments as an epigraph to his paper, declaring that 
‘l’Instant de la Décision est la Folie’.  Derrida argues that that a decision worthy of the name is a 
matter for ethics, as reason cannot dictate the taking of a decision, which would amount to the 
carrying out of a pre-conceived programme as a matter of administration. The necessity for a decision 
arises where reason cannot distinguish between two alternatives.67  It is precisely this decision, 
however, this moment of madness, to which Derrida refuses to commit.  In the closing paragraphs of 
‘La Structure, le signe et le jeu dans les discours des sciences humaines’, Derrida concludes that there 
are two possible paths along which structure, sign and play can be interpreted, one which dreams of 
deciphering the origin, or centre, which continues in the quest of discovery for meaning and truth, and 
another which turns away from this origin and embraces the play of signs in an endeavour to go 
beyond the metaphysical notion of pure presence, ‘l’origine et la fin du jeu’.68  He concludes on the 
question of choosing between two such interpretations:  
Je ne crois pas pour ma part, bien que ces deux interprétations doivent accuser leur différence 
et aiguiser leur irréductibilité, qu’il y ait aujourd’hui à choisir.  D’abord parce que nous 
sommes là dans une région — disons encore, provisoirement, de l’historicité — où la 
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catégorie de choix paraît bien légère.  Ensuite parce qu’il faut essayer d’abord de penser le sol 
commun, et la différance de cette différence irréductible.  Et qu’il y a là un type de question, 
disons encore historique, dont nous ne faisons aujourd’hui qu’entrevoir la conception, la 
formation, la gestion, le travail.  Et je dis ces mots les yeux tournés, certes, vers les 
opérations de l’enfantement; mais aussi vers ceux qui, dans une société dont je ne m’exclus 
pas, les détournent devant l’encore innommable qui s’annonce et qui ne peut le faire, comme 
c’est nécessaire chaque fois qu’une naissance est à l’œuvre, que sous l’espèce de la non-
espèce, sous la forme informe, muette, infante et terrifiante de la monstruosité.69 
Derrida, unlike the Situationists, does not hold much store by the question of the choice, or of 
choosing.  A choice implies a decision, a conclusion to reading and thinking, whereas deconstruction 
provokes ‘an infinite and infinitely surprising reading’ that shows the shortcomings of any unitary, 
finite notion of totality.  The famous neologism Derrida coined, ‘la différance’ — referring to both the 
difference between words and the perpetual deferral of meaning that can constantly be revised and 
refined — here offers the way out of making such a decision, the recourse to an infinitely unnameable 
‘non-concept’ which opens up the possibility of alterity without ever requiring a ‘prise de parti’.  
Derrida, though he took up political questions in his later writings, insisted upon the impossibility of 
properly taking a political position owing to the need for perpetual interrogation and analysis.  Where 
Derrida’s decision is permanently deferred, the Situationists’ decision is an axiom of their thought and 
work.  The utopian commitment to a reign of freedom and play is what demands permanent 
postponement, but Derrida’s ‘forme informe’ is reminiscent of the ‘négativité’ of ‘Cogito et Histoire 
de la folie’ in its muteness (Derrida describes the mad as ‘mute’, deprived of a voice or of 
expression).  The Situationists reject the ‘double bind’ of deconstruction in embracing the fallibility of 
their written, artistic and filmic interventions. 
 The quarrel amongst the readers of Derrida of which I briefly related the terms at the 
beginning of this section would doubtless have been of singular unimportance for the Situationists: 
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‘Laissons aux fossoyeurs officiels la triste besogne d’enterrer les cadavres des expressions picturales 
et littéraires.  La dévalorisation de ce qui ne nous sert plus n'est pas notre affaire; d’autres s’en 
occupent’, Constant Nieuwenhuys would write in a journal article entitled ‘Sur nos moyens et nos 
perspectives.’70  Against the hesitation or political paralysis of deconstruction, the inflammatory 
propaganda of Situationist theory results from making the decision:  
La propagande révolutionnaire doit présenter à chacun la possibilité d’un changement 
personnel profond, immédiat.  En Europe cette tâche suppose des revendications d’une 
certaine richesse, pour rendre insupportable aux exploités la misère des scooters et des 
télévisions.  Les intellectuels révolutionnaires devront abandonner les débris de leur culture 
décomposée, chercher à vivre eux-mêmes d’une façon révolutionnaire.  Ce faisant, ils 
pourront enfin rencontrer les problèmes d’une avant-garde populaire.  Le bifteck sera 
remplacé, comme signe du droit de vivre des masses.  Les intellectuels révolutionnaires 
auront appris la politique.  Mais le délai, qui s’annonce fort déplaisant, risque d’être long.71 
The domain of revolutionary politics does not permit the equivocation and rhetorical somersaults that 
saw Derrida frequently criticised for obfuscation.  The Situationists saw the imperatives of a quasi-
bohemian revolutionary intellectual collective and those of the professor of philosophy as 
irreconcilably different.  Their style of agit-prop demanded greater (if not, we might acknowledge, 
necessarily consummate) clarity as well as, more pressingly, the capacity for seduction.  As far as they 
were concerned, provisos, caveats, parentheses and double binds were not the stuff of political 
propaganda.  Thought, writing and filmmaking may well be essentiality ‘contaminated’, but to admit 
as much would be to stifle the message which motivates the ‘prise de parti’ that thought, to constitute 
a political intervention, requires.  An axiomatic principle of the Situationist movement was that 
neither philosophy nor the academy offered any route to political emancipation on their own.  The aim 
of Situationist activity was not the construction of a ‘theory’ but to encourage political engagement:  
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La participation et la créativité des gens dépendent d’un projet collectif qui concerne 
explicitement tous les aspects du vécu.  C’est aussi le seul chemin pour ‘colérer le peuple’ en 
faisant apparaître le terrible contraste entre des constructions possibles de la vie et sa misère 
présente.72 
Deconstruction can explicitly avow an ethical commitment (‘la résponsibilité’) but political 
commitments remain implied, whereas the Situationists’ political commitments were proclaimed 
loudly and their ethical exigency only rarely alluded to.  Where deconstruction is discursive and 
inquiring, Situationism is declamatory propaganda.  It is the violence of the Situationists’ rhetoric 
which testifies to their political ambition: ‘Depuis le début de notre action commune, nous avons été 
clairs.  Mais maintenant, notre jeu est devenu si important que nous n’avons plus à discuter avec des 
interlocuteurs sans titres.  Nos partisans sont partout.  Et nous n’avons aucune intention de les 
décevoir.  Ce que nous apportons, c’est l’épée.’73  The bid to bring about the prise de parti on behalf 
of their readers finds its basis in the quasi-utopian imperative to oppose existing conditions in the 
name of unnameable and indefinable possibility.  Whilst it is this utopian commitment which is 
permanently postponed, the political commitment to engage is the labour of bringing such a ‘prise de 
parti’ about is an ethical pre-requisite.   
In his later Politiques de l’amitié (1994) Derrida speculates as to how a theory would fare 
which forewent the indissoluble aporia and paradoxical possibilities with which he was so concerned: 
Or que feraient une ‘histoire’, une science ou une action historique qui se voudraient 
résolument et ingénument extradiscursives et extratextuelles?  Que feraient en vérité une 
histoire ou une philosophie politiques enfin réalistes si elles ne prenaient en charge, pour s'y 
mesurer, pour en rendre compte, l'extrême formalisation, les nouvelles apories, l’instabilité 
sémantique, toutes les conversions inquiétantes que nous venons de voir à l’œuvre dans ces 
signaux?  Si elle ne tentait de lire tous les possibles d’apparence contradictoire (‘rapport sans 
rapport’, ‘communauté sans communauté’, etc.) auxquels nous rappellent ces ‘discours 
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sophistiqués’?  Disons-le: très peu de choses, presque rien.  Elles manqueraient le plus dur, le 
plus résistant, le plus irréductible, le plus autre de la ‘chose même’.  Elles s’affubleraient de 
‘réalisme’ au moment de tourner court devant la chose — et de répéter, répéter, répéter sans 
même la conscience ou la mémoire du ressassement.74 
It is this notion of an ‘extra-discursive’ or ‘extra-textual’ political philosophy that Critchley (via 
Nancy) ascribes to the Situationists, bound in their ignorance to repeat the mistakes of those they 
purport to oppose or succeed.  This is precisely the opposite of what I have been attempting to 
demonstrate during this chapter, that Situationist theory is characterised by a profound awareness of 
the limitations of their interventions and the attempt to nevertheless engage the means at their disposal 
in the service of an ethical commitment with which their intellectual and political endeavours begin.  
The entirety of their written, artistic and filmic output can be read as a meditation on the possibilities 
of action within and against the forms they seek to oppose; with the difficulty of using language to 
talk about language, film to talk about film.  Situationist theory, considered in its deeply self-
referential textuality, most notably Debord’s cinema, testifies to the impossibility of ‘burying the old 
forms’ completely.  Constant, towards the end of his contribution to the above cited article, makes a 
distinction between the ‘vrai’ and the ‘faux’, then immediately qualifies it as a distinction between ‘ce 
qui est utilisable et ce qui est compromettant’.   
 This ethical commitment I have attempted to illustrate at play within Situationist theory 
‘n’apparaît pas distinct’ from a moral choice because the Situationists seek to distance themselves 
from a universal morality, an absolute conception of ‘right’ or ‘Truth’, and original or ‘pure’ desire — 
the unfettered realisation of an innate, subjective truth.  The ambiguity of the pronominal ‘ce qui 
assure’ can only be expressed in this indeterminate form.  That which must be undertaken in the name 
of the ‘règne futur’ is as undecidable as the infinitely ludic and liberated utopian horizon itself.  
However, the fact that something must be done — ‘ce que les intellectuels doivent faire’ (from the 
end of the Rapport sur la construction des situations) — is unequivocal.  The only way to understand 
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the world of the spectacle is to oppose it.  This is thus both an ethical and intellectual imperative.  
When communicated, inscribed and transmitted in language, both the ‘ce qui’ and the ‘règne futur’ 
become a presence.  Politics, then, is itself is logocentric because it requires communication in and 
through language, it cannot but relate to postulated ends, to be teleological.  Politics requires an 
intelligible interaction with an ‘other’.  This is why, for Debord and the Situationists, it is necessary to 
speak the language of the spectacle both in analysing it and in the creation of revolutionary 
propaganda, via the media of writing books or making films.   
There is a notion of ethics operating in the Situationists’ critique, in line with the one 
Critchley identifies in Levinas and Derrida, distinct from that historically considered as a branch of 
philosophical inquiry.  Nevertheless, what results from the Situationists’ ludic notion of ethics errs 
towards a Manichean distinction between acts ‘with’ or ‘against’ the spectacle, the status quo.  Not 
only this, but what constitutes the conformism or rebelliousness of one’s actions remains a political 
question.  This question is to be constantly referred and updated, according to Debord’s conception of 
human knowledge as being bound to time and history.  This is why it is difficult to speak of ‘a 
Situationist ethics’, whilst there is nevertheless an ethical commitment, it is one which is indivisible 
from the political and intellectual tasks of analysis, criticism, and creation.  Moreover, these tasks are 
inevitably undertaken in perpetual struggle.  In practice, the nature of this decisiveness would prove 
perhaps predictably problematic.  The conception of discipline that grew from this ethical 
commitment manifested itself in frequent denunciations, splits and bitter sectarianism and rivalry 
between the Situationists and those they perceived to be betraying their revolutionary cause.  As often 
as not, these people were held to be within their ranks.   
 
Friendship and Exclusion 
Given the centrality of everyday experience to the Situationist movement, friendship inevitably played 
a role in the workings of their organisation and the writings which emerged from it.  As Michèle 
Bernstein writes in an article tellingly entitled ‘Pas d’indulgences inutiles’, in the first issue of the 
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Situationists’ journal: ‘Une collaboration d’allure, si l’on veut, intellectuelle ou artistique, dans un 
groupe se livrant à des recherches du genre des nôtres, engage plus ou moins notre usage de la vie 
quotidienne. Elle est toujours mêlée d’une certaine amitié.’75  Bernstein’s article features alongside 
details of the exclusion of three members of the Italian section of the S.I. — the proceedings of the 
S.I.’s second conference, in Paris, having revealed that ‘une fraction avait soutenu des thèses 
idéalistes et réactionnaires, puis s’était abstenue de toute autocritique après qu’elles eussent été 
réfutées et condamnées par la majorité’76 — and the section’s consequent ‘épuration’, as well as the 
break with the only British founding member of the S.I., Ralph Rumney.  The circumstances of 
Rumney’s exclusion are given in an article entitled ‘Venise a vaincu Ralph Rumney’: his inability to 
deliver his psychogeographical report on Venice before the publication of the first journal.  Rumney 
was in Venice with Pegeen Guggenheim, the daughter of Peggy, a wealthy American art collector and 
socialite whom he married in 1958.  Pegeen suffered from depression throughout her life, eventually 
commiting suicide in Paris in 1967; the article announcing Rumney’s exclusion describes Rumney 
‘aux prises de difficultés sans nombre’, which Debord, in a letter to Pinot-Gallizio, a surviving 
collaborator of the S.I. in Italy, would acknowledge referred to Pegeen’s travails.77  Rumney related 
the tale of his exclusion with good humour in a series of interviews collected in The Consul, 
conducted shortly before his death in 2002.  He tells of his own insistence, six months prior to the 
printing of the first journal, that those guilty of not displaying the necessary fanaticism should be 
punished by expulsion as well as his suggestion that the members of the S.I. be introduced along with 
mug-shot style photographs: ‘Venise a vaincu Ralph Rumney’ appears next to two such photos of 
Rumney.  His son Sandro was also born in the same year, prior to his deadline for inclusion in the 
journal; he suggests that Debord and Bernstein both considered the birth of a child to be a ‘bit of 
foolishness that should not distract a true revolutionary from his path.’78  Rumney also asserts that 
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Debord was prone to excluding those whom he considered of comparable intellectual capabilities as 
himself, in order to ensure his control over the groups he commanded, citing his breaks with Lettrist 
companions Gil Wolman and François Dufrêne, the latter of which Debord responded to seeing in the 
streets of Paris by saying, in Rumney’s account: ‘From today on, I will never speak to you again.’79  
Debord was unquestionably not reticent to denounce those around him or those on the left with whom 
he had varying degrees of involvement, as we have seen from the insults hurled in the direction of 
Lefebvre, Althusser and Godard, as Bernstein writes in ‘Pas indulgences inutile’: ‘Nous ne voulons 
toujours pas de relations inoffensives, et nous ne voulons pas de relations qui puissent servir nos 
adversaires.’80  Debord’s concept of friendship was subordinate to his understanding of the political 
exigencies of the S.I.: those whom he considered to be complicit in the workings of the spectacle, 
such as those actively participating in the art market (as at the third conference of the S.I. in 1962), 
would be excluded without compunction, as would those whom Debord decided threatened his 
leadership or those he merely deemed incapable.    
This capricious and despotic method of organisation somewhat jars with Debord’s stated 
desire, in the ‘Rapport sur la construction des situations’, to do without such exclusionary and 
denunciatory machinations: ‘Enfin, il faut liquider parmi nous le sectarisme, qui s’oppose à l'unité 
d’action avec des alliés possibles, pour des buts définis; qui empêche le noyautage d’organisations 
parallèles.’81  Though Rumney relates that the decision to take the form of a disciplined organisation 
was taken at Cosio di Arroscia in 1957, Debord’s pronouncement is inconsistent with the frequent 
splits and excommunications he would later enact: Debord’s conception of friendship, his assessment 
of those with whom he wished to associate himself, was subordinated to his calculations of the 
political goals of the S.I.  That is, he would operate his personal, quotidian relationships with people 
on the basis of what he considered properly political grounds.  This rigorously disciplined — 
bordering on instrumental — conception of friendship also manifested itself in his relative leniency 
towards certain others: Asger Jorn remained Debord’s friend until the former’s death in 1973.  Jorn 
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quit the Situationists in 1961, as it became clear that his relative prominence and success in the art 
world was inimical to the increasingly anti-art direction the S.I. would soon take; nevertheless, he 
would continue to fund the S.I. through sales of his work.  Bernstein appears to qualify the 
Situationists’ policy of categorical exclusion: 
Mais nous n’avons pas de la rupture une conception idéaliste, abstraite, absolue.  Il faut voir 
quand une rencontre dans une tâche collective concrète devient impossible, mais aussi 
chercher si cette rencontre, dans des circonstances changées, ne redevient pas possible et 
souhaitable, entre des personnes qui ont pu se garder une certaine estime.82 
Jorn, for example, was able to remain on good terms owing to the practical use his financing offered 
the S.I., whose refusal to work was unsurprisingly reflected in the often parlous and always precarious 
state of their finances.83  Personal friendship was considered secondary to, and a derivative of, the 
perceived political value of an individual’s contribution to the S.I.  Despite the above caveat, the 
idealist, abstract and absolute nature of such exclusion remains discernible: ‘friendship’ and ‘politics’ 
were seemingly accorded to distinct and unique domains, the former depended on how ‘useful’ — to 
echo the title of Bernstein’s article — you were with regards to the latter.   
It is precisely this demarcation between what is considered ‘friendship’ and the realm of the 
political with which Derrida is concerned in his 1994 book, Politiques de l’amitié.  Derrida seeks to 
show that despite its apparent marginality in political philosophy, the concept of friendship is and has 
always been integral to the notions of community, nation, state and politics.  Derrida’s meditation on 
friendship deals with precisely the question of how the concepts of ‘the political’ and ‘friendship’ 
cannot be conceptually divorced.  Over the course of the fifth and sixth chapters of the book in 
particular, entitled respectively, ‘De l’hostilité absolue: la cause de la philosophie et le spectre du 
politique’ and ‘Serment, conjuration, fraternisation, ou la question “armée”’, Derrida’s examination of 
German philosopher Carl Schmitt’s writings on the fundamental importance of the ‘enemy’ to ‘the 
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political’ provides a lens through which to analyse the Situationists’ ethical decision of opposition to 
the spectacle and the exclusionary model of Situationist organisation as a reflection of their politics of 
the decision.   
Derrida recapitulates Schmitt’s understanding of antagonism as inherent to the notion of ‘the 
political’: ‘Seul un ennemi concret, concrètement déterminé, peut réveiller le politique, nous est-il 
répété sans relâche; seul un ennemi réel peut arracher le politique à son sommeil et, on s’en souvient, 
à la “spectralité” abstraite de son concept; seul il peut l'éveiller à sa vie effective.’84  As I have 
attempted to show above, Situationist theory conceives of the capitalist spectacle as this ‘enemy’ 
against whose commoditising imperatives political opposition takes shape.  Debord’s chef d’oeuvre 
takes the name of this enemy as its title, La Société du spectacle; the formation of a political program 
in response to this enemy begins with the theoretical explanation of how this enemy came to be and 
how it functions.  For Schmitt, it is with the identification of this figure of the enemy that politics 
begins.  Quoting Schmitt’s Le Concept du politique (Der Begriff des Politischen, 1927), Derrida goes 
on to outline how this concept of the enemy finds its antithesis in the notion of the friend: ‘La 
discrimination entre l’ami et l’ennemi serait aussi, au sens hégélien du terme, une “différence éthique” 
(sittliche Differenz), la première condition de la détermination éthique, ce qui ne veut pas dire 
morale.’85  Firstly, we may note the reference to Hegel, who Derrida cites as Schmitt’s key reference 
point in the construction of his theory of the political, and who, alongside Marx, informs most 
fundamentally Debord’s own theory.  Secondly, that this difference is categorised as an ethical one 
goes some way to further revealing the fundamentally ethical operation at work in Situationist theory 
and practice: if there is an ethical demand to agitate in favour of the ‘other-than-spectacle’, there is 
also an ethical dimension to the form and organisation of how this endeavour is undertaken.  That is, 
exclusion and excommunication await those who are deemed unworthy or agents of the spectacle.  
Such is the logic of this absolute hostility.  Moreover, the distinction between the enemy and the 
friend, in the realm of what Schmitt (and the Situationists, both following Hegel) repeatedly insist on 
                                                          
84 Derrida, Politiques de l’amitié, pp.159-60.  
85 Ibid., p.160. 
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calling the ‘concrete’ — the application of the theoretical categories friend and enemy, the transition 
from the conceptual level of ‘the political’ to the everyday one of ‘politics’ — necessarily implies a 
measure of exclusion from the beginning.  Derrida’s central critique of Schmitt’s theorisation of ‘the 
political’ (and indeed, of the concept of what the canonised philosophical tradition names ‘the 
political’, since Plato and Aristotle) is that this is an exclusionary operation.    
Throughout Politiques de l’amitié, Derrida aims to show the androcentric character of the 
traditionally conceived idea of friendship.  That the notion of fraternité has such a privileged role in 
French public discourse, most notably in terms of the Republican motto, ‘Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité’, 
but also in a more general term for solidarity and cooperation, illustrates this predisposition towards 
an understanding of friendship as masculine.  The classical concept of friendship is, as Derrida shows, 
that of two mortal men, brothers, effectively excluding the notion of friendship between women or 
between a woman and a man.  Derrida traces this back notably to Aristotle’s Physics and a passage 
concerning the familiar, or ‘oikeiôtês’, one of the words Derrida cites as an incarnation of presence in 
Western metaphysics.86  The concept of friendship is then, for Derrida, revealed to be not just 
logocentric, but phallogocentrique: fundamentally inflected by gender.87  Derrida states that this 
exclusion or omission categorically manifests itself in Schmitt’s analysis: 
Pas femme qui vive.  Un désert peuplé, certes, un plein désert en plein désert, et même, diront 
certains, un désert noir de monde: oui, mais des hommes, des hommes, des hommes, depuis 
des siècles de guerre, et des costumes, des chapeaux, des uniformes, des soutanes, et des 
guerriers, des colonels, des généraux, des partisans, des stratèges, et des politiques, des 
professeurs, des théoriciens du politique, des théologiens.  Vous chercheriez en vain une 
figure de femme, une silhouette féminine, et la moindre allusion à la différence sexuelle.88 
                                                          
86 Ibid., p.177.  Derrida elaborates on the same page: ‘mais elle forme un indissociable réseau de significations 
qui nous importent ici, un foyer sémantique tout entier rassemblé, justement, autour du foyer (oikos), de la 
maison, de l'habitation, du domicile — et du tombeau: parenté — littérale ou figurée —, domesticité, familiarité, 
propriété, donc appropriabilité, proximité, tout ce qu'une économie peut rendre conciliable, ajustable ou 
harmonisable, j'irai jusqu'à dire présent dans la familiarité du proche ou du prochain.’  
87 Ibid., p.182. 
88 Ibid., p.179. 
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We are confronted with this same desert in Debord’s La Société du spectacle, where we find no 
mention of women or as Derrida says of Schmitt, even the slightest allusion to sexual difference.  This 
absence does not take the same form in the Situationists’ journal (or Debord’s cinema, as we have 
seen in the previous chapter) where numerous sexualised images of women in various stages of 
undress feature regularly.  In the ninth issue of the journal, such an image adorns many pages, 
including one reproduction of a Spanish ‘tract clandestin’ of a nude woman flirtatiously smiling at the 
camera, which has been détourned with the incorporation of a speech bubble declaring (in Spanish, as 
the I.S. caption tells it) ‘Je ne connais rien de mieux que coucher avec un mineur asturien.  Voila des 
hommes!’, a reference to the Asturian miners’ strike of 1934 which was crushed by General Franco.  
The fact that Michèle Bernstein has an article in the issue, and was unquestionably a valued member 
of the group, fails to mitigate this, given (as mentioned in Chapter Two) her own account of how she 
and Jacqueline de Jong were referred to by their surnames, ‘like the men’, therefore disqualifying 
herself from responding to a question asking as to the Situationists’ treatment of women.89  That 
Bernstein also was charged with much of the typing of hand written articles for each issue with which 
she was involved also betrays a clear hierarchy as far as what constitutes ‘women’s work’ was 
concerned.  Despite some meagre evidence that this blindness to female equality was lifting by the 
end of the 1960s — the sole journal published after les événements of 1968 included an article entitled 
‘Le commencement d’une époque’, which declared, more or less in passing, that ‘L’importance de la 
participation des femmes à toutes les formes de lutte est un signe essentiel de sa [May’s] profondeur 
révolutionnaire’90 — such a delayed and very brief reference to the role of women serves to highlight 
the failure to confront the issue previously, falling far short of rectifying this occlusion.  The 
Situationists were guilty of unproblematically inheriting an androcentric conception of political 
action.  As Derrida describes: ‘la vertu politique […] a toujours été vertu virile en sa manifestation 
androcentrée.’91 
                                                          
89 See note 118 of preceding Chapter. 
90 Debord, ‘Le commencement d’une époque’, p.4. 
91 Derrida, Politiques de l’amitié, p.183. 
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For the group to be party to such egregious automatism rather belies some of the Situationists’ 
more declarative propositions, where they often announce their resistance to any and all conditioning 
or convention: Bernstein in ‘Pas d’indulgences inutiles’ declares: ‘Le rôle révolutionnaire de l’art 
moderne, qui a culminé avec le dadaïsme, a été la destruction de toutes les conventions dans l’art, le 
langage ou les conduites.’92  Similarly, the limits to their often professed desire for ‘la désorientation 
des réflexes habituels’,93 are rather keenly brought to light when the contemporary reader is 
confronted with such highly sexualised images.  The gender and sexual politics of the S.I. 
demonstrate their inability to stand equal to their own ‘Définition minimum d’une organisation 
révolutionnaire’, which asserted that: ‘Une telle organisation refuse toute reproduction en elle-même 
des conditions hiérarchiques du monde dominant.’94  That it was precisely such automatism, such 
reproduction of existing hierarchies, that the Situationist project sought to defy, along with the 
obstacles and difficulties in doing so, is elaborated in Raoul Vaneigem’s ‘Banalités de base’, a series 
of thirty long theses that spanned the seventh and eighth issues of the journal.  For the Situationists, as 
Vaneigem expounds, the spectacle is the self-justificatory narrative of ‘le pouvoir hierarchisé’ seeking 
to perpetuate the conditions for its own preservation.  Vaneigem emphasises the continuity between 
the harnessing of developed technological forces that characterises the spectacle and the forms of 
myth and theology which served the same process over the centuries: ‘Le spectacle n’est que le mythe 
désacralisé et parcellarisé’, extricated from the notion of divine entities and fragmented into a series 
of perceived necessities, prescriptions, commodities or idols which the spectacle distributes.  
Vaneigem describes a notion of myth which adapts according to the technological and social 
structures within a given culture, whilst always ensuring the necessity of hierarchical power.  This 
role of the mythic endures, for Vaneigem, ‘de la République platonicienne à l’État cybernéticien’.95  
Vaneigem gives another name to this confluence of myth, spectacle and hierarchical power, logos: 
‘Chaque fois que le Logos ou “organisation de l’apparence intelligible” gagne en autonomie, il tend à 
                                                          
92 Debord, ‘Les situationnistes et les nouvelles formes d’action dans la politique ou l’art’. 
93 Debord, ‘Introduction à une critique de la géographie urbaine’.  
94 ‘Définition minimum des organisations révolutionnaires’, p.54. 
95 Raoul Vaneigem, ‘Banalités de base (ii)’, Internationale situationniste, 8 (1963), 34-47 (p.35). 
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se couper du sacré et à se parcellariser.’96  This organisation of intelligible appearance represents what 
Agamben describes as the ‘linguistive and communicative being’ or ‘nature’ of humans97 at a 
particular juncture in time and history.  This logos, myth (or spectacle, at a particular historical 
moment) binds all individuals, oppressed and oppressor alike, to a particular conception of life, of the 
idea of happiness and the idea of necessity, it imposes an order as if it were natural (as Debord 
describes a second or pseudo nature in La Société du spectacle (Theses 24 and 39)), an inescapable 
law: 
Le mythe unit donc possédant et non-possédant, il les enrobe dans une forme où la nécessité 
de survivre, comme être physique ou comme être privilégié, contraint de vivre sur le mode de 
l’apparence et sous le signe inversé de la vie réelle, qui est celle de la praxis quotidienne.  
Nous en sommes toujours là, attendant de vivre au-delà ou en deçà d’une mystique contre 
laquelle chacun de nos gestes proteste en y obéissant.98  
As above with Vaneigem’s discussion of roles, and the ‘chatouillement de satisfaction’ attainable in 
the faithful reproduction of the gamut of available models of behaviour at any given point (a point he 
reiterates during the course of Banalités de base), there is the assertion that we are obliged to act in 
regard to these stereotypes but are always capable of defiance: the occupation of daily life and capture 
of human activity can never be complete.  Even in the most obedient enacting of such paradigms, 
Vaneigem contends that there is protest in the materiality of the act, as opposed to its abstracted 
prototype, the model against which our actions are measured.  The labour of both the creation and 
mimesis of these roles unties those Vaneigem calls the possessor and non-possessor, as both are 
subordinate to the machinations of power, fulfilling their duties according to the mythic order of 
spectacle.  It is this reproduction — this automatism — that the S.I. hope to fight.  As such, the 
political question of allocation of material resources, the battleground of the traditional understanding 
of Marxist struggle, comes after this ethical distinction between reflecting and breaking the 
                                                          
96 Ibid. 
97 Agamben, The Coming Community, p.79.  
98 Vaneigem, ‘Banalités de base (i)’, p.37. 
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automatism of one’s allocated social role and the tastes, attitudes, actions and positions derived 
therefrom.   
Vaneigem seeks to give examples of those who attempt such defiance: ‘Déjà, les signes d’une 
révolte se manifestent chez les acteurs, vedettes qui essaient d’échapper à la publicité ou dirigeants 
qui critiquent leur propre pouvoir, B.B. [Brigitte Bardot] ou Fidel Castro.  Les instruments du pouvoir 
s’usent, il faut compter avec eux, dans la mesure où, d’instruments, ils revendiquent leur statut d’être 
libre.’99  This problematic identification of who is considered a ‘friend’ and who the ‘enemy’ (whilst 
those with whom they lived and collaborated are routinely denounced and excommunicated, dubious 
public figures can be heralded for the revolutionary implications of certain actions) reveals much of 
the destructive, discriminatory understanding of organisation the S.I. practised.   
It is in the same meditation on Schmitt’s brother/enemy distinction that Derrida’s perspective 
offers a prism through which to view this organisational practice.  In redressing the exclusive, 
privileged notion of fraternity in the discourse of friendship, Derrida places ultimate significance on 
the fundamental unnaturalness — that is, always constructed — of notions of brotherhood and enmity:  
Pour être conséquent avec cette dénaturalisation de l’autorité fraternelle (ou si l’on veut, avec 
sa ‘déconstruction’), il faut prendre en compte une première nécessité, une première loi: il n’y 
a jamais rien eu de naturel dans la figure du frère sur les traits de laquelle on a si souvent 
calqué le visage de l’ami — ou de l’ennemi, du frère ennemi.  La dénaturalisation était à 
l’œuvre dans la formation même de la fraternité.  C’est pourquoi, entre autres prémisses, il 
faut rappeler que l’exigence d’une démocratie à venir est déjà ce qui rend possible une telle 
déconstruction.  Elle est la déconstruction à l’œuvre.  Le rapport au frère engage d’entrée de 
jeu dans l’ordre du serment, du crédit, de la croyance et de la foi.  Le frère n’est jamais un 
fait.100 
                                                          
99 Vaneigem, ‘Banalités de base (ii)’, p.39. 
100 Derrida, Politiques de l’amitié, p.150. 
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Derrida’s’ ‘démocratie à venir’ is a recurring idea throughout Politiques de l’amitié, an attempt to 
give a name to that at which his work is directed.  It is an indefinable concept, one which both offers 
an idea of what a certain form of political organisation could look like and at the same time founds the 
political and ethical commitment of his interventions.  It is this mechanism of a foundational axiom 
which is at once the ultimate horizon of his writings.  In Derrida’s estimation, there is nothing 
inherent or natural in the concept of recognising who is one’s friend and who is one’s enemy.  This 
antagonistic conceptualisation ultimately leads to the identification of the other in oneself, and oneself 
in the other: the traditional understanding of friendship, between two mortal men, recognises only 
what is familiar in the other.  This insistence on locating the other, the one to fight and to eliminate, 
rests on the recognition of this other.  The traditional understanding of friendship excludes the figure 
of the woman from its schema, neither brother nor enemy.  The Situationists were guilty of inheriting 
unquestioningly such an exclusive model of friendship, a model which was inherently exclusive, if 
not of women themselves in practice (though they were largely confined to semi-subordinate roles), 
then of ‘otherness’ more broadly conceived, as that which constitutes the ‘other-than-spectacle’ but 
which they could not recognise themselves.  Derrida poses himself the question of how, in the context 
of this model of exclusionary friendship upon which our inherited notions of the political operate, can 
one respond and hope to act politically:  
1. Ou bien admettre que le politique, c’est en effet ce phallogocentrisme en acte.  Schmitt ne 
ferait qu’en prendre acte; et nous ne pourrions pas ne pas reconnaître qu’en effet, tant de faits 
l'attestent dans toutes les cultures européennes, dans la Bible et le Coran, dans le monde grec 
et dans la modernité occidentale, la vertu politique (le courage guerrier, la mise de mort et la 
mise à mort, etc.) a toujours été vertu virile en sa manifestation androcentrée.  La vertu est 
virile. […] On ne peut combattre cette structure qu'en se portant au-delà du politique, du nom 
‘politique’, et en forgeant d'autres concepts, des concepts autrement mobilisateurs.  Qui 
jurerait que cela n’est pas en cours?  
2. Ou bien garder le ‘vieux nom’, analyser autrement la logique et la topique du concept, et 
engager d’autres formes de lutte, d’autres opérations de ‘partisan’, etc.  S’il y avait une thèse 
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au présent essai, elle poserait peut-être que choix il ne saurait y avoir: la décision consisterait 
une fois encore à trancher sans exclure, à inventer d’autres noms et d’autres concepts, à se 
porter au-delà de ce politique-ci sans cesser d’y intervenir pour le transformer.101 
Despite a too willing and unquestioning internalisation of the androcentric concept of politics, the 
Situationists, like Derrida, sought to go between these two possible responses.  On the one hand, they 
agitated for another idea of politics, one beyond the ‘idée de bonheur’ they alleged both the traditional 
left and right agreed upon, one of freedom and play against the commoditising imperatives of the 
market and the continuation of hierarchical power.102  In seeking to effect ‘concrete’ change, however, 
and in continuing to intervene politically, the inherited exclusivity and discrimination of ‘the political’ 
— notably in the case of their gender and sexual politics but also more generally in their constant will 
to purify and excise those deemed useless — the destructive brand of political action Derrida 
identifies is distinctly evident in Situationist practice.  Once again, however, there is no little evidence 
that they were at least partially aware of their failings on this front:  
Tout ce qui est praxis entre dans notre projet, il y entre avec sa part d’aliénation, avec les 
impuretés du pouvoir: mais nous sommes à même de filtrer.  Nous mettrons en lumière la 
force et la pureté des gestes de refus aussi bien que des manœuvres d’assujettissement, non 
dans une vision manichéenne, mais en faisant évoluer, par notre propre stratégie, ce combat 
où, partout, à chaque instant, les adversaires cherchent le contact et se heurtent sans méthode, 
dans une nuit et une incertitude sans remède.103  
                                                          
101 Derrida, Politiques de l’amitié, p.183. 
102 ‘Instructions pour une prise d’armes’, p.3: ‘Les groupes qui cherchent à créer une organisation 
révolutionnaire d’un type nouveau rencontrent leur plus grande difficulté dans la tâche d’établir de nouveaux 
rapports humains à l’intérieur d’une telle organisation.  Il est sûr que la pression omniprésente de la société 
s’exerce contre cet essai.  Mais, faute d’y parvenir par des méthodes qui sont à expérimenter, on ne peut sortir 
de la politique spécialisée.  La revendication d’une participation de tous retombe d’une nécessité sine qua non 
pour la gestion d’une organisation, et ultérieurement d’une société, réellement nouvelles, au rang d’un souhait 
abstrait et moralisateur.  Les militants, s’ils ne sont plus les simples exécutants des décisions des maîtres de 
l’appareil, risquent d’être encore réduits au rôle de spectateurs de ceux d’entre eux qui sont les plus qualifiés 
dans la politique conçue comme une spécialisation; et par là, reconstituent le rapport de passivité du vieux 
monde.’  
103 Vaneigem, ‘Banalités de base (ii)’, p.45. 
153 
 
The acknowledgement of their own potential shortcomings comes accompanied with an insistence 
that they were able nevertheless to factor this into their theory, such calculated intransigence as to the 
righteousness of their cause serves as a rhetorical disclaimer of sorts.  The self-critical aspect of such 
acknowledgments is defied and yet endorsed by this rhetorical brio: the latter is a by-product of their 
attempts as a political organisation to seduce and galvanise their readers.  Just as Vaneigem 
acknowledges that the Situationists could only make use of the means at their disposal in order to 
reach a readership — ‘nous ne pouvons éviter de nous faire connaître, jusqu’à un certain point, sur le 
mode spectaculaire’104 — their theory can only be read with the particular ends of a group at a 
particular time in mind.  Vaneigem reiterates the point throughout ‘Banalités de base’: 
Mais il faut se rendre à l’évidence, nous sommes aussi empêchés de suivre librement le cours 
de tels moments (excepté le moment de la révolution même), aussi bien que par la répression 
générale du pouvoir, par les nécessités de notre lutte, de notre tactique, etc.  Il importe 
également de trouver le moyen de compenser ce ‘pourcentage d’erreur’ supplémentaire, dans 
l’élargissement de ces moments et dans la mise en évidence de leur portée qualitative.105 
The purpose of their theoretical works and incendiary tracts always comes back to the everyday 
struggle, the contamination of the media employed in the service of this struggle is the source of a 
constant anxiety that is nevertheless suppressed in the rhetorical effusions of their writing.  Vaneigem 
subsequently describes the need for absolute coherence within any revolutionary organisation: ‘La 
seule limite de la participation à sa démocratie totale, c’est la reconnaissance et l’auto-appropriation 
par tous ses membres de la cohérence de sa critique: cette cohérence doit être dans la théorie critique 
proprement dite, et dans le rapport entre cette théorie et l’activité pratique.’106  This relationship 
between theory and practice is the central conundrum in all Situationist works: how to establish a 
relationship between words and actions.107  The journal’s preoccupation with organisation and 
                                                          
104 Ibid., p.47. 
105 Ibid., p.38. 
106 Raoul Vaneigem, ‘Avoir pour but la vérité pratique’, Internationale Situationniste, 11 (1967), 37-39 (p.37). 
107 ‘Nous ne prétendons pas avoir le monopole de l’intelligence mais bien celui de son emploi.  Notre position 
est stratégique, nous sommes au centre de tout conflit quel qu’il soit. […]  Mais ce point ne saurait être fixe.  Il 
représente […] le jeu de tous les hommes, l’ordre mouvant de l’avenir.’  Vaneigem, ‘Banalités de base (ii)’, 
p.47. 
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exclusion, with other groupings on the left and the frequent explicit declarations that their work 
sought to constitute a praxis all testify to this grand ambition.  Derrida is particularly critical of this 
notion: ‘On ne peut pas faire ce qu’on dit.  Ni ce qu’on dit faire ni ce qu’on dit qu’il faudrait faire.  
Aucune praxis ne peut correspondre à ce qu’en dit une léxis.’108  He continues: 
Le concept du politique correspond sans doute, comme concept, à ce que le discours idéal 
peut vouloir énoncer de plus rigoureux sur l’idéalité du politique.  Mais aucune politique n’a 
jamais été adéquate à son concept.  Aucun événement politique ne peut être correctement 
décrit ou défini à l'aide de ces concepts.  Et cette inadéquation n’est pas accidentelle, dès lors 
que la politique est essentiellement une praxis, comme l’implique toujours Schmitt lui-même 
en recourant de façon si insistante au concept de possibilité ou d’éventualité réelles et 
présentes dans ses analyses des structures formelles du politique.109 
Derrida contrasts this presumption of politics as praxis to Schmitt’s defence when on trial for his 
complicity with the Nazis, where he described himself purely as a diagnostician, writing with the 
pretence to pure objectivity in assessing his object of study.110  Derrida is particularly suspicious of 
this idea of the diagnostician: he cites this as Schmitt’s possible retort to his own charges of 
androcentrism.  That is, the exclusion of sexual difference merely reflects the nature of politics in 
history, where the figure of woman has been excluded.  Derrida responds to the response he himself 
has placed in Schmitt’s name: ‘Il ne s’agirait pas de faire la guerre à cet être qu’on appelle la femme 
— ou la sœur, mais de répéter et de consolider, dans le diagnostic, une structure générale qui tienne 
sous contrôle et sous interdiction cela même qui la constitue — et qu’on appelle depuis si longtemps 
le politique.’111  Whilst the charge of ever pretending to be ‘pure diagnosticians’ is far from the case 
as regards the Situationists, their belief that their own theoretical coherence would provide the path to 
political revolution relies on the initial accuracy of their concept of ‘the political’.112  If the initial 
                                                          
108 Derrida, Politiques de l’amitié. p.133. 
109 Ibid., p.134. 
110 Ibid., p.137. 
111 Ibid., p.182. 
112 The process of exclusions and denunciations were a performance of the Situationist conception of politics, 
which sought to demonstrate the dynamism and evolution of their ideas to those they hoped to seduce.  Ivan 
Cthecheglov, writing to Debord in correspondences printed in the journal entitled ‘Lettres de loin’, remarked 
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ethical decision that Situationist theory demands is to oppose, to break the automatism and 
conditioning of the spectacle, then the practical consequences of this decision rely on the analytical 
assessment of what ‘concrete’ actions are to be taken.  Otherwise, their films, books and journals 
remain mere spectacle themselves, in their own account.  Their conception of theory and practice 
remains derived from the same heritage as that which Derrida traces in Schmitt, that is, one of 
exclusion, of identifying the concrete enemy, those who must be opposed.  The peculiarly ethical 
practice of excommunication and denunciation which emerged from this mode of organisation was an 
expression of this exclusionary understanding of politics.    
‘La catégorie de la totalité étant le jugement dernier de l’organisation révolutionnaire 
moderne, celle-ci est finalement une critique de la politique.  Elle doit viser explicitement, dans sa 
victoire, sa propre fin en tant qu’organisation séparée’,113 states Vaneigem in ‘Banalités de base’.  The 
Situationists’ own end as an organisation came in 1972, when Debord declared the dissolution of the 
S.I., Vaneigem having resigned two years earlier.114  Whilst this disbanding was heralded by Debord 
as a final gesture in defiance of their own recuperation, there was not much victorious in it.  Four 
years after May ’68, only one journal issue would follow, in 1969, dedicated predominantly to 
revisiting those events, and the resignation or expulsion of many key members; there was not much of 
a Situationist International left for Debord to command.  By their own criteria of success, the 
Situationists unquestionably failed, such bitter exclusionism doubtless contributing to this failure.  
Bernstein (who by 1972 had divorced Debord, though she had drifted from the S.I. years before)115 
wrote in the first issue of the journal: 
                                                          
upon the apparent undesirability of sectarianism at the same time as the valuable role such excisions carried in 
demonstrating the Situationists’ distinctive character as a revolutionary group: ‘Sur l’exclusion d’A[ttila] 
K[otányi], que dire d’autre?  Ces exclusions devraient cesser.  Je sais que ce n’est pas facile: il faudrait prévoir 
les évolutions, ne pas accepter d’avance les suspects, enfin l’idéal, quoi.  Ces exclusions font partie de la 
mythologie situationniste.’  The Situationists cultivated a mythology of their own, if Vaneigem describes myth 
as the mechanism of power, it is inevitable that in seeking to achieve ‘political’ goals, such power was 
necessarily a vehicle to such ends.  ‘Nous sommes devenus plus forts, plus séduisants donc’, says Bernstein of 
the exclusions of three of the nascent Italian section of the S.I. in ‘Pas d’indulgences inutile’.   
113 ‘Définition minimum des organisations révolutionnaires’, p.54.  
114 Guy Debord and Gianfranco Sanguinetti, La Véritable scission dans l’internationale (Paris: Fayard, 1998).  
First Published 1972.  
115 As Bernstein relates in an interview with Gavin Everall, ‘The Game’, Frieze, 157 (September 2013). 
Available online here: <http://www.frieze.com/issue/article/the-game/> [Accessed 22 June 2015].  
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Il est vrai qu’un travail commun tel que celui que nous avions entrepris, et que nous 
poursuivons, ne peut aller sans être mêlé d’amitié.  Je l’ai dit pour commencer.  Mais il est 
vrai aussi qu’il ne peut être assimilé à l’amitié, et qu’il ne devrait pas être sujet aux mêmes 
faiblesses.  Ni aux mêmes modes de continuité ou de relâchement.116   
This demarcation of the realms of politics and friendship served to undermine the Situationists’ 
capacity to realise their stated aims of politicising the everyday, and constitutes a particular 
automatism of their own.  Debord was certainly the architect of this practice, he played the 
demagogue despot of the S.I., a role he would appear to have thought was politically desirable.  When 
he writes, in 1955, that ‘la première déficience morale reste l’indulgence, sous toutes ses formes’,117 
such a spikily confrontational understanding of how revolutionary organisations should seek to 
behave derives in no small manner from the ‘virile virtue’ that Derrida teases out from the concept of 
friendship.
  
                                                          
116 Bernstein, ‘Pas d’indulgences inutile’, p.26. 
117 Debord, ‘Introduction à une critique de la géographie urbaine’. 
157 
 
4 
 
‘The Beginning of an Era’ 
 
The upheaval of May 1968 was a watershed moment in the history of the Situationist International.  
Les événements, as they have come to be known, saw what for many contemporary observers 
constituted the apotheosis of the Situationists’ influence on political and intellectual life in France.1  
Whilst, like the majority of those who had taken part, they were insistent that the desire to name 
leaders ran contrary to the anti-hierarchical ethos of the events themselves, Debord and the 
Situationists were nevertheless keen to outline what role they had played in the movement and to 
detail their interpretation of what had gone on: the successes and failures of what they saw as a 
potentially revolutionary moment.  The final Internationale situationniste journal appeared in 
September of 1969 — two years after the eleventh and penultimate issue in October of 1967 and three 
years before the eventual dissolution of the group — and dealt predominantly with fallout from May.  
A text by Guy Debord opened the issue, following on from the collaboratively written Enragés et 
situationnistes dans le mouvement des occupations — produced by Debord, Vaneigem, René Viénet, 
Mustapha Khayati, and René Riesel, and published under Viénet’s name from self-imposed exile in 
Brussels in the immediate aftermath of the events — which had detailed the activities of the 
Situationists themselves during the month of occupations and strikes.2  Entitled ‘Le commencement 
                                                          
1 The twelfth issue of the I.S. journal collates some of the judgments pronounced upon the Situationists in the 
European press, in leftist journals and published accounts of the events before, during and after May under 
seven subheadings: ‘La bêtise’; ‘Le soulagement prématuré’; ‘La panique’; ‘Le confusionnisme spontané’; ‘Le 
confusionnisme intéressé’; ‘La calomnie démesurée’; and ‘La démence’.  See ‘Jugements choisis concernant 
l’I.S. et classés selon leur motivation dominante’, Internationale situationniste, 12 (1969), 55-63.  The rather 
bureaucratic presentation of these excerpts is doubtless a deliberately tongue-in-cheek technique further 
mocking the perceived poverty of the various assessments, in addition to the explicit mockery of the categories 
themselves.  Nevertheless, this final issue of the journal’s relentless efforts to distinguish themselves from other 
strands of thought and action amongst such a disparate movement as that of May speaks of a tension between 
the professed anti-hierarchism and an exercise in self-advancement.   
2 René Viénet, Enragés et situationnistes dans le mouvement des occupations (Paris: Gallimard, 1968). 
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d’une époque’, Debord’s article sought to assess the historical significance of May, arguing that such 
an outpouring of revolutionary fervour, though it had been stifled by the machinations of bureaucratic 
trade unions and state power, as well as the inability of the vast majority of students to free 
themselves from the yoke of their bourgeois aspirations, would usher in a new period of revolutionary 
struggle.  One of the most written about and contested events of the history of the twentieth century, 
May has been subject to a great deal of theoretical and historical discussion, both in France and 
abroad.  It is not the primary intention of this chapter to intervene in such debates but to examine how 
the Situationists’ activities and reaction to what happened can inform our assessment of Situationist 
theory’s relevance to the present day.  With this aim in mind, the chapter will begin by outlining the 
Situationists’ May in the context of some of the salient critical perspectives which have emerged in 
the forty-eight years since.  In light of some of these more recent debates, particularly surrounding the 
development of capitalism since May ‘68, this chapter will proceed by examining the Situationists on 
labour and communication and how their theoretical arguments can be read in the wake of nearly half 
a century’s worth of technological and social transformation.  An assessment of this development will 
lead on to a critique of the neo-liberal university, and a subsequent evaluation of the Situationists’ 
usefulness to the today’s struggle against commodification, inequality and subjugation.  
 
Les événements 
The Situationists’ involvement in what they called the ‘Strasbourg scandal’ — the publication of 
Mustapha Khayati’s De la misère en milieu étudiant and subsequent trial of the students who printed 
it for the misappropriation of U.N.E.F. funds — in 1966 was part of a significant period of protest in 
French universities leading up to May ‘68.  After months of protests throughout 1967 at the 
hierarchical organisation, poor facilities and the institutional enforcement of repressive sexual mores 
at the Nanterre campus on the outskirts of Paris, the university was closed by the authorities on May 
2nd.  The next day, hundreds of students gathered in the courtyard of the Sorbonne in response to the 
closure where they were met by members of the fascist student group Occident, who were seeking to 
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eradicate ‘Bolshevism’ from the universities.  The police were called by the rector of the university, 
whereupon violent clashes with students resulted in 574 arrests.  On the sixth, a group of protesters 
calling themselves le mouvement du 22 mars (named for their occupation of the Salle du conseil at the 
top of the administrative tower at Nanterre on that date in ’68)3 were to attend a disciplinary hearing 
as a result of their actions.  Among the students attending the hearing were Daniel Cohn-Bendit, who 
would come to be held as the de facto leader of the student protesters owing to journalistic coverage 
of the early skirmishes, and René Riesel, who, as one of the leading Enragés became close to the 
Situationists during the course of the month.  A considerable number once again demonstrated outside 
the Sorbonne against the treatment of their fellow students; whilst inside, Riesel treated the meeting 
with disdain, reportedly rolling up his leather jacket and using it as a pillow on the wooden floor.  It 
was such intransigence which endeared Riesel to the Situationists, whom he would join throughout 
the occupations of May and afterwards in exile in Belgium.  Fighting broke out when the Compagnies 
Républicaines de Sécurité (CRS, French riot police), notorious for their involvement in the massacre 
of Algerian demonstrators on the 17th of October 1961, and their violent response to miners’ strikes in 
the North of France earlier in 1968, confronted the students once again.  Reacting to the fighting in 
the streets, the authorities closed the Sorbonne for what was only the second time in the University’s 
seven-hundred-year history, lending further meaning to the students’ chants of ‘CRS: SS’.  Posters 
representing this equation would become one of the most well-known images of May.  Prior to the 
hearing on the sixth, Debord and the Situationists handed out a pamphlet entitled ‘La rage au ventre’ 
outside in the public courtyard of the Sorbonne, intended as a provocation to further action against the 
university administration and the police.4  The street fighting continued, culminating on the night of 
the tenth in the nuit des barricades.  Images of the barricades, burned cars and torn up paving stones 
are now a familiar part of the May heritage.   
The CGT and other unions were initially scornful of the student protests, declaring Cohn-
Bendit and le mouvement du 22 mars puerile and petit-bourgeois but could eventually not afford to 
                                                          
3 See Robert Merle, Derrière la vitre (Paris: Gallimard, 1970).  Though a novelistic account, rather than an 
academic study in the traditional sense, Merle’s book is based closely on the events of the 22nd of March.  
4 ‘La rage au ventre’, in Viénet, Enragés et situationnistes dans le mouvement des occupations, pp.260-61.  
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ignore the solidarity felt among workers, particularly the young, with the rioting students.  An official 
strike was called by the CGT only after workers had taken to the streets and, in some cases, occupied 
factories.  Graffiti denouncing the unions could be seen on the streets: ‘les syndicats sont des bordels’ 
and ‘camarades, lynchons Séguy’, referring to Georges Séguy, the secretary general of the C.G.T, are 
two indicative examples.  At the height of what began as wildcat strikes and culminated in a general 
strike, a third of the French workforce refused business as usual.  Debord and the Situationists would 
take part in the occupation of the Sorbonne that began on the 13th of May.  Initially establishing the 
‘Comité enragés-situationnistes’, one of many such committees set up by various factions in the 
occupied Sorbonne, the Situationists produced tracts, détourned comic strips and adorned walls with 
their slogans.  Photographs of the occupation along with many of the tracts and posters produced from 
within the occupied Sorbonne are collected in Viénet’s book.  The Situationists would leave by the 
17th of May, fatigued by the perceived fecklessness of the students and their internecine quarrels.5  
They subsequently set up the Conseil pour le mantien des occupations with the intention of producing 
more tracts in support of the worker-occupied factories and encouraging ‘councilist tendencies’.  The 
eventual negotiations between union bosses and the government at the end of May resulted in the 
‘accords de Grenelle’, comprising a 7% increase in wages and a 35% rise in the minimum wage.  
Though they were initially rejected by many striking workers, harsh police repression during June saw 
the occupations end and normal work resume.  Eventually, over the course of the next month, the 
dissipation of revolutionary enthusiasm would see de Gaulle’s newly formed Union pour la Défense 
de la République party emerge with an absolute majority in hastily called parliamentary elections after 
the P.C.F and the socialists had attempted unsuccessfully to translate the street protests into electoral 
success.  The organs of state power were able to re-establish themselves and the revolutionary 
possibilities ebbed away.   
Despite the dissolution of the movement as June wore on, the Situationists remained 
convinced of the revolutionary potentialities the events revealed, describing May as ‘Le plus grand 
                                                          
5 This is made clear throughout both Viénet, Enragés et Situationnistes and Debord, ‘Le Commencement d’une 
époque’. 
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moment révolutionnaire qu’ait connu la France depuis la Commune de Paris’,6 the last time such an 
erosion of state power had been effected by people taking to the streets, and pouring scorn on the 
nomenclature that had, by 1969, already become commonplace:   
Depuis la défaite du mouvement des occupations, ceux qui y ont participé aussi bien que ceux 
qui ont dû le subir, ont souvent posé la question: ‘Était-ce une révolution?’.  L’emploi 
répandu, dans la presse et la vie quotidienne, d’un terme lâchement neutre — ‘les 
événements’ —, signale précisément le recul devant une réponse; devant même la formulation 
de la question.  Il faut placer une telle question dans sa vraie lumière historique.  La ‘réussite’ 
ou ‘l’échec’ d’une révolution, référence triviale des journalistes et des gouvernements, ne 
signifient rien dans l’affaire, pour la simple raison que, depuis les révolutions bourgeoises, 
aucune révolution n’a encore réussi: aucune n’a aboli les classes.7  
Since no revolutionary movement had succeeded in overthrowing hierarchical power, moments of 
interruption of the dominant socio-economic order, Debord would continue, were worthy of the name 
revolution.  In their capacity to reveal the future potential of alternative conceptions of society, such 
moments were therefore of the utmost historical significance.  The euphemistic coinage of the term 
‘events’ to describe what had happened in May was therefore a risible attempt to diminish their true 
weight.  The criterion of whether or not a revolutionary movement had managed to seize control of 
state power was no longer enough to constitute historical import.  Debord described reducing May to 
such a banal category as a manoeuvre of Gaullist thought, seeking to reassure that nothing had really 
happened.8  This is precisely what Kristin Ross identifies as the ‘police conception of history’ in her 
book on May and the enormous output of critical literature it has generated.  Ross argues that much of 
the work dedicated to explaining, commemorating and analysing May, particularly the work of 
sociologists, consists of asserting that nothing happened.  Drawing from Jacques Rancière, Ross 
describes the role of the sociologist to the past as analogous to that of the police in the present: in 
what she describes as a ‘teleology of the present’, the ultimate message of such works is ‘move on, 
                                                          
6 Debord, ‘Le Commencement d’une époque’, p.3. 
7 Ibid., p.13. 
8 Kristin Ross, May ’68 and its Afterlives, pp.19-27.  
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nothing to see here’.9  Ross, again like Debord, also argues that to judge the revolutionary importance 
of May according to the number of deaths incurred would be to miss the point.10  Debord describes 
this as a Romantic conception of history, one which ‘ne mérite pas d’être discutée’.11  This was 
another measurement in which the forces of order would seek refuge to deny the import of May: 
instead, such events should be judged by the potentialities they, however briefly, seemed to realise.   
Debord begins his article by asserting the prescience of the S.I., citing Arnold Ruge’s words 
to Marx in 1843 on the unlikelihood of any revolutionary uprising five years before the revolutions 
which swept across Europe in 1848.  Debord had taken Ruge’s words as an epigraph in La Société du 
spectacle, a book first published, Debord reminds the reader, six months before the May uprising, in 
December 1967.  His characterisation of May accorded primacy to the workers’ strikes, as opposed to 
the student riots, in addition to affirming the revolutionary nature of the events: 
La plus grande grève générale qui ait jamais arrêté l’économie d’un pays industriel avancé, et 
la première grève générale sauvage de l’histoire; les occupations révolutionnaires et les 
ébauches de démocratie directe; l’effacement de plus en plus complet du pouvoir étatique 
pendant près de deux semaines; la vérification de toute la théorie révolutionnaire de notre 
temps, et même çà et là le début de sa réalisation partielle; la plus importante expérience du 
mouvement prolétarien moderne qui est en voie de se constituer dans tous les pays sous sa 
forme achevée, et le modèle qu’il a désormais à dépasser — voilà ce que fut essentiellement 
le mouvement français de mai 1968, voilà déjà sa victoire.12   
For two weeks, somewhere in the region of ten million factory workers were on strike, many of whom 
took part in factory occupations in Paris, Nantes and Rouen.  The fact that these were wildcat strikes, 
undertaken in resistance to union organisation — the C.G.T, C.F.D.T and P.C.F. all initially opposed 
strike action and denounced the rioting students — was of particular significance to the Situationists.  
The spontaneous and defiant nature of the workers’ action, particularly amongst younger workers, in 
                                                          
9 Ibid., pp.23-24.  
10 Ibid., p.186.  
11 Debord, ‘Le Commencement d’une époque’, pp.13-14. 
12 Ibid., p.3. 
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solidarity with the student protesters signalled, along with the subsequent factory occupations 
throughout the country, the possibility of creating autonomous workers’ councils.  Debord blamed the 
forces of organised labour for the eventual petering out of workers’ revolutionary fervour.  By 
comparison with the potentially revolutionary actions of the striking workers, the Situationists saw the 
student revolt as of secondary importance to the factory occupations coming back under the sway of 
the trade unions:  
La déficience presque générale de la fraction des étudiants qui affirmait des intentions 
révolutionnaires a été certainement, par rapport au temps libre que ceux-ci auraient pu 
consacrer à l’élucidation des problèmes de la révolution, lamentable, mais très secondaire.  La 
déficience de la grande masse des travailleurs, tenue en laisse et bâillonnée a été, au contraire, 
bien excusable, mais décisive.  […] Ils n’avaient pas, en majorité, reconnu le sens total de 
leur propre mouvement; et personne ne pouvait le faire à leur place.13 
Workers were unable to truly grasp the potentially momentous consequences of their actions, whilst 
the majority of student demonstrators were in thrall to the various ideologies of the ‘groupuscules’, 
small factions of predominantly leftist students, denounced by the Situationists variously as Maoist, 
Stalinist, Trotskyist or anarchist.  The issue Debord took with regard to such groups was the 
submission of events to pre-conceived categories: the insurrectionary nature of the uprising defied the 
deterministic impulse to ascribe what was happening in terms of pre-conceived methods of 
interpretation.  This theoreticism, according to Debord’s analysis, prevented the student movement 
from recognising the potential revolutionary implications of their actions.  For the Situationists, there 
is an analogous relationship between the competing ideological currents in the student movement and 
the role of the unions and political parties in suffocating the workers’ movement.   
There is, however, a certain tension between the conception of May as this limitless refusal of 
constraints, an irreducible and incomparable revolt against power and ideology, whilst simultaneously 
pronouncing the pre-eminent importance of their own analyses, theories and actions.  Though both 
                                                          
13 Ibid., pp.11-12. 
164 
 
Viénet and Debord emphasise that what was so remarkable about May was the refusal of constraints 
and the impossibility of reducing all the activities of the revolt to any set formula, their casting of the 
events nevertheless centres on Paris, and on themselves.14  Debord argues that the Situationists, unlike 
the various groupuscules, never sought power in their own name: 
Au contraire, les situationnistes peuvent résumer leur action dans la Sorbonne par cette seule 
formule: ‘tout le pouvoir à l’assemblée générale’.  Aussi est-il plaisant d’entendre maintenant 
parler du pouvoir situationniste dans la Sorbonne, alors que la réalité de ce ‘pouvoir’ fut de 
rappeler constamment le principe de la démocratie directe ici même et partout, de dénoncer 
d’une façon ininterrompue récupérateurs et bureaucrates, d’exiger de l’assemblée générale 
qu’elle prenne ses responsabilités en décidant, et en rendant toutes ses décisions exécutoires.15 
This declaration only comes however, after Debord has sought to redress what he sees as three trends 
of miscasting the role of the Situationists during May in the ‘three hundred or so’ books which had 
been published in the intervening year and a half.  The first of which, and here he names the book 
Daniel Cohn-Bendit wrote, consists of reducing the Situationists’ involvement to the Strasbourg 
scandal eighteen months earlier.16  Secondly, the outright lie that the Situationists were in any way 
associated with the mouvement du 22 mars, and thirdly, that the Situationists were a group of crazed 
vandals, intent on wanton destruction, responsible for the worst excesses of the Sorbonne occupation, 
possibly armed and seeking monstrous disorder.17  Those who doubt the contribution of the S.I. are 
instructed to ‘lire les murs’.18  Though Viénet and Debord both seek to emphasise the provincial and 
global scenes of revolt during the course of the year and their account lauds the spontaneous nature of 
the explosion of unrest, they still ascribe a central role to their actions in the capital.  Debord and the 
Situationists were as guilty as the groupuscules they criticised of manipulating accounts of the events 
                                                          
14 Edgar Morin proffered a similar argument at the time.  See Edgar Morin, ‘May ’68: complexité et ambiguïté’, 
in Morin, Claude Lefort and Cornelius Castoriadis, Mai 1968: la brèche, premières réflexions sur les 
événements, suivie de Vingt ans après (Paris: Complexe, 1988), pp.171-82. 
15 Debord, ‘Le Commencement d’une époque’, pp.23-24.  
16 See Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Le Gauchisme, remède à la maladie sénile du communisme (Paris: Seuil, 1969). 
17 Debord, ‘Le Commencement d’une époque’, pp.17-18. 
18 Ibid., p.18. 
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to emphasise their own theoretical contributions; there is an inherent contradiction in making 
declarations about the fact that they had sought not to publicise themselves:  
Personne ne peut nier que l’I.S., opposée également en ceci à tous les groupuscules, s’est 
refusée à toute propagande en sa faveur.  Ni le C.M.D.O. n’a arboré le ‘drapeau 
situationniste’ ni aucun de nos textes de cette époque n’a parlé de l’I.S. […] Et parmi les 
multiples sigles publicitaires des groupes à vocation dirigeante, on n’a pas pu voir une seule 
inscription évoquant l’I.S. tracée sur les murs de Paris; dont cependant nos partisans étaient 
sans doute les principaux maîtres.19   
Debord insists that he is not interested in framing triumphant denunciations of his ‘intellectual 
adversaries’, despite doing so at some length throughout ‘Le commencement d’une époque’.  The 
categorical assertion that supporters of the S.I. were ‘principal masters’ of May’s graffiti and poster 
art appears highly dubious, both in its veracity and in the authoritarian nature of such a 
pronouncement.   
Whilst on the one hand, the Situationists rejected any attempt to place the revolutionary 
movement under any kind of pre-conceived political banner, in writing their own accounts of the 
events, they could only be seen to offer their own brand of interpretive authority.  Hence the 
pretention to declare ‘ce que fut essentiellement le mouvement de mai’.  Though they lamented the 
use of the term ‘Situationism’ and the notion that their work could be reduced to a static body of 
thought, they were precisely concerned with convincing their readership of the need for revolutionary 
change and therefore sought an authority rhetorically in the name of Situationist theory.  As we have 
seen in the previous chapter, their understanding of politics and ‘the political’ requires this rhetorical 
authority in the seduction of their audience.  Theoretical coherence was prized by the Situationists as a 
means to the end of mobilising those who came into contact with their work, rather than for the sake 
of ‘scientific’ correctness in and of itself.  This is why Debord’s text refers to the beginning of a new 
era of contestation, rather than being only a case of settling accounts of what happened.   
                                                          
19 Ibid., p.26. 
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The emphasis in Debord’s text and throughout the final issue of the journal is placed upon 
that which remains to be pursued of the opportunities that May seemed to make possible: ‘Au lieu de 
souligner ce qui est déjà vérifié, il est plus important désormais de poser les nouveaux problèmes; de 
critiquer le mouvement de mai et d’inaugurer la pratique de la nouvelle époque.’20  This is a critical 
enterprise which has been undertaken in innumerable guises in the immediate aftermath and on the 
occasion of anniversaries, though certainly not in the manner in which Debord envisaged.  The ‘new 
era’ which May has been seen to have ushered in is frequently held to be one of capitalism’s 
adaptation and reinforcement, rather than one of exciting new proletarian revolutionary experiments.  
The occasion of anniversaries of the May events have frequently seen the publication of works 
seeking to historicise the revolt, to place it into the context of what has happened since.  There has 
been a proliferation of studies and theories seeking to reconcile the May events with subsequent 
historical developments.   
While Ross’s excellent book on the ‘afterlives’ of May seeks to criticise the ‘official 
histories’ which have come to characterise May in retrospect, one particular strand of this critical 
consensus is particularly relevant in relation to Situationist theory: the attempt to explain away the 
revolutionary prospects of May and why the critique of capitalism was, supposedly, amenable to 
capitalistic recuperation.  Régis Debray’s ‘modest contribution’ to the tenth anniversary 
commemorations argued that, ‘Mai 68 est le berceau de la nouvelle société bourgeoise.’21  It was the 
‘socio-cultural’ side of May which — with the equal rights movements, sexual liberation and youth 
revolt — updated the top-down, old-fashioned and out of touch Gaullism.  The malfunctioning 
capitalist machine could thus be corrected in bringing social values into accordance with those of a 
modern, industrial economy.  Similarly, in the early 1980s, Gilles Lipovetsky would argue that May 
heralded a new era of individualism, again, thoroughly in accordance with the growth of the consumer 
economy.22  Jean-Pierre Le Goff’s Mai ’68: L’Héritage impossible, in its assertion of the paradox 
                                                          
20 Ibid., p.17. 
21 Régis Debray, Modeste contribution aux discours et cérémonies officielles du dixième anniversaire (Paris: 
Maspero, 1978). It is worth recalling that the Situationists used the term ‘Masperisation’, referring to the 
publisher François Maspero, to mean falsification or misrepresentation.   
22 Gilles Lipovetsky, L’Ere du vide: essai sur l’individualisme contemporain (Paris: Gallimard, 1983).  
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between the ‘socio-cultural’ side and the ‘workerist, Leninist/Neo-Marxist’ side, claimed that it was 
the leftist groupuscules that sought to effect a synthesis of ouvriérisme and libertarianism.23  Le Goff 
insists upon an impossible heritage of a polyvalent May whilst simultaneously arguing that May can 
be reduced to these two contradictory currents.  Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello’s Le Nouveau esprit 
du capitalisme is probably the best known of these post-May analyses.  Written in 1999, the two 
authors, Boltanski, a sociologist who had worked closely with Pierre Bourdieu, and Chiapello, a 
scholar in the field of management studies, argued that that the unique impact of the May events was 
brought about by the combination of two separate types of thought.24  They called these ‘la critique 
sociale’, the call for solidarity and equality, typically associated with workers’ movements, and ‘la 
critique artiste’, which decries the inauthenticity, alienation of the subject and repression of individual 
freedom and creativity perpetrated by capitalism.  It is this latter critique which the ‘new spirit’ has 
found it eminently useful to recuperate in its compatibility with what they call a ‘connexioniste’ 
capital’s valorisation of freedom and creation.   
It is precisely such a dichotomy, between an ‘artistic’ and ‘social’ critique which the 
Situationists opposed, particularly with regard to May, and Debord spends much of ‘Le 
commencement d’une époque’ analysing the incompatibility of the student and worker movement, not 
on the basis of competing or antagonistic thought, but in terms of their susceptibility to fall back into 
forms of spectacular control, be that the bourgeois aspirations of certain sections of the students, the 
related surrender to the ideological formations of the groupuscules, or the workers’ eventual return to 
the factories under the authority of the management.  For Debord, it was the ‘sabotage’ of the 
university enacted by groups of ‘anti-students’ — by which he specifically indicates he does not mean 
groupuscules such as the mouvement 22 mars — which created the opportunity for direct action on 
behalf of young workers in particular.  He also draws attention to the strikes which had taken place in 
the early months of 1968 in Cannes and Redon, as evidence of a burgeoning revolutionary movement 
within the factories.25  Debord refutes the popular understanding of May as a student movement:  
                                                          
23 Jean-Pierre Le Goff, Mai ’68: L’Héritage impossible (Paris: La Découverte & Syros, 1998). 
24 Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, Le Nouveau esprit du capitalisme (Paris: Gallimard, 1999).  
25 Debord, ‘Le commencement d’une époque’, p.8.  
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Tout au contraire, et quoi qu’affectent d’en croire le gouvernement et les journaux aussi bien 
que les idéologues de la sociologie moderniste, le mouvement de mai ne fut pas un 
mouvement d’étudiants.  Ce fut un mouvement révolutionnaire prolétarien, resurgissant d’un 
demi-siècle d’écrasement et, normalement, dépossédé de tout: son paradoxe malheureux fut 
de ne pouvoir prendre la parole et prendre figure concrètement que sur le terrain éminemment 
défavorable d’une révolte d’étudiants: les rues tenues par les émeutiers autour du Quartier 
Latin et les bâtiments occupés dans cette zone, qui avaient généralement dépendu de 
l’Éducation Nationale.26 
Debord’s description of the sociological response to May is once again reminiscent of Kristin Ross’s 
later assessment, in the assertion that to describe May as a student movement facilitates the forgetting 
of the general strike and the reduction of what happened to a ‘generational’ or ‘socio-cultural’ 
conflict.  It was the university environment which remained intact despite the occupations and street 
fighting (here again, Debord’s animosity towards the vast majority of students and their ideological 
affiliations is evident).  The ‘sabotage’ of this environment remains a crucial aspect of the 
revolutionary moment, but could not be considered the motivation for much of the student 
movement’s activity.  He argues that though thousands of students during May were transformed by 
their experiences and sought to reject ‘la place qui leur est assignée dans la société’, the 
overwhelming majority of the students were not transformed in this way.  Debord then qualifies why 
this is: not, he says, because of the ‘pseudo-marxist platitude’ that considers their social origins as 
determinant, but because of the ‘social destiny’ of the student: ‘le devenir de l’étudiant est la vérité de 
son être.’27  Debord describes how the student is ‘fabriqué et conditionné pour le haut, le moyen ou le 
petit encadrement de la production industrielle moderne’: this is a productive process of the students’ 
upbringing and provisional social role, rather than an innate function of their bourgeois identity.  
Debord goes on to state that students who sought their deliverance from the undesirable future role as 
a functionary of industry in the ideologies of the groupuscules saw their studies as having furnished 
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them with the tools to defy this conditioning, whereas in fact the university was indeed part of this 
process: ‘Pour cet ensemble de raisons, les étudiants, comme couche sociale elle aussi en crise, n’ont 
rien été d’autre, en mai 1968, que l’arrière-garde de tout le mouvement.’28  The refusal of assigned 
social roles is the predominant characteristic of May, one which comes easily to the factory workers, 
in the Situationist analysis, as theirs is a role in which they are subjugated and exploited.  The student, 
on the other hand, occupies a provisional role destined for the patronat, and Debord argues that the 
rejection of both the role of the student — in its subordination of the hierarchical strictures of the 
university — and, crucially, the future position of manager or boss is necessary.29  It would appear on 
the evidence of this reading of Debord that the Situationists prized what Boltanski and Chiapello call 
‘la critique sociale’ above the ‘critique artiste’, in their exaltation of the proletariat and dismissal of 
the vast majority of the student activists.  However, what emerges from the Situationists’ emphasis on 
rejecting the allocation of social roles is the proletarianisation of the salariat, that is, the submission of 
all social classes: ‘Le mouvement des occupations, c’était le retour soudain du prolétariat comme 
classe historique, élargi à une majorité des salariés de la société moderne, et tendant toujours à 
l’abolition effective des classes et du salariat.’30  It is the spectacle’s domination of social life and 
regulation of hierarchical roles which the proletarian revolution rebels against.  This is as true of the 
students as of the workers, though the distribution of power in the allocation of these roles in 
unquestionably unequal: 
C’est une consommation hiérarchique, et qui croît pour tous, mais en se hiérarchisant 
davantage.  La baisse et la falsification de la valeur d’usage sont présentes pour tous, quoique 
inégalement, dans la marchandise moderne.  Tout le monde vit cette consommation des 
marchandises spectaculaires et réelles dans une pauvreté fondamentale, ‘parce qu’elle n’est 
pas elle-même au-delà de la privation, mais qu’elle est la privation devenue plus riche’ (La 
Société du Spectacle).  Les ouvriers aussi passent leur vie à consommer le spectacle, la 
                                                          
28 Ibid., pp.8-9.  
29 Again, there is a parallel with this reading and Kristin Ross’s description of May as a ‘crisis in functionalism’. 
Kristen Ross, May ’68 and its Afterlives, pp.25 and 65-80.  
30 Debord, ‘Le commencement d’une époque’, p.3.  
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passivité, le mensonge idéologique et marchand.  Mais en outre ils ont moins d’illusions que 
personne sur les conditions concrètes que leur impose, sur ce que leur coûte, dans tous les 
moments de leur vie, la production de tout ceci.31 
Where the Situationists viewed the separation of student and worker as a concoction of the spectacle, 
they rejected categorisations of separate critiques such as those which would later be formulated by 
Boltanski and Chiapello.  It is this demarcation which permits the students’ identification with the 
revolutionary ideologies of the groupuscules or their allocated role in spectacular society which 
amount to the same abnegation of revolutionary responsibility, in the Situationist analysis.   
Maurizio Lazzarato, who has written on and been active within Italian and French labour 
movements over the last three decades, in his essay on Boltanksi and Chiapello’s work, also argues 
that the demarcation of the two critiques is a political and methodological error.  Lazzarato sees this 
operation as a ‘liquidation’ of what the May events united in theory and in practice.32  In 
manufacturing this divorce, Lazzarato understands the traditional Marxist concept of ideology as 
being culpable.  Where Boltanski and Chiapello suggest that capitalism’s ‘new spirit’ seeks to justify 
hierarchical social organisation ‘moralement’, by means of discourse and language, Lazzarato argues 
that this argument artificially separates politics and the economy, ‘la macropolitique et la 
microphysique du pouvoir’.33  In upholding the category of ideology, Debord, it could be argued, 
performs this same operation: what for Lazzarato constitutes capitalism’s production of subjectivities 
is misunderstood as an appropriation of the metaphysical notion of human nature, a self-legislating 
individual subject.  This is also why the Situationists might be identified with Boltanski and 
Chiapello’s ‘critique artiste’, in their use of concepts such as alienation and ‘l’homme totale’.  What 
we see at the end of the above quotation from Debord, however, is a reference to the production of 
these conditions; the Foucauldian critique of ideology resists the reference to any preconceived notion 
of a subject, whilst the theory of spectacle holds that the political subject is forged in response to the 
contradictions and hypocrisies of the dominant social order, in the form of an ‘idéologie matérialisée’, 
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32 Maurizio Lazzarato, Marcel Duchamp et le refus du travail (Paris: Les Prairies ordinaires, 2014), pp.71-72. 
33 Ibid., p.73. 
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the title of the final chapter of Debord’s La Société du spectacle.  This materialised ideology is a 
parallel configuration to Lazzarato’s Foucauldian ‘dispositifs qui impliquent l’individu’;34 not merely 
the mystification of images usurping the natural activity of the spectator but the hierarchical social 
relationships produced and maintained by its own making: ‘On ne peut opposer abstraitement le 
spectacle et l’activité sociale effective; ce dédoublement est lui-même dédoublé.  Le spectacle qui 
inverse le réel est effectivement produit’ (Thesis 8). 
If the Situationist concept of alienation can be understood not as some perversion of innate 
subjectivity, but as the subjective response to exploitation under hierarchical social conditions, then 
the concept of this ‘materialised ideology’ can be similarly understood.  Debord gives two clear 
indications of this in ‘Le commencement d’une époque’, firstly in response to this accusation from the 
journalist Fréderic Gaussen that the Situationists possess ‘une confiance messianique dans la capacité 
révolutionnaire des masses et dans leur aptitude à la liberté’.35  The same journalist would later refer 
with almost identical wording to the revolutionary movements of 1968 across Europe.  Debord is 
contemptuous of such an assertion, given his conviction that his work seeks not to predict the future 
or carry any notion of ‘belief’ but to describe the workings of the spectacle given the evidence at 
hand.  Secondly, and despite the fact that it is frequently cited as an example of the Situationist 
slogans which adorned the walls of Paris during May, Debord is disdainful of one of May’s most 
famous epithets: ‘en écrivant sur des murs en béton “prenez vos désirs pour la réalité”, ils [les 
enragés] détruisaient déjà l’idéologie récupératrice de “l’imagination au pouvoir”, prétentieusement 
lancée par le “22 mars”. C’est qu’ils avaient des désirs, et les autres pas d’imagination.’36  The 
concept of imagination, that is, one derivative of a Romantic conception of individual genius and 
creation is eschewed by the S.I., in accordance with the theory of détournement we have seen.   
                                                          
34 Ibid., p.75. 
35 Quoted in Debord, ’Le commencement d’une epoque’ from an article in Le Monde, 9th December 1966.   
Henri Lefebvre is quoted similarly, much to the Debord’s disdain given the May revolt would shortly follow: 
‘Les situationnistes […] ne proposent pas une utopie concrète, mais une utopie abstraite.  Se figurent-ils 
vraiment qu’un beau matin ou un soir décisif, les gens vont se regarder en se disant: “Assez!  Assez de labeur et 
d’ennui!  Finissons-en!” et qu’ils entreront dans la Fête immortelle, dans la création des situations?  Si c’est 
arrivé une fois, le 18 mars 1871 à l’aube, cette conjoncture ne se reproduira plus.’  Henri Lefebvre, Positions 
contre les technocrates (Paris: Gonthier, 1967). 
36 Debord, ‘Le Commencement d’une époque’, p.21.  
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On the other hand, the Situationists’ valorisation of the proletariat could be seen to approach a 
teleological conception of history as the march towards egalitarian harmony.  Debord is equally 
scornful, however, of such pretension to ‘scientific’ status, reminiscent of Althusserianism, an 
influence on many of the groupuscules:  
Mais c’est justement en ceci que l’étudiant fournit le bétail avide de trouver sa marque de 
qualité dans l’idéologie de l’un ou l’autre des groupuscules bureaucratiques.  L’étudiant qui 
se rêve bolchevik ou stalinien-conquérant (c’est-à-dire: le maoïste) joue sur les deux tableaux: 
il escompte bien gérer quelque fragment de la société en tant que cadre du capitalisme, par le 
simple résultat de ses études, si le changement du pouvoir ne vient pas répondre à ses vœux.  
Et dans le cas où son rêve se réaliserait, il se voit la gérant plus glorieusement, avec un plus 
beau grade, en tant que cadre politique ‘scientifiquement’ garanti.37 
Where Debord does refer to the ‘return of history’, it is once again tempting to see this not as a 
question of an ontology of the proletariat as universal class but, firstly, as a response to the 
enforcement of hierarchical power and secondly as a tactic of political subjectivation, forging the 
identification with an oppressed group in order to work towards material change.  Once again, the 
rhetorical impact of such pronouncements seeks to serve both of these aims.   
The fact remains that despite the apparent optimism of Debord’s article’s title, May ’68 did 
not herald the beginning of a new contestatory era but a period of development and adaptation of 
capital which has only enhanced its control over life in Western societies, and indeed throughout the 
globe.  The question of how capitalism has changed over the course of the last half-century or so is 
obviously a contested one, given the countless published and doubtless forthcoming accounts of ‘neo-
liberalism’, ‘post-industrial society’ or comparable competing conceptualisations of the latter half of 
the twentieth century and the beginning of this one.  In light of Debord’s analysis of the worker and 
student movements, subsequent developments in the analysis of labour and the role of the university 
will here be considered.  Lazzarato’s work provides a theoretical counterpoint for what follows: his 
                                                          
37 Ibid., p.10.  Lefebvre is accused of possessing a similar ‘prétention scientifique’.   
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work on ‘immaterial labour’ and the production of subjectivity will first be outlined in order to 
present certain affinities with Debord’s theory of spectacle, whilst acknowledging their clear 
disparities.  Secondly, Lazzarato’s more recent work on debt, taking the creditor-debtor relationship 
as the ‘archétype de l’organisation sociale’ will be analysed alongside Debord’s conceptualisation of 
spectacular power relations, with particular attention to how both treat the concept of time.38  The 
question of debt leads on to the final section of this chapter on the university, and how Situationist 
theory’s treatment of notions of power, control, politics and opposition can inform and nourish our 
understanding of the current predicament facing higher education in Britain and the ‘neo-liberal’ 
West.  Lazzarato’s work on capitalism and the production of subjectivity presents a prism through 
which can emerge a revaluation of the Situationists’ relevance to contemporary discussions of work, 
resistance and politics.   
 
Labour, Subjectivity, Communication  
The concept of ‘Immaterial Labour’ offers an important interpretation of how forms of work in 
developed Western economies have changed since May 1968.  Lazzarato defines immaterial labour as 
‘the labour which produces the informational and cultural content of the commodity’.39  It is this 
concept which increasingly describes the activity of the working class in technologically developed 
Western societies, in which the tertiary (service, logistics, commercial) and quaternary (‘knowledge’: 
finance, information etc.) sectors have come to predominate, where work is increasingly characterised 
by the operation of computers and supported by digital networks, as well as the activity involved in 
the establishment of cultural and artistic tastes and standards, as in marketing and advertising but far 
from confined to these activities.  Related notions of ‘cognitive capitalism’,40 the ‘knowledge’ or 
                                                          
38 Maurizio Lazzarato, La Fabrique de l’homme endetté (Paris: Editions Amsterdam, 2011), p.30. 
39 Maurizio Lazzarato, ‘Immaterial Labour’, in Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics, ed. by Paolo 
Virno and Michael Hardt, trans. by Paul Colilli and Ed Emory (London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 
pp.132-46. 
40 See Yann Moulier-Boutang, Le Capitalisme cognitif: la nouvelle grande transformation (Paris: Editions 
Amsterdam, 2007). 
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‘information economy’ and the transition from the industrial capitalism of the post-war era and its 
technologies of production specific to the factory indicated by terms such as ‘post-Fordism’, or ‘post-
Taylorism’ also seek to lend further descriptive depth to his change.  For Lazzarato, this changes how 
we understand work and by extension the concept of the proletariat, requiring the abandonment of 
what he calls ‘our factoryist prejudices’, the division between intellectual and manual labour and the 
privileging of the latter.41    
This transformation of what constitutes labour in post-industrial capitalism takes cultural 
work as the model of ‘human capital’, the individual as creative entrepreneur who combines 
imagination, technical and manual labour as well as the management of social relations in structuring 
cooperative activity with others in the undertaking of various projects and tasks.  This paradigm of the 
creative entrepreneur demands the internalisation of the labour market’s norms and values, combining 
activity ostensibly constitutive of the ‘self’ into modes of economic valorisation.  For Lazzarato, this 
kind of working existence erodes the boundaries between work and life, ‘leisure’ and ‘productive’ 
time: ‘Now, the post-Taylorist mode of production is defined precisely by putting subjectivity to work 
both in the activation of productive cooperation and in the production of the “cultural” contents of 
commodities. […] In a sense, life becomes inseparable from work.’42  Lazzarato states that immaterial 
labour produces subjectivity and economic value simultaneously, touching every moment of our lives, 
demolishing the boundaries between economy, power and knowledge. 
Lazzarato argues that this threatens to become a more ‘totalitarian’ power relation than the 
clearly defined hierarchy between ‘boss’ and ‘worker’ because of this integration of subjectivity and 
productivity, as the very process of social communication is incorporated into the sphere of economic 
value: ‘If Fordism integrated consumption into the cycle of the reproduction of capital, post-Fordism 
integrates communication into it.’43  Where the figure of the consumer emerged particularly after the 
                                                          
41 Lazzarato, ‘Immaterial Labour’, p.136.  
42 Ibid., p.137.  Confusing this apparent erosion of the boundaries between ‘work’ and ‘life’ under the banner of 
‘free creative activity’ and the collapse of what the Situationists called ‘separation’ between alienated labour (in 
the form of both production and consumption) and ‘free activity’ is indicative of Nancy’s description of their 
role as ‘capital’s avant-garde’ as mentioned in the previous chapter.   
43 Ibid., p.142. 
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Second World War as the motor of economic growth, what defines immaterial labour is this 
disintegration between ‘leisure’ and ‘work’ and the assimilation of communication, subjectivity, and 
personality into the production process.  Lazzarato describes this as a redefinition of the production-
consumption relationship, as the cultural and informational products of immaterial labour are no 
longer ‘consumed’, that is, ‘used’, but consumption is inscribed from the beginning in the processes 
by which consumer tastes, fashions, and standards are produced: ‘Consumption is no longer only the 
“realization” of a product, but a real and proper social process that for the moment is defined with the 
term communication.’44  Immaterial labour promotes continual innovation in the forms and conditions 
of communication and in its consequent production of subjectivity, since this is precisely what 
communication deals in, as a social relationship.  This leads Lazzarato to argue that immaterial labour 
‘makes immediately apparent something that material production had “hidden”, namely, that labor 
produces not only commodities, but first and foremost it produces the capital relation.’45  
It would be misleading to map Lazzarato too neatly onto Debord’s theory of spectacle, but it 
is in this relation between immaterial labour, communication and social relations that Lazzarato’s 
conceptualisation of this new form of work comes close to how Debord characterises the spectacle.  
As we have seen in Chapter One of this thesis, Debord describes the spectacle as a ‘rapport social 
entre les personnes’ (Thesis 4), which is mediated by the images to which the theory of spectacle is so 
often reduced, considered narrowly in terms of ‘the media’, where the capture of the spectator’s 
activity is neither confined to ‘work’ or ‘leisure’.  Rather, Debord echoes Lazzarato on the process of 
commodity production and consumption as extensive and perpetually unfolding, encompassing the 
entirety of the individual’s activity: ‘Le temps qui a sa base dans la production des marchandises est 
lui-même une marchandise consommable, qui rassemble tout ce qui s’était auparavant distingué, lors 
de la phase de dissolution de la vieille société unitaire, en vie privée, vie économique, vie politique’ 
(Thesis 151).  Debord quotes Marx’s Capital at the conclusion of the same thesis, stating that one 
commodity’s consumption can form the basis of another, rather than necessarily being exhausted in 
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the extraction of its use-value.  It is this understanding of consumption as a continual process in the 
production of value which Debord and Lazzarato share, one which motivates Debord’s dissatisfaction 
with the concept of the ‘société de consommation’, expressed in ‘Le Commencement d’une époque’.  
Debord laments what he calls an ‘inepte travestissement sociologique’ for its limited characterisation 
of a society which certainly proffers the commodities and their consumption, but does so only as part 
of a process which subjects everyone to hierarchical power.46  The power relations inscribed in the 
consumption of commodities are the target of Debord’s analysis, rather than the vacuity or futility of 
consumption alone.   
Again, as for Lazzarato, communication is implicated in this power relation: ‘toute 
communication personnelle directe entre les producteurs’ is lost under the regime of the spectacle, 
where communication becomes ‘l’attribut exclusif de la direction du système’ (Thesis 26).  As we 
noted in Chapter Three, the Situationist model of post-revolutionary organisation is described as 
‘communication totale’, signifying a social relation unmediated by hierarchical power.47  By contrast, 
Debord holds that spectacular communication is: 
essentiellement unilatérale; de sorte que sa concentration revient à accumuler dans les mains 
de l’administration du système existant les moyens qui lui permettent de poursuivre cette 
administration déterminée.  La scission généralisée du spectacle est inséparable de l’État 
moderne, c’est-à-dire de la forme générale de la scission dans la société, produit de la division 
du travail social et organe de la domination de classe.  (Thesis 24)   
Despite the changes in the workplace and forms of communication between l967 and 1996 — the 
expansion of information technology and digital networks even up to the mid-nineties bearing little 
comparison to Debord’s denunciation of, essentially, the factory and the television — Lazzarato’s 
prognosis of the predicament of the individual subject permits no greater capacity for action: 
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The subject becomes a simple relayer of codification and decodification, whose transmitted 
messages must be ‘clear and free of ambiguity’, within a communications context that has 
been completely normalized by management.  The necessity of imposing command and the 
violence that goes along with it here take on a normative communicative form.48   
Under the regime of immaterial labour, the worker’s personality and subjectivity have to be made 
susceptible to organization and command as it is incumbent upon the individual to mould themselves 
to the requirements of the market.  Nor is this simply a matter of professionalism or workplace 
conduct, as communication, and therefore language, taste, behaviour are constitutive of this 
marketised subjectivity.  Though internalised and taken on by the individual, this is a unilateral power 
relation of command and control.   
In his more recent work, Lazzarato has referred to Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of the 
Marxian base/superstructure paradigm in terms of the univocity of the concept of production to 
describe the workings of this relationship: the production of subjectivity, no less than forms of life and 
of existence, does not constitute an ideological or discursive superstructure but part of an economic 
infrastructure.  In this way, subjectivity becomes the commodity par excellence, the commodity which 
goes into the production of all other commodities.49  Debord and Situationist theory are here closer to 
Lazzarato than both the ‘vulgar Marxist’ model of economic base and representational superstructure 
or its simple inversion, asserting the independence of the latter from the former.  As Debord remarks, 
‘Là où était le ça économique doit venir le je.  Le sujet ne peut émerger que de la société, c’est-à-dire 
de la lutte qui est en elle-même.  Son existence possible est suspendue aux résultats de la lutte des 
classes qui se révèle comme le produit et le producteur de la fondation économique de l’histoire’ 
(Thesis 56).  The role of a ‘leisure’ industry, what Debord refers to as commodified blocks of time — 
reducing time itself to a commodity —, in addition to what we immediately recognise as 
‘consumption’, prefigures Lazzarato’s theorisation of capital’s production of subjectivity.  Debord 
prophesises that ‘culture’ will become the ‘marchandise vedette’ of spectacular society, outlining ‘le 
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complexe processus de production, distribution et consommation des connaissances’ (Thesis 193.  
Emphasis Debord’s) becoming to the second half of the twentieth century what the car had been to the 
first half, and the train had been to the second half of the nineteenth, the perceived principal motor of 
economic growth.  Similarly, he argues that it is ‘les conduites qu’il [the spectacle] règle’, the gestures 
of everyday life, affective behaviour and conduct, cultural tastes and preferences which become 
commodified under the spectacle.  It is worth considering the theatrical connotations of the French 
‘spectacle’ as opposed to the English ‘spectacle’, where the former pertains more immediately to the 
theatre and therefore to the undertaking of gestures, actions and performance.  Rather than being 
restricted to the external and passive observation, we might read the theory of spectacle as 
encompassing both performance and audience, constitutive of both what we think of as ‘work’ and 
‘leisure’. 
It must simultaneously be acknowledged, however, that Debord did not prophesise capital’s 
capture of taste and preferences as evinced by the digital era in the twenty-first century.  The media 
today, most obviously in the guise of social media, demand the opposite of passivity.  Where the 
Situationists write in the context of the overtly top down, hierarchical power relations of Gaullist 
France in the 1960s, notably state control over television and radio via the ORTF, which crystallised 
around May, today’s media require the individual to narrate their own life via writing and image.  
Nevertheless, where Debord describes power, the pertinence of his conclusions maintains a 
recognisable relevance: what the likes of Facebook, Twitter or YouTube offer is a formal and 
technical template into which one can pour one’s subjective impressions.  The equivalence of profiles, 
posts and videos, and their comments or messages, present a technical-bureaucratic model in which 
we enter our ‘personal’ contributions pro forma.  The commodity form of such profiles is redoubled 
not only by the mimetic nature of so many such ‘subjective contributions’ (opinions imported from 
other media, photographs in which appearance, pose or style are reproduced from magazines, film or 
television) but also the way in which such contributions are subsequently captured and sold in the 
form of data, for marketing and advertising purposes most obviously.   
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Whilst this may not be ‘passive’ in the sense Debord describes the spectator of television or 
film, the conception of activity to which Debord opposes such passivity is far removed from the 
formal, bureaucratic and mimetic operations that overwhelmingly characterise social media.  As 
Mustapha Khayati wrote in De la misère en milieu étudiant: ‘L’autogestion de l’aliénation marchande 
ne ferait de tous les hommes que les programmateurs de leur propre survie: c’est la quadrature du 
cercle.’50  Survival used in this manner is a frequently employed term in Situationist theory, referring 
to the maintenance of the spectacular status quo.  Where Lazzarato describes a communication where 
the terms are ‘normalised by management’, we might discern a comparable understanding of 
contemporary media forms, owned by corporations who produce no content themselves but own the 
means of production and invite us to produce the substance ourselves.  What emerges from this 
reading of the commodity form, communication and what we might call, following Lazzarato, the 
production of subjectivity, is that ‘work’, for the Situationists, is any activity that is valorised by 
capitalism.51  Labour, in the Situationist analysis, is not the ‘essence’ of human activity.  Rather, it is 
the critique of value itself which Debord and the Situationists develop from Marx’s work.52   
Focusing on the concept of time as understood by Debord and the Situationists allows a 
reading of their theory which eschews a metaphysical conception of the ‘value’ of human labour, and 
more generally what might be understood as vitalism or the recourse to humanistic notions of the 
proletariat as universal class, a misunderstanding which so much of their rhetoric would seem to 
perpetuate.  Understanding Situationist theory as taking the expropriation of time as that which is 
perpetrated by the spectacle permits an analysis of their work which demonstrates its relevance to the 
present day.  It is here once again that we can see certain convergences between Situationist theory 
and Lazzarato’s.  The latter’s more recent work has concentrated on the question of debt, in La 
Fabrique de l’homme endetté (2011) and Gouverner par la dette (2014) and, as a part of this, on the 
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expropriation of time, in the formation of which he draws on Marx, Nietzsche and Deleuze and 
Guattari.  Where his essay on immaterial labour offers some optimism as regards what he calls the 
‘autonomous organisational capabilities’ of new forms of labour, this has been replaced by an 
emphasis upon the importance of ‘subtracting’ oneself from the logics of capitalist valorisation, 
experimenting with new forms of subjectivity and of organisation.  The notion of opposition, refusal 
and experimentation is crucial to the Situationists and Lazzarato, and it is to how the expropriation of 
time functions in the latter’s theorisation of debt and the former’s of spectacle that the following 
section turns. 
 
Debt, Exchange and Time  
Writing in the context of the global financial crisis of 2008, Lazzarato’s more recent work has sought 
to confront the power relations defining contemporary society (La Fabrique de l’homme endetté is 
subtitled ‘essai sur la condition néo-libérale’), understanding debt as the ‘fondement du social’.53  He 
argues that the debtor-creditor relationship intensifies mechanisms of exploitation and domination as 
it applies across society without distinguishing between workers and the unemployed, consumers and 
producers, working and non-working populations, retirees and welfare recipients.  The creditor-debtor 
relationship is therefore one of the most effective instruments of exploitation man has managed to 
create, since the expropriation of labour, wealth and time of others is blind to such distinctions.  
Lazzarato criticises Boltanski and Chiapello for ignoring the financialisation of capital in their 
attempts to conceptualise contemporary forms of capitalism, where he holds that what is commonly 
referred to as ‘speculation’ constitutes a machine for capturing and preying on surplus value in 
conditions created by modern-day capitalist accumulation, conditions in which it is impossible to 
distinguish rent from profit.  Subsequently, all of modern-day capitalist accumulation is comparable to 
rent, as a class owning the means of production (most notably, the means of producing money, as 
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debt) is able to perpetually extract the wealth of a class of non-owners by virtue of this relationship.54  
Under neo-liberalism, Lazzarato states, what we reductively call ‘finance’ is indicative of the 
increasing force of the creditor-debtor relationship.55   
Understanding debt as the archetype of social relations has two consequences for Lazzarato.  
Firstly, that the basis of what we call economy and society presupposes an asymmetrical relation of 
power, rather than the presumed equality of market exchange.  Secondly, debt affords the power to 
reconfigure the economy and society by controlling the subjectivity of the indebted.  What we call 
work becomes indissociable from what he calls ‘travail sur soi’, as the indebted individual must be 
capable of promising a future commitment to ‘pay back’ the debt, and therefore undertake the means 
of doing so, not only by obtaining a job but also by conforming to the expected standards of the 
responsible subject.  He describes this relationship as revealing ‘une vérité qui concerne toute 
l’histoire du capitalisme: ce qu’on définit comme “économie” serait tout simplement impossible sans 
la production et le contrôle de la subjectivité et de ses formes de vie.’56  
In a section headed ‘Le temps de la dette comme possible, choix, décision’, Lazzarato argues 
that capital expropriates the time of the indebted subject, in that the provision of credit requires a 
future commitment — a disciplined regular labour required to repay the debt, normalising and 
stabilising the debtor’s future.  The importance of the debt economy lies in the fact that it appropriates 
and exploits both chronological labour time and action, non-chronological time, time as choice, 
decision, a wager on what will happen and on the forces (trust, desire, courage etc.) that make choice, 
decision and action possible.   
In this way, social relations become a matter of contractual obligation between individuals; as 
a debt is undertaken on the level of the individual, the subject is individually responsible for its 
                                                          
54 McKenzie Wark’s theorisation of a new ‘vectoral class’, according to which the proprietors of the means of 
communication (the ‘information vector’) extract value from those who use them similarly understands 
contemporary capital’s accumulation as rent.  See McKenzie Wark, Telesthesia: Communication, Culture and 
Class (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), p.208. 
55 David Graeber, Debt: The First 5000 Years (New York: Melville House, 2011), p.53.  Lazzarato discusses 
Graeber’s reading of Nietzsche on the question of value and values in uncomplimentary terms, see Gouverner 
par la dette (Paris: Les Prairies Ordinaires, 2014), pp.68-69.   
56 Lazzarato, La Fabrique de l’homme endetté, p.30.  
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repayment, neutralising the possibilities for collective action.  A subjective feeling of guilt and 
isolation is the consequence of this ‘contractualisation’, Lazzarato offers a reading of Nietzsche on the 
moral foundation of the concept of debt (in German, debt and guilt are the same word, ‘schuld’) 
alongside recent press campaigns against the Greek ‘loafers and parasites’ surrounding the ongoing 
Euro crisis.  This rhetoric finds its analogue in contemporary British politics: the demonization of 
‘benefit scroungers’ as opposed to the ‘hardworking people’, striving to forge a ‘strong economy’ 
which has become a constant refrain of the current Conservative government.  The emphasis once 
placed on the ‘work ethic’ now functions not only in the construction of social prestige which 
surrounds work and consumption, along the lines of which subjective valorisation is measured, but as 
a means of sowing division and suspicion between the indebted, foreclosing the possibility of forming 
alliances and modes of being together.      
The appropriation of time as a mode of economic valorisation and impediment to collective 
political action are therefore inextricably linked in Lazzarato’s analysis and he quotes Marx to 
establish how this operation functions: 
Pour agir, c’est-à-dire pour commencer quelque chose dont la réalisation est soumise aux 
aléas du temps, pour se risquer dans l’inconnu, l’imprévisible et l’incertain, il faut d’autres 
forces que celles engagées dans le travail: la confiance dans les autres, dans soi-même et dans 
le monde.  La relation créancier-débiteur ne représente que ‘l’illusion’ de la fin de la 
subordination de l’homme à la production ‘de la valeur’ économique et son élévation à la 
‘production des valeurs’ fondée non plus sur le travail salarié, le marché et la marchandise, 
mais sur la communauté et sur les sentiments les plus nobles du cœur humain (la confiance, le 
désir, la reconnaissance de l’autre homme, etc.).  Avec le crédit, nous dit Marx, l’aliénation 
est complète, puisque ce qui est exploité, c’est le travail éthique de constitution de soi et de la 
communauté.57 
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The power of the debt relation extends beyond the realm of ‘work’ and into the realm of inter-
subjective relations.  The model of the neo-liberal free creative entrepreneur sees his or her peers as 
competitors rather than potential allies.  Where Lazzarato employs Marx’s understanding of 
alienation, it describes the expropriation of time as life itself.   
The concept of time in Debord’s theory of spectacle functions in a remarkably similar fashion 
to Lazzarato’s theorisations of debt.  Though Lazzarato is keen to establish the pre-eminence of the 
creditor-debtor relation over the notional equality of exchange in the market place — exchange and 
commodity being two of La Société du spectacle’s central theoretical categories taken from Marx — 
Debord in fact argues that the expropriation of time precedes the workers’ entry into the commodity 
economy:   
Pour amener les travailleurs au statut de producteurs et consommateurs ‘libres’ du temps-
marchandise, la condition préalable a été l’expropriation violente de leur temps.  Le retour 
spectaculaire du temps n’est devenu possible qu’à partir de cette première dépossession du 
producteur.  (Thesis 159. Emphasis is Debord’s.) 
Time, rather than labour, still less any metaphysical notion of ‘human nature’, is what the spectacle 
usurps in order to appropriate the activity of the proletarian.  What Debord calls commodity or 
spectacular time, ‘returns’ as it is constituted by ‘une accumulation infinie d’intervalles équivalents’, 
marked by what Debord calls its ‘exchangeable character’ (Thesis 147).  If the purpose of the 
commodity is to render all things equal before the law of the market, spectacular time levels all forms 
of activity to this measure.  For Debord, quoting Marx’s Misère de la philosophie (1847), time is 
everything, where ‘l’homme’ is nothing but the carcass of time, spectacular commodity time is, ‘le 
temps dévalorisé, l’inversion complète du temps comme ‘champ de développement humain’ (Thesis 
147).  Again, where Debord quotes Marx’s reference to human development, this notion cannot be 
understood without reference to capitalist expropriation, as opposed to an ontological conception of 
‘the human’.  This conceptualisation of time as ‘returning’ and equivalent derives from the power and 
control the spectacle exerts on all forms of life.  What Debord describes as ‘le caractère 
fondamentalement tautologique du spectacle’ (Thesis 13), where ‘le but n’est rien, le développement 
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est tout.  Le spectacle ne veut en venir à rien d’autre qu’à lui-même’ (Thesis 14), the image of a 
society which actively inhibits the prospect of political action as the capacity to forge new modes of 
social organisation, presages Lazzarato’s ruminations on debt, the future and the way in which power 
relations ensure conformity: 
Dans chacune de ces sociétés, une structuration définitive a exclu le changement.  Le 
conformisme absolu des pratiques sociales existantes, auxquelles se trouvent à jamais 
identifiées toutes les possibilités humaines, n’a plus d’autre limite extérieure que la crainte de 
retomber dans l’animalité sans forme.  Ici, pour rester dans l’humain, les hommes doivent 
rester les mêmes.  (Thesis 130) 
The societies to which Debord is referring here are what he calls ‘froides’, frozen in their refusal to 
countenance alternative possibilities.  Theoretical notions of structure or system are anathema to 
Lazzarato, who insists that capitalism cannot be described in these terms, since it is constantly 
developing, adapting and establishing new forms of exploitation and domination, forging new power 
blocs in order to ensure control over time and forms of life: ‘Le pouvoir du capitalisme, comme le 
monde qu’il veut maîtriser et s’approprier, est toujours en train de se faire.’58  Where Lazzarato 
attempts to think what he refers to as the processes and flows of economic valorisation, how 
subjectivity is produced and reconfigured, in order to formulate the logics from which workers’ 
movements might seek to ‘subract’ themselves, Debord refuses to understand these processes as 
anything other than the usurpation of time in the service of class interest.  This may appear, on the one 
hand, indicative of what Lazzarato describes as a politics coming from nothing: in this case, an innate 
subjectivity, a vital sovereignty of the individual, a humanistic, metaphysical belief.  On the other 
hand, however, this could be read as a tactic of political subjectivation in and of itself: that is, a 
rhetorical move with the intention of scandalising the reader, establishing the terms of a class 
antagonism that requires resistance and action, and thus a means of ‘soustraction’ within and against 
spectacular forms themselves.  Indeed, in its totalising aspect, there is an injunction to accept or reject 
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this state of affairs, this is the ethical moment discussed in the previous chapter, and it is inseparable 
from capital’s production of subjectivity: in demanding the opposition to acquiescence in this regard, 
there is a refusal to accept the commodity time of both labour and leisure and a dismissal of both the 
prestige of capitalist valorisation as well as the moralising stigma of the work ethic.   
 
The University and Protest 
We apologise to readers for our obsessions.  But the outcome of our conflict concerns them 
also.  It will decide not only whether this University can become a good, technologically well-
equipped and intellectually alert, self-governing community — as it still, despite all its 
history, could be — or whether it will become simply ‘the Business University’ from which 
all other aspirations fall rapidly away.  The outcome of this episode will also be some kind of 
an index of the vitality of democratic process — and of the shape of the next British future. 
(E.P Thompson, Warwick University Ltd. Industry, Management and the Universities, p.164.)   
In the final section of this chapter, I turn to higher education in England for a localised examination of 
the consequences of neo-liberal managerialism and then to how possible modes of opposition to 
capitalist valorisation endure.  In Gouverner par la dette, Lazzarato outlines how the American 
university serves as a model for the debt economy, with high levels of student indebtedness incurred 
as a matter of course, obligating the indebted student to manage themselves over the course of their 
life in order to pay.59  In England, higher education has been restructured over the last few years in 
accordance with international and governmental requirements pressing the need for reform and for 
renewed sources of funding.  Raising tuition fees and the inducement of private investment into the 
higher education sector have seen a new climate in English higher education emerge, emphasising 
‘competitiveness’ domestically and internationally, in which universities battle each other in a game 
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Wendy Brown has also written on neo-liberalisation in the context of the American university, see Chapter six, 
‘Educating Human Capital’ in Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neo-liberalism’s stealth revolution (New 
York: Zone Books, 2015), pp.175-201. 
186 
 
of seduction for fee-paying students, who inevitably act as consumers purchasing a commodity on 
which they expect to see a financial return.  Some of the potential consequences of this marketised 
environment in higher education will be outlined here, in accordance with the analysis of debt, power 
and control above, with consideration of how this current climate impacts upon a reading of 
Situationist theory.    
Andrew McGettigan’s The Great University Gamble (2013) charts recent policy changes in 
the wake of the Browne Review on higher education funding, commissioned by the last Labour 
government in 2009 and released in 2010, after the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 
government was formed in the wake of that year’s General Election.60  The purpose of the Browne 
review — named for the man who led report, John Browne, a former executive of British Petroleum 
— was always to reduce the sector’s reliance on central funding and to foster greater 
entrepreneurialism, according to the 2009 program set out by the Labour government’s then Secretary 
of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Peter Mandelson.  McGettigan’s analysis shows the 
underpinning logic of the reforms undertaken since 2010, the government having given themselves 
the task of cutting back public finance according to the narrative of ‘austerity’: marketisation, 
privatisation and financialisation.  In order for our universities to ‘compete’ with international 
institutions, they require greater funding than the public purse can provide.  Therefore, the 
establishment of a market in higher education, where ‘better’ universities are able to charge higher 
tuition fees than others and private investors can seek profit, was facilitated by cutting the block grant 
distributed for undergraduate provision from £5 billion to £2 billion, including removing central 
funding for some subjects entirely.  McGettigan quotes David Willets, Minister for Universities and 
Science between 2010 and 2014, as seeking a ‘level playing field’ for any private provider to enter the 
market by removing ‘anti-competitive’ barriers to market entry of central funding.61   
As we have seen above in connection with Lazzarato and debt, the extent to which the ‘free’ 
market constitutes a level playing field is vastly overstated.  The complex financial mechanisms upon 
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which the government’s plans for the long-term provision of student loan financing rely — plans 
which, McGettigan suggests, are almost certain to be subsequently revised — are little-understood by 
those whom they will most affect and the process as a whole has been subject to conspicuously little 
oversight or public debate (indeed, the legality of George Osborne’s plans to modify the rate of loan 
repayments has since been called into question).62  The most well-known, widely reported and 
immediately felt consequence of the government’s recent reforms is the increase in maximum tuition 
fee cap that universities can charge as of 2012, up from £3,375 to £9,000.  The intention behind this 
move was not just to increase the financial burden upon individual students and off the government 
but to allow a differentiation between institutions, so those with ‘high quality providers’, those with 
greater prestige, could charge more than those perceived as less worthy of higher prices.  Though 
McGettigan describes a ‘gamble’ regarding the stated aims of the reforms, their long-term fiscal 
viability and the stability and health of what was a relatively stable system, he alleges in the 
introduction to his book that, ‘the clear intent of the government is to make universities more 
customer-, business-, and industry-focused’ in the course of what he goes on to term ‘a single 
ideological aim’: reducing the role of the state in order to broker deals between finance and private 
sector provision.63  As with Lazzarato’s evaluation of financial speculation, whilst this restructuring 
might initially be seen as a gamble or ‘speculation’, it in fact represents strategic manoeuvre in itself: 
students are forced to behave as consumers seeking returns on their investment and education 
becomes a commodity.  David Graeber, in remarks addressed to an occupation at the New University 
Amsterdam in 2015, described this as a ‘pre-emptive strike’, in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, 
where any perceived source of potential alternative ideas is clamped down upon and what he 
describes as ‘neo-liberal logic’ is inculcated in the student.64  Just as in the EU’s negotiation with the 
Greek government, which sought austerity policies rather than any feasible plan of debt repayment, 
                                                          
62 Ibid., p.49.  Indeed, this aspect of the government’s student loan reform has been the subject of more recent 
scrutiny: Helen Lock, ‘Lawyers lines up to challenge sneaked-in student loans charges’, The Guardian, 15 
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the ideological aims are achieved in the enactment of the policy, the control of behaviour in the 
present, rather than whether such policies result in their stated criteria being fulfilled.  In the case of 
tuition fees, advertised as necessary belt-tightening on behalf of the government, the increase in 
student loan provision necessitates an increase in upfront government borrowing.  The narrative of 
austerity is employed to make such ‘reform’ or ‘modernisation’ appear rational and inevitable.   
The application of corporate managerialism in the university has been the subject of two 
particular articles I wish to review here in light of their resonance with Situationist theory, both of 
which pre-date the reforms McGettigan describes.  Both seek to describe the subjective consequences 
of the changing landscape of higher education for those working in universities.  Both identify this 
application with the reform under way at present with the ‘there is no alternative’ program of neo-
liberalisation beginning with Thatcher and Regan in the late 1970s.  In the first of these two articles, 
Joyce E. Canaan outlines what she describes as this ‘dramatic reconfiguration’ of higher education, 
citing a World Bank report from the late 1990s stipulating what is required of such a transformation, 
which: 
means either fewer and/or different faculty, professional staff and support workers.  This 
means lay-offs, forced early retirements, or major retraining and reassignment […] which 
means radically altering who the faculty are, how they behave, the way they work and are 
organised and the way they work and are compensated.65   
Canaan theorises the implementation of this reform as the extension of the corporate sector’s ‘audit 
culture’.66  She describes how the constant bureaucratic oversight enacted by an increasing number of 
administrative staff and corresponding duties required of academics leads to ‘new forms of conduct 
and professional behaviour […] and the creation of new kinds of subjectivity: self-managing 
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individuals who render themselves auditable.’67  Metrics introduced to calculate the ‘quality’ of 
academic performance in teaching and research — seeking to impose a quantitative measurability 
upon their work, so that such outputs can be published as various forms of rankings tables which 
permit differentiation between individuals and institutions for the purposes of the market (who is 
hired and fired; which ones can charge higher fees for their product) — necessitate the fulfilment of 
certain criteria in order to present the characteristics deigned desirable by the ‘audit’ process.  Canaan 
identifies the alleged neutrality of this phenomenon as a misnomer: where the etymology of the word 
suggests its impartiality, the Latin audere, hearing, listening, then measuring according to apparently 
objective standards, audit also, in Canaan’s terms, ‘takes a view’:  
[Audit] does not just examine an institution and the departments and individuals within it as 
they are; it makes a judgement about how the institutions, departments and individuals ought 
to be — which transforms these entities.68 
Under the guise of supposed neutrality, the objective necessity dictated by the laws of the market 
economy, the audit process reshapes what it is that constitutes valuable activity.  In accordance with 
Lazzarato’s meditations on capitalist valorisation and subjectivity outlined above, the internalisation 
of this logic that its apparent ineluctability demands applies equally to the professional and to the 
‘personal’ life of the individual.  Once again, we can go further back in identifying the emergence of 
this phenomenon.  In the 1970s, the historian E.P. Thompson wrote that the integration of business, 
managerialism and the university brought about politically prescriptive consequences: 
The demands of the institution become larger — moving outwards from the working life to 
the private and social life of its employees — and its attempts to enforce loyalties by moral or 
disciplinary means, by streaming its procedures or by managing promotions and career 
prospects, become greater.  The managers, at the top, need not even see themselves as police-
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minded men; they think they are acting in the interests of greater ‘efficiency’; any other 
course would damage the institution’s ‘public image’ or would encourage subversion.69     
The language of political intrigue reflects the concerns of the book, published in reaction to a scandal 
as Warwick’s university administration stood accused of routine surveillance of staff and students and 
colluding with local businesses and politicians in seeking to influence admissions and hiring in light 
of the local activism of certain students and staff members.  Whilst talk of subversion and loyalties 
might not necessarily echo the terms in which most people couch academia today, the introduction of 
new practices under the rubric of greater ‘efficiency’ is directly related to McGettigan’s analysis of 
funding and Canaan’s conception of audit.  The concept of ‘police-mindedness’ equally reflects the 
political nature of this technocratic modernisation, here calling to mind Rancière’s understanding of 
the police order as the defence and reinforcement of the status quo.  Canaan argues that the paradox of 
‘audit’ is that, whilst it constantly demands accountability from those it surveys, its professed 
objectivity grants it freedom from similar accountability: ‘audit is not accountable to anyone or 
anything and is therefore hardly democratic.’70  Equally, the subjects of audit ‘internalise the logic of 
this policing’,71 enacting the new market norms as a technique of survival, reproducing the behaviour 
required of the World Bank’s new academic.  
If the concept of audit, imported from corporate managerialism, reflects the clandestine 
workings of a political agenda, then the second article in this field which I wish to discuss, brings a 
recognisably Debordian lexicon to the analysis of education reform.  Stephen J. Ball’s 2003 article 
‘The Teacher’s soul and the terrors of performativity’ also understands education reform in terms of 
the ‘policy technologies’ of marketization and managerialism, aligning public sector organisations 
with the ‘methods, culture and ethical system of the private sector’.72  Ball anticipates David 
Graeber’s ‘iron law of liberalism’, that where neo-liberalism professes to abhor bureaucracy and state 
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control in the name of flexibility and freedom, the construction of markets requires not less but more 
form-filling and red tape: ‘[C]rucially it is a mis-recognition to see these reform processes as simply a 
strategy of de-regulation, they are processes of re-regulation.  Not the abandonment by the State of its 
controls but the establishment of a new form of control.’73  This new form of control takes the form of 
a ‘management panopticism’, whereby the imperatives of quality and excellence in teaching and 
research are driven by the market and competition.74  For Ball, the internalisation of these norms 
engenders the individualisation of responsibility in conforming to such imperatives, replacing 
solidarities based on collective identity and common cause with the construction of an institutional 
identity based around the corporate culture of the university as a market competitor.  What constitutes 
‘quality’ and ‘excellence’ is at stake, and control of this field of judgement in the hands of managers 
and the market results in the experience of what Ball calls ‘a kind of values schizophrenia’.75  
Whatever subjective values are not in line with market reason are necessarily subordinated in the 
course of professional survival:  
This structural and individual schizophrenia of values and purposes, and the potential for 
inauthenticity and meaninglessness is increasingly an everyday experience for all.  The 
activities of the new technical intelligentsia, of management, drive performativity into the 
day-to-day practices of teachers and into the social relations between teachers.  They make 
management, ubiquitous, invisible, inescapable — part of and embedded in everything we do.  
Increasingly, we choose and judge our actions and they are judged by others on the basis of 
their contribution to organizational performance, rendered in terms of measurable outputs.  
Beliefs are no longer important — it is output that counts.  Beliefs are part of an older, 
increasingly displaced discourse.76 
This leads Ball to speak of the ‘spectacle’ of these performances:  he speaks of ‘game playing’ and 
‘cynical compliance’ where the professional necessity of conforming to the bureaucratic requirements 
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of management and the market demands activities we might consider pointless or contrary to 
intellectual or ethical values.  This ‘spectacle’ of a solicited performance calls us back to Debord, and 
can allow us to understand the relevance of his theory in more everyday contexts.  Restricted to the 
realm of representation, the spectacle of television and media, it is passivity that is demanded of the 
spectator; more broadly understood as spectacular social relations, we see that the performance of 
activity valorised by capital is precisely what Debord’s ‘économie spectaculaire-marchande’ compels.   
In the field of higher education, we can observe how Debord’s theory can be read as the 
market’s colonisation of new realms of social activity.  The clandestine workings of an ideological 
agenda behind Canaan’s ‘audit’ and Ball’s conception of ‘values’ find their analogue in Debord’s 
theory precisely when he argues that the spectacle is more than mediatic representation alone: ‘Le 
spectacle ne peut être compris comme l’abus d’un monde de la vision, le produit des techniques de 
diffusion massive des images.  Il est bien plutôt une Weltanschauung devenue effective, 
matériellement traduite.  C’est une vision du monde qui s’est objectivée’ (Thesis 6).  Ball describes an 
‘alienation of self’, the product of this ‘values schizophrenia’; Debord’s invocation of the concept of 
alienation can be read as the appropriation of the spectator’s activity — as time, once again opposed 
to the repression of an innate species being — which seeks to diagnose why the refusal of this 
universal model of valorisation is necessary.    
For Debord, this impulse to universality is characteristic of the commodity form in its endless 
levelling of qualitative distinctions, whilst at the same time, the ‘économie spectaculaire-marchande’ 
is based in the maintenance of power relations and is therefore inherently hierarchical, fostering 
distinction at every level:  
Le spectacle est universel comme la marchandise.  Mais le monde de la marchandise étant 
fondé sur une opposition de classes, la marchandise est elle-même hiérarchique.  L’obligation 
pour la marchandise, et donc le spectacle qui informe le monde de la marchandise, d’être à la 
fois universelle et hiérarchique aboutit à une hiérarchisation universelle.  Mais du fait que 
cette hiérarchisation doit rester inavouée, elle se traduit en valorisations hiérarchiques 
inavouables, parce que irrationnelles, dans un monde de la rationalisation sans raison.  […]  
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Avec la marchandise, la hiérarchie se recompose toujours sous des formes nouvelles et 
s’étend; que ce soit entre le dirigeant du mouvement ouvrier et les travailleurs, ou bien entre 
possesseurs de deux modèles de voitures artificiellement distingués.  C’est la tare originelle 
de la rationalité marchande, la maladie de la raison bourgeoise, maladie héréditaire dans la 
bureaucratie.  Mais l’absurdité révoltante de certaines hiérarchies, et le fait que toute la force 
du monde de la marchandise se porte aveuglément et automatiquement à leur défense, conduit 
à voir, dès que commence la pratique négative, l’absurdité de toute hiérarchie.77 
Debord detects the same process of hierarchisation at work in bureaucratic and bourgeois reason, once 
again testifying to the essential compatibility of the ‘diffuse’ and ‘concentrated’ spectacle, in a 
formulation which pre-empts the profusion of bureaucracy under neo-liberal managerialism.  
Asserting the reinforcement of hierarchical structures in higher education is a common thread of the 
articles discussed above: that those not in ‘elite’ institutions face the choice of conforming to the new 
managerialism or losing out, as McGettigan states, ‘elite’ institutions will benefit from recent 
reforms.78  Ball argues that these are the places least likely to become afflicted by alienation and the 
‘terrors of performativity’ owing to their hierarchical prestige and consequent strong market 
position.79  Wendy Brown says much the same of ‘elite’ private institutions in the American setting.80   
The notion of this ‘pratique négative’ is a nebulous one, one designed to encompass all forms 
of protest and resistance to the hierarchical status quo, including both the work of the S.I. and the 
revolt of the Watts rioters in Los Angeles, of whom the text is a staunch defence.  The particular, 
‘unavowable’ hierarchies invoked above refer to the racism and ghettoization suffered by the 
population of the district who took to violent resistance in response.  Recognisable contemporary 
incarnations of the resistance to police racism — the Watts insurrection began after a black motorist 
was pulled over by police and a fight ensued — such as the Black Lives Matter movement, which has 
seen hundreds of thousands march the streets to protest against the fact that young black men are so 
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often the victims of police violence, could be considered to constitute incidences of this broad concept 
of ‘pratique négative’.  Riots in response to police violence are not a thing of the past, as those in the 
Paris suburbs in 2005 and in London in 2011 attest.  Indeed, it is the police reaction to various forms 
of protest which testifies to the insecurity of contemporary capital’s universal mode of valorisation:  
in 2010, over 50,000 marched in protests organised by various student groups (some of which have 
since coalesced into the Free Education movement) against the UK government’s trebling of tuition 
fees were met with the ‘technique’ of kettling and even a cavalry charge, which was captured live on 
BBC news.  Numerous incidents of campus occupations have, over the last three or four years been 
met with varying degrees of repression: in 2013, five students from the University of Sussex were 
banned from campus by the university administration after a floor of a building was occupied, whilst 
at the University of Warwick the following year, a small sit-in of free education activists was greeted 
by taser- and pepper spray-wielding police.  Under the previous Labour government, ‘joint enterprise’ 
legislation was introduced tantamount to criminalising peaceful protest, legislation which was 
recently employed in order to bring LSE academic Lisa McKenzie to court after someone else had 
placed a sticker on a door during a protest against ‘poor-doors’ in London housing blocks.81  Whilst 
there is often suspicion expressed at such campus contestation as the bleating of the privileged few, 
the mere performance of rebelliousness and spectacle of refusal, such disproportionate responses from 
police, university administration and government displays something of a panicked fear towards any 
signs of diversion from the dominant model of neo-liberal rationality.82    
As we have seen above, both Canaan and Ball incorporate the notion of performativity into 
their analyses of higher education reform.  Where Ball understands the ‘spectacle’ required by 
bureaucratic managerialism along the lines of Judith Butler’s description of such performance as 
‘enacted fantasy’, his use of ‘performativity’ is restricted to this reproduction of established norms 
and as the title of his article suggests, his usage of the term owes more to Jean-Francois Lyotard’s 
                                                          
81 Owen Jones, ‘Our right to protest should be sacrosanct.  Unforgivably, it’s being betrayed’, The Guardian, 23 
October 2015, available online here: <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/23/protest-
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82 See, for example, Slavoj Žižek, ‘The Revolt of the Salaried Bourgeoisie’, London Review of Books, 34.2 
(2012), 9-10.  
195 
 
discussion of the ‘terrors of performativity’ in relation to the commodification of knowledge.83  
Canaan, however, employs Butler’s notion more fully than Ball, arguing (as Butler does) that though 
norms may well be increasingly prescribed, they are far more insecure than their apparent universality 
allows.84  Such norms require constant reiteration, but alternative performances are therefore possible, 
ones which resist the dominant narratives.85  In this sense, Debord’s ‘pratique négative’ includes all 
forms of riot, strike and occupation which disturb and interrupt the ‘business as usual’ of the status 
quo, the faithful reproduction of the norms and enaction of prescriptive social roles and capitalist 
valorisation.   
The Situationists’ preferred designation for May, ‘le mouvement des occupations’, links what 
McKenzie Wark, in some reflections on 2010’s Occupy Wall Street movement, notes are two 
conceptual opposites: a movement seeks some measure of coherence in meaning and purpose to 
animate those who belong or might soon belong to it, whilst an occupation selects a space and resides 
in it.  Often, this entails the interruption of the usual activities undertaken in that space, as with 
campus occupations of university buildings or the factory occupations of May, but, as in the case of 
Occupy Wall Street, this can just as easily be the occupation of a public space.  Wark notes that 
Occupy Wall Street didn’t take place on Wall Street itself, but in Zucotti Park, a few blocks over.  The 
police would doubtless not have permitted such disruptive action on Wall Street, not that they were 
particularly enamoured of protesters gathering in a public park, in any case.  In a brief book chapter 
entitled ‘How to Occupy an Abstraction’, Wark puts forward his interpretation of Occupy as both the 
occupation of a public space as well as of an abstract terrain: the idea of ‘Wall Street’, as the 
encapsulation of the power of finance capital, a synecdoche for power in general.  This second, 
‘abstract occupation’, however, lends itself more to the category of movement: a question is addressed 
to those not in the space occupied, in this case, a question of how the world is run and how it could be 
run.  The question was, of course, essentially the same one during May, and when the Situationists 
refer to the ‘mouvement des occupations’, what is clear is that they are describing the contagion, the 
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feverish excitement which spread first throughout Paris then throughout other parts of France, in 
factories, public offices, universities.  The Occupy movement famously presented no demands, there 
was a declaration, but no stated requirements to bring an end to their civil disobedience; by contrast, 
the Situationists sought, after May particularly, to present their theorisation of what would come after 
the initial strikes and occupations, the moments of negativity which cause rupture in the status quo.     
Vaneigem’s article in the final journal issue, ‘Avis aux civilisés relativement à l’autogestion 
généralisée’ takes its title from a text by Charles Fourier entitled ‘Avis aux civilisés relativement à la 
prochaine métamorphose sociale’, the détournement clearly signifying the attempt to formulate a 
program for what comes after revolutionary upheaval.  The article begins by invoking David Lloyd-
George’s demand of political dissidents, to those who would abolish social structures, he asks, with 
what would they replace them?  This question of ‘what next’ (Vaneigem’s article deals with the 
workers’ councils and the notion of generalised self-management) is not just one the more utopian, 
idealistic Vaneigem sought to answer, but so too Debord, who writes of a ‘third stage’ in the history 
of the S.I. — after the ‘supersession of art’ (1957-62), and the subsequent period of underground 
agitation and fomentation of revolt — in ‘La question de l’organisation pour l’I.S.’, a text also 
published in the final issue of the journal but written in April of ’68, before the ‘events’: ‘L’I.S. doit 
maintenant prouver son efficacité dans un stade ultérieur de l’activité révolutionnaire — ou bien 
disparaître.’86  Debord’s text predictably deals more with the methodology involved in some recent 
exclusions than attempting to provide a politically coherent vision to affirm and around which to rally, 
as does Vaneigem’s, though attaining a new coherence of the movement is given as one of the 
concerns of this ‘third stage’.   
What is significant about Debord’s periodisation and desire to usher in a new phase of activity 
is the assertion that this question of ‘what next’ is one to which a response must be given.  In the final 
issue of the journal, and in this third phase, the Situationists convinced themselves that it was now 
necessary to posit an affirmative vision of the future of a post-revolutionary society, whereas the 
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earlier calls to the workers’ council served a rhetorical aim of furnishing their theory of negativity and 
revolt with a seductive endgame.  The substantive shift, as opposed to yet another rhetorical one, lies 
in the fact that Debord now repeatedly threatens the group’s extinction.  As above, where Debord 
declares the S.I. must adapt to this ‘third stage’ or disappear, ‘Le Commencement…’ ends with a brief 
acknowledgment of the tension between a theory which prizes spontaneous organisation whilst 
constantly narrating the necessity of this spontaneity: 
Le ‘lever du soleil qui, dans un éclair, dessine en une fois la forme du nouveau monde’, on l’a 
vu dans ce mois de mai de France, avec les drapeaux rouges et les drapeaux noirs mêlés de la 
démocratie ouvrière.  La suite viendra partout.  Et si nous, dans une certaine mesure, sur le 
retour de ce mouvement, nous avons écrit notre nom, ce n’est pas pour en conserver quelque 
moment ou en tirer quelque autorité.  Nous sommes désormais sûrs d’un aboutissement 
satisfaisant de nos activités: l’I.S. sera dépassée.87 
Debord is quoting Hegel whilst asserting the dialectical relationship between what he calls ‘le 
mouvement réel et “sa propre théorie inconnue”’.  May is this sunrise, according to Debord, signalling 
their certainty of a revolutionary future.  Yet the eventual dissolution of the S.I., a process which took 
place over the next three years, can hardly be said to have derived from the satisfactory culmination of 
their activity, as Debord puts it here.  Indeed, that May signalled the beginning of a quite different era 
to the one Debord appears so sure is coming limits the impact of this final rhetorical flourish, 
particularly when the gesture of announcing the group’s eventual supersession in the certainty of what 
is to come constitutes a gesture of authority renounced in the preceding sentence.   
The paradox of renouncing this authority so authoritatively recalls Henri Lefebvre’s charge 
that the Situationists were absolutely dogmatic but without any stable dogma.  What Lefebvre does 
not acknowledge, in the 1983 interview with Kristin Ross, is that this precisely echoes Debord’s 
description of the spectacle: ‘Le spectacle est absolument dogmatique et en même temps ne peut 
aboutir réellement à aucun dogme solide’ (Thesis 71).88  Situationist theory presents a negative 
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response to the forms of capital’s subjectivation, in the hope of encouraging ‘la pratique negative’ 
which refuses and resists such forms, in the quest to forge new modes of subjectivation.  The frequent 
paradoxical self-contradiction of their writing reflects this negative project, which consistently 
emphasises the limits of theory and of writing alone.  As Debord states in La Société du spectacle:  
Le temps irréversible est le temps de celui qui règne; et les dynasties sont sa première mesure.  
L’écriture est son arme.  Dans l’écriture, le langage atteint sa pleine réalité indépendante de 
médiation entre les consciences.  Mais cette indépendance est identique à l’indépendance 
générale du pouvoir séparé, comme médiation qui constitue la société.  Avec l’écriture 
apparaît une conscience qui n’est plus portée et transmise dans la relation immédiate des 
vivants: une mémoire impersonnelle, qui est celle de l’administration de la société.  ‘Les écrits 
sont les pensées de l’État; les archives sa mémoire’ (Novalis).  (Thesis 131) 
Irreversible time is the opposite of what Debord calls historical time, in which man (as we have seen 
in the previous chapter, such gendering is common in the Situationists’ work) autonomously forges 
his own history.  As I have argued previously, Situationist theory, read in a manner which emphasises 
their relevance to the twenty-first century, does not comprise a teleological conception of history that 
hypostatises Hegel’s dialectic.  Rather, this conception of history is a rhetorical imposture, 
emphasising the capture of the individual’s time as both work and leisure under the spectacle and 
encouraging its rejection.  Writing cannot but function in the same way as spectacular power, what 
Situationist theory attempts is a writing which cultivates an oppositional tendency.  Writing is 
understood as the means of resistance to capital’s subjectivation.  Though this takes place in the name 
of a multiplicity of other forms of subjectivation (the sunrise which reveals the form of a new world), 
it is the same delimiting notion of the political that I discussed in Chapter Three which holds that an 
authoritative relation of the text to the reader is necessary for this negativity to be effected.  This in 
turn confines their writing to a prescriptive and restricting account of subjectivation, limiting the 
theories of spectacle and of praxis to the thought of negativity and revolt, against their apparent 
pretentions to outlining post-revolutionary forms of social organisation.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
Throughout this thesis, I have argued that interpretations of Situationist theory which insist upon its 
basis in ontological or metaphysical conceptions of ‘the human’ refuse to acknowledge the extent to 
which the work of the S.I. resists such epistemological foundationalism.  The repudiation of the term 
‘Situationnisme’ outlined in the first issue of Internationale situationniste, anticipated such an 
understanding of their writings which presumed theoretical foundations that required mere translation 
into the realm of practice.  This popular reading sees Guy Debord and the S.I. primarily as theorists of 
the mass media, who oppose the saturation of human life by images and the passivity this condition of 
spectatorship engenders.  Whilst it may be tempting to identify Debord’s theory of spectacle, and by 
extension the work of the S.I. as a whole, with the critique of what he calls the spectacle’s 
‘manifestation superficielle la plus écrasante’ (Thesis 24), I have attempted to show that considered as 
a body of work not limited to La Société du spectacle or to the concept of a ‘constructed situation’ 
that unifies art and everyday life, Situationist theory offers a more complex perspective on the 
workings of what they called the ‘économie spectaculaire-marchande’ and the possibilities of 
resistance to it than one premised on the usurpation of the human subject’s sovereign activity.   
In the first issue of the journal, the following quotation from Asger Jorn, writing in an article 
entitled ‘La lutte pour le contrôle des nouvelles techniques de conditionnement’, demonstrates from 
the inception of the group both the Situationists’ refusal of traditional concepts of ‘the human’ and the 
distinctive understanding of political activity which follows on from this refusal:  
C’est toute la conception humaniste, artistique, juridique, de la personnalité inviolable, 
inaltérable qui est condamnée.  Nous le voyons s’en aller sans déplaisir.  Mais il faut 
comprendre que nous allons assister à une course de vitesse entre les artistes libres et la 
police pour expérimenter et développer l’emploi des nouvelles techniques de 
conditionnement.  Dans cette course, la police a déjà un avantage considérable.  De son issue 
dépend pourtant l’apparition d’environnements passionnants et libérateurs, ou le renforcement 
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— scientifiquement contrôlable, sans brèche — de l’environnement du vieux monde 
d’oppression et d’horreur.1  
In Chapter One, I endeavoured to show, with reference to Debord’s deployment of Marx and Hegel, 
how the theory of spectacle incorporates the rejection of this ‘personnalité inviolable, inalterable’, in 
binding the human subject to time and history.  Subsequently, in Chapter Two, what Jorn describes as 
the ‘artistique’ and ‘juridique’ aspects of this rejection were explored as they pertain to the theory of 
détournement: they refuse the idea of the artist as creator, the moral injunction not to plagiarise and 
the legal injunction to respect intellectual property, in the name of a form of a political and aesthetic 
practice predicated on appropriation.  Jorn’s invocation of ‘artistes libres’ is indicative of the early 
Situationist project to realise art in the realm of the everyday, one which they abandoned after 1962 in 
the name of what Debord called the ‘second phase’ of the S.I.  Nevertheless, the conflict in the form 
of a ‘race’ which Jorn identifies between these free artists and the police (this latter understood as the 
representation of the status quo) bespeaks what I have identified in Chapter Three as an antagonistic 
ontology of the political which runs through Situationist theory.  Equally, this battle between the 
repressive and the revolutionary ‘usages’ of these ‘techniques de conditionnement’ implies a mastery 
of technology which I have argued is complicated elsewhere in the journal and in Debord’s La Société 
du spectacle, but maintained in the guise of a propagandistic rhetoric of progress and the inevitability 
of their assertions’ ‘truth’.  Whilst there are mentions made of ‘cinéma odorant’ and forms of ‘lavage 
de cerveau’ involving forced submission to images, there is no programmatic explanation of what use 
these free artists might make of the new techniques of conditioning.   
It is my contention that the rhetorical incorporation of a Hegelian dialectic of history-as-
progress and terms such as ‘l’homme totale’ or ‘la perte d’unité du monde’, which invite 
interpretations referring to a teleological understanding of human activity and an unalienated human 
consciousness, is excessive to the purely theoretical manner in which many seek to read their work 
and therefore what leads to the casting of Situationist theory’s foundational metaphysical 
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commitments.  I have attempted to analyse this rhetoric, alongside the quasi-utopian sketches of 
workers’ councils and a ‘future reign of freedom and play’, as a tactic inviting their reader to a 
different kind of political subjectivation.  That is, an attempt to encourage the reader to forge a 
rupture, Jorn’s ‘brèche’, in the pre-established processes of subjectivation that the spectacle permits 
— the prescriptive social roles, the forms of work, leisure, communication and the social relations 
with which they are entwined — which constitute Debord’s spectacle. 
The book which announced the dissolution of the S.I., La Véritable Scission dans 
l’internationale (1972), includes a series of sixty-one theses, entitled ‘Thèses sur l’I.S. et son temps’, 
during the course of which Debord makes rare mention of the rhetorical techniques he and the 
Situationists sought to employ:   
Une inévitable part du succès historique de l’I.S. l’entraînait à être à son tour contemplée, et 
dans une telle contemplation la critique sans concessions de tout ce qui existe en était venue à 
être appréciée positivement par un secteur toujours plus étendu de l’impuissance elle-même 
devenue pro-révolutionnaire.  La force du négatif mise en jeu contre le spectacle se 
trouvait aussi admirée servilement par des spectateurs.  La conduite passée de l’I.S. avait été 
entièrement dominée par la nécessité d’agir dans une époque qui, d’abord, ne voudrait pas en 
entendre parler.  Environnée de silence, l’I.S. n’avait aucun appui, et nombre d’éléments de 
son travail étaient, à mesure, constamment récupérés contre elle.  Il lui fallait atteindre le 
moment où elle pourrait être jugée, non ‘sur les aspects superficiellement scandaleux de 
certaines manifestations par lesquelles elle apparaît, mais sur sa vérité 
centrale essentiellement scandaleuse’ (I.S. no 11, octobre 1967).  L’affirmation tranquille de 
l’extrémisme le plus général, comme les nombreuses exclusions des situationnistes 
inefficaces ou indulgents furent les armes de l’I.S. pour ce combat; et non pour devenir une 
autorité ou un pouvoir.  Ainsi, le ton de fierté tranchante, assez employé dans quelques 
formes de l’expression situationniste, était légitime; et du fait de l’immensité de la tâche, et 
surtout parce qu’il a rempli sa fonction en permettant la poursuite et la réussite.  Mais il a 
cessé de convenir dès que l’I.S. a pu se faire reconnaître par une époque qui ne considère plus 
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du tout son projet comme une invraisemblance [‘Quand on lit ou relit les numéros de l’I.S., il 
est frappant, en effet, de constater à quel point et combien souvent ces énergumènes ont porté 
des jugements ou exposé des points de vue qui furent, ensuite, concrètement vérifiés.’ — 
Claude Roy, ‘Les desesperados de l’espoir’ (Le Nouvel Observateur, 8 février 1971).]; et 
c’est justement parce que l’I.S. avait réussi cela que ce ton était devenu, pour nous sinon pour 
les spectateurs, démodé.2 
In the wake of May and the burgeoning autonomist workers’ movements in Italy and throughout 
Europe, which he alludes to approvingly, Debord claims that this ‘ton de fierté tranchante’ is no 
longer necessary and that the S.I.’s revolutionary agenda is no longer as improbable as it was once 
considered.  This assertion comes during the course of a text replete with the same tone, notably in its 
excoriation of the ‘pro-situs’ who gathered around the Situationists after what he calls the ‘historical 
success’ of the S.I. and in the familiar self-validating course of his argument (the final thesis reads: 
‘Qui considère la vie de l’I.S. y trouve l’histoire de la révolution.  Rien n’a pu la rendre mauvaise’).3  
The description of this style as ‘démodé’ indicates once again the seductive and propagandist 
intentions of their writings, in that they clearly sought not objective theoretical exposition but a more 
affective, immediate reaction from their readers.  Similarly, the vocabulary of war and violence 
employed to justify his exclusionary practice, alongside ‘tranchante’, with its connotations of incision 
or cutting, illustrates what I described in Chapter Three as their ‘politics of the decision’: the 
necessity, first and foremost, of militating against the status quo.  This rhetorical violence forms part 
of the ‘force négative’ of Situationist writings.   
After May, Debord laments the servile admiration of the S.I.’s own ‘spectators’, who were 
attracted by the singular style of the S.I. and the notoriety they had attained, without sharing their 
revolutionary commitments.  Referring back to their own assertion of their ‘essentially 
scandalous truth’ we may observe the rhetorical role of violence as per Chapter One’s discussion of 
the skandalon: the ‘stumbling block’, an inducement to ‘sin’ — here, to transgress the prescriptive 
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3 Ibid., p.60. 
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norms of the spectacle-commodity economy — just as the ‘sabotage’ of the university which Debord 
alleges constituted the best of May’s student movement in ‘Le Commencement d’une époque’.  The 
imported quotation from Le Nouvel Observateur, which evokes both the accuracy of the S.I.’s 
pronouncements as well as their bombastic rhetoric, may have met with Debord’s approval on account 
of the particular figuration conjured: ‘énergumènes’ deriving from the Latin, referring to persons 
appearing as if possessed by a demon.  As we will see below in connection with his In girum imus 
nocte et consumimur igni, Debord was fond of cultivating a heretical mystique around the S.I., whilst 
Raoul Vaneigem would later go on to write a history of heretical movements.4  This prizing of this 
negativity, as well as the above deprecation of the ‘positive appreciation’, seems consistent with a 
thought of revolt and refusal, rather than the affirmative project of the construction of a humanistic 
political or theoretical programme.   
This prizing of negativity manifests itself in the Situationists’ rhetoric as what we might call, 
after Gilles Deleuze, a ‘return to the subject’.5  Deleuze explicitly cautions against any such a return in 
a 1990 interview with Antonio Negri, during a discussion of processes of subjectivation in what he 
names control or communication societies: ‘de tels processus ne valent que dans la mesure où, quand 
ils se font, ils échappent à la fois aux savoirs constitués et aux pouvoirs dominants.’6  Throughout the 
interview, Deleuze refers to ‘sabotage’ as a form of delinquency or resistance which resists the 
business as usual of the status quo, and, in response to Negri’s rather optimistic enquiry as to the 
technological possibilities afforded by new forms of communication in the construction of a 
communism based on the ‘transversal organisation of free individuals’, Deleuze further elaborates on 
how this escape from established forms of power and knowledge could take place:  
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Peut-être la parole, la communication est-elle pourrie.  Elles sont entièrement pénétrées par 
l’argent: non par accident, mais par nature.  Il faut un détournement de la parole.  Créer a 
toujours été autre chose que communiquer.  L’important, ce sera peut-être de créer des 
vacuoles de non-communication, des interrupteurs, pour échapper au contrôle.7   
Deleuze states that even if these processes of subjectivation which forge this ‘vacuoles de non-
communication’ eventually institute new forms of power and knowledge, they nevertheless comprise 
a ‘spontanéité rebelle’ in the moment of their creation.  It is at this point that Deleuze rejects any such 
‘return’ to a notion of the individual as sovereign actor: ‘Il n’y a là nul retour au “sujet”, c’est-à-dire à 
une instance douée de devoirs, de pouvoir et de savoir.’8  I have attempted to show how the 
Situationists anticipate Deleuze’s concerns in resisting the dominant structures of power by sabotage 
and in their reiterated suspicion of writing, film-making and communication in the form of a 
‘communication contenant sa propre critique’, just as Deleuze echoes the Situationists in evoking the 
notion of a ‘détournement de la parole’.  However, the Situationists enact this ‘return’ in conceiving 
of writing and film-making as a stimulus to the negative formation of alternative subjectivities.  
Debord does not go down the Deleuzian path of refusing the egoic, or the heroic, as I have attempted 
to show in Chapter Two’s discussion of the simultaneous process of identification and distanciation at 
work in Debord’s films.  On the contrary: for Debord, this is the model of political subjectivation by 
means of ideological contestation, presenting the critique of the spectacle’s production of subjectivity 
by seeking a subjectivation of their own, a contestatory, negative one.  The utopian figurations of 
post-revolutionary organisation offer a rhetorical justification for this tactic of political subjectivation, 
agitating for the creation of a ‘brèche’ (or ‘vacuoles’ in Deleuze’s terms) from which opposition can 
begin.  Such varied notions of what another world could look like stand in for the refusal to accept the 
business as usual of the status quo.   
In Debord’s 1978 film In girum imus nocte et consumimur igni, he offers a precis of such a 
project: ‘notre intention n’avait été rien d’autre que de faire apparaître dans la pratique une ligne de 
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partage entre ceux qui veulent encore de ce qui existe, et ceux qui n’en voudront plus.’9  As I have 
shown in Chapter Three, an ‘ethical commitment’ to oppose the machinations of spectacle, though not 
depending on any metaphysical conception of the human, but on resistance and refusal of hierarchical 
power, requires this ‘politics of the decision’: a Manichean choice between acquiescence and 
opposition.  Where Henri Lefebvre accuses Debord of imitating André Breton10 in his proclivity for 
denunciation and excommunication, I would see this destructive practice (this ‘arme’, as we have seen 
Debord put it above) as derived from this delimiting conception of ‘the political’.  Whilst resolutely 
refusing to see ‘the political’ as an autonomous realm that can be divorced from writing, filmmaking 
and everyday life, and despite their professed resistance to all hierarchical power, the Situationists’ 
misogyny, as I have shown in Chapters Two and Three, reflects the automatism, or ‘undétourned 
element’ of this notion of politics conceived as a constantly antagonistic activity, as opposed to 
seeking convergence between different forms of thought and action.  In practice, these assumptions 
about the adversarial nature of political activity led to the reproduction of hierarchy within the group, 
as well as the declamatory position towards others on the left and those deemed unworthy of their 
membership of the S.I.   
 A consequence of these assumptions is the role of a certain method of myth-making which 
became integral to this project of negativity, a project described as a ‘quest’ in In girum, and which is 
cast in theological language and imagery throughout the film:  Debord describes the ‘Graal néfaste’ 
the Situationists pursued, in addition to the incorporation of Jules Berry’s devil, from Marcel Carné’s 
Les Visiteurs du soir (1942).  Berry cavorts with fire in one détourned scene, narrating his character’s 
affinity with it; Debord’s notes for the film identify fire as one of the two primary themes, 
representing ‘momentary brilliance’ and revolution, as opposed to water’s signification of the passage 
of time.11  Echoing the plot of Carné’s film, Debord describes how he and his cohort became 
emissaries of the ‘Prince de la division, de “celui à qui on a fait du tort”, et nous avons entrepris de 
                                                          
9 Guy Debord, Œuvres cinématographiques complètes, p.260.  
10 Kristen Ross, ‘Henri Lefebvre on the Situationist International’, pp.69-83.  
11 Guy Debord, ‘Notes sur In girum’ in ‘Fiches techniques’ accompanying the DVD box set of Debord’s films: 
Guy Debord, Œuvres cinématographiques complètes (Paris: Gaumont, 2005).  
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désespérer ceux qui se considéraient comme les humains’.12  This retrospective view of the work of 
the S.I. as a provocation, a nefarious samizdat designed to bring about a negative reaction against the 
status quo, reigns throughout the film: ‘C’est ainsi que nous nous sommes engagés définitivement 
dans le parti du Diable, c’est-à-dire de ce mal historique qui mène à leur destruction les conditions 
existantes; dans le “mauvais côté” qui fait l’histoire en ruinant toute satisfaction établie.’13  Referring 
to Hegel’s ‘bad side’ of history on which history progresses, it is alongside Debord’s assertions as to 
the dialectical nature of détournement, a dialectic of ‘dévalorisation/révalorisation’ as we have seen in 
Chapter Two, that we can understand the simultaneous rejection of the human subject, and its 
subsequent ‘return’ in the form of this propagandistic rhetoric.   
Kristin Ross, in her book on the Paris Commune and its intellectual legacy, describes how 
Marx, ‘after 1871 distances himself from a revolutionary perspective that depends on capitalist 
“progress”, whether technical or socio-structural.’14  Ross quotes a letter Marx sent to the Russian 
writer and revolutionary Vera Zasulich: 
But, he [Marx] adds, ‘Everything depends on the historical context in which it is located.’  At 
this level, he concludes, ‘it is a question no longer of a problem to be solved, but simply of an 
enemy to be beaten.  Thus it is no longer a theoretical problem … it is quite simply an enemy 
to be beaten.’15  
Ross argues that this distinguishes between two forms of dialectic: an ‘either-or’ dialectic, and a 
Hegelian transcendental one.  Marx breaks with the latter, a teleology of historical progress, in favour 
of the former, conceiving struggle of the proletariat as this conflict with the bourgeois ‘enemy’.  In the 
work of the Situationists, both of these forms could be said to be at play, whilst I argue that despite 
pronouncements indicating otherwise, their theory performs a similar break to the one Ross alleges 
Marx makes. However, this transcendental dialectic is maintained in the course of the ‘either-or’ one: 
the rhetorical evocation of historical progress is a tactic in the service of defeating this ‘enemy’, in the 
                                                          
12 Debord, Œuvres cinématographiques complètes, p.255. 
13 Ibid., p.253.   
14 Kristin Ross, Communal Luxury (London: Verso, 2015), pp.88-89. 
15 Ibid., pp.83-84 
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form of a self-mythologising project dedicated to the destruction of ‘toute satisfaction établie’.  The 
notion, taken from Hegel, of ‘man being one with time’ is inflected in their writings by the 
propagandistic mode inciting this conflict with the established order.   
The role of the concept of dialectics in the work of the Situationists is one worthy of further 
consideration, and has not been the central focus of this thesis, but I would argue that hypostasising 
any kind of concept of the dialectic would be misleading in this case.16  As Theodor Adorno argues in 
his creation of ‘negative dialectics’: 
The name of dialectics says no more, to begin with, than that objects do not go into their 
concepts without leaving a remainder, that they come to contradict the traditional norm of 
adequacy.  Contradiction is not what Hegel’s absolute idealism was bound to transfigure it 
into: it is not of the essence in a Heraclitean sense.  It indicates the untruth of identity, the fact 
that the concept does not exhaust the thing conceived.17 
The same could perhaps be said of the notion of the dialectic itself, the apparently uncritical 
incorporation of the concept in so much of the S.I.’s work indicates an area in which the tension 
between theory and rhetoric is at play.  The Situationist predilection for definition and redefinition — 
manifest in the first journal issue’s list of ‘definitions’, the stated (but never completed) project of a 
‘Situationist dictionary’ announced in the subtitle of Mustapha Kayati’s article ‘Les mots captifs’, as 
well as their repeated contrasting of what ‘art’ or ‘the cinema’ currently were and what they could be 
— suggests a resistance to any kind of steadfast conceptualisation of any such theoretical notion.  As 
Khayati’s article states, ‘Or rien n’est manifestement plus soumis à la dialectique que le langage,’ 
where language itself is ‘la demeure du pouvoir, le refuge de sa violence policière.’  Once again, this 
invocation of the policing function of language indicates an understanding of the police which seems 
close to Rancière’s understanding of the police order, as well as Deleuze’s notion of communication 
                                                          
16 See Bunyard, ‘A Genealogy and Critique of Guy Debord’s Theory of Spectacle’.  
17 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics (London: Routledge, 1973), p.5. 
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as a function of control societies, and for the Situationists signifies the conformism of everyday life 
unless spectacular forms of language and activity are self-consciously resisted.    
By contrast with this policing violence, the Situationists’ negative project takes the form of 
‘un langage autre’,18 which functions as both theoretical and rhetorical justification of their 
oppositional posturing.  Clearly, for Debord and the Situationists, the realm of writing is still a 
political form, and despite their awareness of the limitations of particular written or filmic 
interventions, they wrote and made films in any case.  I have endeavoured to show that the 
Situationists understand all forms of power, knowledge, and language as deeply interwoven and 
constitutive of one another; that this is simplified into an antagonistic political relation in their rhetoric 
is indicative of the contestatory, oppositional, negative ‘force’ they saw their work as effecting, which 
takes place in and against this language, by means of what they called an ‘insoumission des mots’.19   
The inextricability of the theoretical and rhetorical is in evidence in an apparently open-ended 
notion of the dialectic.  Khayati’s article states that: ‘Toutefois nous savons d’avance que ces mêmes 
raisons ne nous permettent en rien de prétendre à une certitude légiférée définitivement; une définition 
est toujours ouverte, jamais définitive; les nôtres valent historiquement, pour une période donnée, liée 
à une praxis historique précise.’  This conviction stands for their organisational activity as a group just 
as much as their attempts to define and elaborate certain concepts.  In the twelfth and final issue of 
International situationniste, a short article, ‘Qu’est ce qu’un situationniste’ states that what was most 
necessary to be considered ‘a Situationist’ was to ‘nous oublier un peu’; to forget the Situationists 
themselves.20  Debord repeats this same sentiment throughout In girum, stating that ‘les avant-gardes 
n’ont qu’un temps’,21 just as ‘les théories sont faites pour mourir dans la guerre du temps’.22  A 
similar notion of forgetting, pointing to the historical finitude of the S.I., ends Debord’s theses on the 
                                                          
18 All quotations from Mustapha Khayati, ‘Les Mots captifs: préface à un dictionnaire situationniste’, 
Internationale situationniste, 10 (1966), 50-55 (p. 50).  The exposition of language as this policing violence 
continues: ‘Tout dialogue avec le pouvoir est violence, subie ou provoquée.  Quand le pouvoir économise 
l’usage de ses armes, c’est au langage qu’il confie le soin de garder l’ordre opprimant.’ 
19 Ibid., p.51. 
20 ‘Qu’est-ce qu’un situationniste’, p.85. 
21 Debord, Œuvres cinématographiques complètes, p.266. 
22 Ibid., p.219.  
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S.I. and its time: ‘Que l’on cesse de nous admirer comme si nous pouvions être supérieurs à notre 
temps; et que l’époque se terrifie elle-même en s’admirant pour ce qu’elle est.’23  In all of these 
invitations to forget, apparent acknowledgements of the limitations of a particular historical project 
bound to its time, there is a simultaneous gesture of theoretical authority being taken up: Khayati’s 
‘nous savons...’ indicates how this apparent self-deprecation involves the assumption of an all-
knowing position outside of the processes of history.  As we are entreated to forget, we are 
nevertheless reminded of the fact that it is they themselves who demand this forgetting.  Nietzsche is 
the figure best known for this kind of active forgetting, and in his memoir Ecce Homo, he quotes his 
own Thus Spoke Zarathustra in a formulation which neatly encapsulates my reading of the 
Situationists’ attempts at disavowing their own authority:  
So is Zarathustra not a seducer? 
But what does he himself say when for the first time he again returns to his solitude?  Exactly 
the opposite of what any ‘sage’, ‘saint’, ‘world savior’ and other décadent would say in such a 
case...  He not only speaks differently, he is different too...  
Now I go alone, my disciples!  You too go away now and alone!  So I will it!  Go 
away from me and protect yourselves against Zarathustra!  And better yet: be 
ashamed of him!  Perhaps he has deceived you.  The man of knowledge must not only 
love his enemies, he must also be able to hate his friends.  One repays a tender 
teacher badly if one always remains a pupil.  And why do you refuse to pluck at my 
wreath?  You revere me: but what if one day your reverence comes tumbling down?  
Beware lest a statue slay you!  You say you believe in Zarathustra?  But what does 
Zarathustra matter?  You are my believers: but what do all believers matter?  You had 
not yet sought yourselves: then you found me.  Thus do all believers; therefore all 
                                                          
23 Debord and Sanguinetti, La Véritable scission, p.22.  
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belief means so little.  Now I bid you lose me and find yourselves; and only when you 
have all denied me will I return to you...24 
That this passage immediately precedes a section entitled ‘Why I am so Wise’ is no accident, the 
entreaty to forget is at once the gesture of theoretical authority par excellence.  Considered in a 
theoretical manner, we understand this forgetting as a testimony to the dialectical inescapability of 
negation and supersession of concepts, theories and political movements.  Considered as a rhetorical 
ploy, this same approach testifies to the inescapable logic of the theory itself.  As such, it is as much 
difficult as purposeless to attempt to discern where the theory ends and the rhetoric begins and vice 
versa: in the work of the Situationists, the rhetorical bombast was performative of the theoretical 
conviction that their work should seek to encourage a revolutionary prise de conscience.    
In In girum, Debord suggests the partial success of their search for their ‘Graal néfaste’ owed 
to their status as, ‘possesseurs d’un bien étrange pouvoir de séduction’25 which led those with whom 
they came into contact to want to follow them.  I have attempted to show that the fact that this 
seduction was understood as a necessary step in what we might call, after Deleuze, ‘le devenir 
révolutionnaire’ reveals, on the one hand, a rejection of humanistic notions in its implication of the 
processes by which the spectacle-commodity economy engenders its own forms of subjectivation.   
On the other hand, this notion equally implies a form of revolutionary ethics which is at least 
as delimiting and prescriptive as it is liberatory, based on the uncritical inheritance of an 
understanding of political action located in a particular time, and resulted in a destructive practice of 
excommunication, denunciation and the group’s eventual dissolution.  As a result, the dissolution 
should not be understood as the revolutionary gesture which Debord thought it was.  That the 
Situationists signposted their own limitations in relation to their times and demanded that they were 
forgotten is no reason to endorse their work uncritically, but invites their work to be subjected to 
future détournement.  
                                                          
24 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, trans. by Thomas Wayne (New York: Algora Publishing, 2004), p.10. 
25 Debord, Œuvres cinématographiques complètes, p.252. 
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The decades following May’68 failed to provide Debord’s predicted new contestatory era but 
the Situationists’ analysis of the workers’ and students’ movements present some convergences with 
Lazzarato’s attempts to theorise the present moment.  What the Situationists’ particular brand of 
revolutionary theory emphasised was the immediacy of revolt and the importance of protest in 
positing the possibility of ‘another world’.  Their ‘future reign of freedom and play’ was not, 
however, a Romantic vision of universal harmony and reconciled lost unity; though they employed 
considerable rhetorical recourse to comparable notions, their theorisations of the spectacle, of 
détournement and of communication demonstrate how they rejected all such foundationalism in 
favour of an analytical, strategic engagement with politics and everyday life.    
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